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Abstract 
 
 
Jaegwon Kim (1998a, 2005) claims that his exclusion problem follows a 
priori for the non-reductive physicalist given her commitment to five apparently 
inconsistent theses: mental causation, non-identity, supervenience, causal closure 
and non-overdetermination. For Kim, the combination of these theses entails that 
mental properties are a priori excluded as causes, forcing the non-reductive 
physicalist to accept either epiphenomenalism, or some form of reduction. In this 
thesis, I  argue  that  Kim’s  exclusion  problem depends on a particular conception 
of causation, namely sufficient production, and that when causation is understood 
in interventionist terms, the non-reductive physicalist can avoid the exclusion 
problem. I argue that   Woodward’s   (2003,   2008a,   2011a) version of 
interventionism not only provides an account of mental causation that avoids the 
exclusion problem, but argue that it also upholds all of the minimal commitments 
of non-reductive physicalism, thereby providing a successful non-reductive 
physicalist solution to the exclusion problem.  
In Chapter 2, I argue that all five theses are minimal commitments of 
non-reductive physicalism that cannot be rejected in order to avoid the exclusion 
problem. Chapter 3 identifies the assumptions that I take to underlie the 
exclusion problem. Chapter 4 introduces and outlines the central features of 
Woodward’s   (2003)   interventionism   and Chapter 5 argues that Woodward’s  
interventionist account of mental causation provides a solution to the exclusion 
problem. I examine two alternative interventionist accounts of mental causation1 
that fail to provide satisfactory solutions to the exclusion problem and conclude 
that   Woodward’s   account   therefore   provides   the   only satisfactory account of 
mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem. Chapter 6 addresses 
some challenges proposed by Michael Baumgartner (2009, 2010) and argues that 
the interventionist is able to defend her position against these objections and 
uphold the interventionist solution to the exclusion problem outlined in this 
thesis.  
                                                 
1 Proposed by List and Menzies (2009) and Campbell (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010).  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Since  Descartes  and  the  emergence  of  the  modern  ‘mind-body’  problem,  
questions surrounding the causal role of the mental have been commonplace in 
the philosophical literature. The problem of mental causation for Descartes is 
well known: if the mental and the physical are distinct substances, where the 
former is immaterial and un-extended and the latter is material and spatially 
extended, how is causal interaction between such distinct substances possible? It 
is widely accepted that the thesis of causal closure - the thesis that every physical 
effect has a sufficient physical cause - makes Cartesian dualism an untenable 
thesis. However, as we will see, the problem of mental causation did not 
disappear with dualism, but rather, a new set of problems emerged that are still 
widely debated today.  
With the thesis of causal closure accepted as part of common scientific 
understanding by the middle of the twentieth century, physicalism - the view that 
there are no non-physical entities or substances and that everything1 is either 
                                                 
1 In Chapter 2, I add a caveat to this definition of physicalism, since as Papineau (2001) points 
out, the formulation of physicalism that follows from the thesis of causal closure does not 
necessarily entail the view that everything is physical, but need only entail the view that 
everything that has a physical effect must be identified with, or supervene on the physical. This is 
because the thesis of causal closure states that every physical effect has a physical cause and 
hence leaves open the possibility that there may be non-physical properties, such as mathematical 
properties, so long as those properties do not have any physical effects. 
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physical, or else is dependent upon the physical - became the received view2. It 
was the work of those such as Place (1956), Feigl (1958), Smart (1959), Putnam 
(1960), Davidson (1963), Lewis (1966) and Armstrong (1968) (Papineau, 2001) 
that contributed to physicalism becoming the near orthodox position in 
philosophy that it is today.  
According to Papineau (Ibid), this emergence of physicalism in the 
1950’s  and  1960’s  can  be  attributed   to   the  fact   that   the   thesis of causal closure 
became available as a key premise in the arguments for physicalism at that time. 
Although there are different formulations of physicalism that follow from the 
thesis of causal closure, each of which have different implications for mental 
causation, I focus on the theory of physicalism as it follows from the Causal 
Argument, advocated, for instance, by Papineau (2004). Moreover, following 
recent discussion on mental causation, I refer, for the most part, to causation as 
between properties, or more accurately, property instantiations (more on this 
below), rather than, for example, as between events or states. With this in mind, 
the Causal Argument for physicalism can be formulated as follows:  
 
1. Mental properties have physical effects.  
2. All physical effects have sufficient physical causes.   
3. The   physical   effects   of  mental   properties   aren’t   always   overdetermined  
by metaphysically distinct, sufficient causes. 
Conclusion: Mental properties are identical to, or supervene on physical 
properties.  
                                                 
2 I discuss the thesis of causal closure and its specific implications for physicalism in further 
detail in Chapter 2. 
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 As an illustration, consider a paradigmatic case of mental causation: my 
conscious desire for a cup of tea causes me to reach for the kettle. Now, 
according to causal closure, this physical effect, namely my reaching for the 
kettle, already has a sufficient physical cause, which by definition is enough to 
bring about the occurrence of the effect. If we then want to avoid the systematic 
overdetermination of physical effects (by two metaphysically distinct, sufficient 
causes) we must either identify mental causes with physical causes or accept the 
supervenience of mental causes on physical causes, hence the physicalist 
conclusion of the Causal Argument.   
Now, as it is formulated above, the Causal Argument generates two 
broadly physicalist conclusions, one being that mental properties are identical to 
physical properties and the other being that mental properties supervene3 on 
physical properties. Before exploring these two physicalist positions further, it is 
important to emphasise that what is common to all physicalist positions is their 
physicalist ontology: all physicalists hold that every concrete particular and 
entity is physical, therefore disavowing the existence of disembodied souls, 
spirits, and so on. As we shall see, the difference between these two physicalist 
positions concerns the question of whether there can be genuinely distinct, non-
physical, e.g. mental, properties.  
The first of the physicalist positions, namely reductive physicalism, holds 
that there are no distinctively mental properties. There may of course be mental 
predicates and mental levels of description, but these do not correspond to mental 
properties, but correspond instead to physical properties (Baker, 2009: 2). 
                                                 
3 I discuss the notion of supervenience below and in detail in Chapter 2.  
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According to reductive physicalists, mental property types, such as beliefs, 
intentions and desires are identical and reducible to physical property types. 
What does reduction in this context amount to? There are a variety of forms of 
reduction discussed in the literature4, but for the purposes of this thesis, we may 
simply appeal to the notion of explanatory reduction, which involves the idea 
that a set of properties, S, reduces to another set of properties, P, if S can be 
exhaustively explained in terms of P.   
We can then see that the issue of mental causation under reductive 
physicalism becomes fairly straightforward: if mental properties just are physical 
properties, then it is no wonder that they can have physical effects. However, in 
giving up on the idea that there are distinct mental properties that can have 
distinct causal roles in relation to physical effects, the reductive physicalist 
essentially gives up on mental causation; under reductive physicalism, mental 
causation just collapses into physical causation.  
For many, reductive physicalism is too strong. If reductive physicalism 
entails giving up on the idea that what we think can and does have a real and 
distinct effect in the physical world, then for many, this is so much the worse for 
reductive physicalism. The second physicalist position that can be generated 
from the Causal Argument is therefore non-reductive physicalism, which upholds 
the physicalist ontology, whilst positing the existence of distinct mental 
properties that can have distinct causal roles in the physical world.  
                                                 
4 For instance, as Daniel Stoljar (Fall 2009) points out, reduction is often taken to involve the idea 
that one theory reduces to another if it is possible to logically derive the first from the second 
with  appropriate  ‘bridge  laws’  (see,  for  example,  Nagel  (1961)).  Alternatively,  reduction  is  often  
taken  to  involve  the  idea  that  “the  properties  expressed by the predicates of (say) a psychological 
theory  are  identical  to  the  properties  expressed  by  the  predicates  of  (say)  a  neurological  theory.”  
(Stoljar, Fall 2009).  
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It was the multiple realization arguments of Putnam (1975a) in particular5 
that provided the support for non-reductive physicalism. Very roughly, these 
arguments suggest that the idea that mental property types are identical to 
physical property types is implausible, given that it seems possible for the same 
mental   property   type   to   be   ‘realized’6 by a wide variety of physical property 
types. For example, it seems possible that both a human being and an octopus 
could share the property of being in pain, while it is unlikely that the physical 
properties  that  ‘realize’  the  property  of  being  in  pain  in  those  animals  share  any  
common physical features. These arguments suggested that it is not possible to 
identify a mental property type with one physical property type and hence 
supported the existence of irreducible and hence distinct mental properties.  
However, multiple realization arguments on their own are not sufficient 
for non-reductive physicalism. This is because even if one thinks that multiple 
realization makes reductive physicalism implausible and that there are therefore 
distinct mental properties, those mental properties may simply be mere 
epiphenomena, i.e. contrary to our intuitions, mental properties do not actually 
causally influence anything. Moreover, if they are mere epiphenomena then this 
would seem to undermine the idea that they are genuinely distinct; if mental 
properties do not contribute anything new in addition to physical properties, then 
in what sense can they   be   considered   as   ‘real’, distinct properties? Central to 
non-reductive physicalism then is the idea that if mental properties are to be 
                                                 
5 The work of Fodor (1974), Nagel (1974) and Jackson (1986) was also influential in the rise of 
non-reductive physicalism.  
6 I discuss the notion of realization below.  
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considered as genuine and irreducible features of the world, they must have 
genuine and irreducible causal powers.7 As Kim puts it,  
 
“For  unless  mentality  made  causal  contributions  that  are  genuinely  novel,  
the claim that it is a distinct and irreducible phenomenon over and beyond 
physical-biological phenomena would be hollow and empty. To be real, 
Alexander has said, is to have causal powers; to be real, new, and 
irreducible, therefore, must be to have new, irreducible causal powers.”  
(Kim, 2003b: 203-204)  
 
If these distinct and irreducible properties are not identical to physical 
properties then what relationship do they bear to the physical that respects the 
physicalist ontology, whilst avoiding reduction? The answer for most non-
reductive physicalists is some form of supervenience. I examine the thesis of 
supervenience in detail in Chapter 2 and establish exactly which form of 
supervenience the non-reductive physicalist is committed to, but for now, it will 
be helpful to point out that all forms of supervenience that are consistent with 
physicalism entail the metaphysical dependence of mental properties on physical 
properties. (As it is often put, supervenience entails that there can be no 
difference at the mental level without a difference at the physical level.) 
                                                 
7 This view contrasts with that of Shapiro (2010, 2011) and Shapiro and Sober (2007), for 
example, who argue that mental properties can be considered as real and irreducible causes of 
physical effects, in addition to their physical realizers, even though it turns out that on their 
account of causation, the causal powers of mental properties are identical and hence reducible to 
those of their physical realizers. I will not provide an independent argument for it here, but it is a 
plausible assumption that in order for mental properties to be considered as real and irreducible 
features of the world, they must have real and irreducible causal powers. Given that Shapiro and 
Sober accept that the causal powers of mental properties are identical to those of their physical 
realizers, it is therefore fair to assume that their account of causation would fail to provide a 
genuine non-reductive physicalist solution to the exclusion problem. I will return to these issues 
later in the thesis (especially in Chapters 5 and 6).     
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In virtue of what does the supervenience relationship hold? The idea that 
mental   properties   are   ‘realized’   by   physical   properties   is   an   idea   that   gained  
popularity  with  the  multiple  realization  arguments  of   the  1960’s,  but  what  does  
realization  entail?  For  now,  we  can  simply  think  of  ‘realization’  as  synonymous  
with  ‘instantiated’,  or  ‘implemented’  (Kim,  2003b: 194) and on this reading, it is 
plausible to assume that physical realization entails supervenience (Ibid: 195). 
The   specific   nature   of   this   ‘instantiation’,   in   particular,   the   modal   force   with  
which it holds, will become clearer when we look at supervenience in more detail 
in Chapter 2, but for now, we can appeal to the idea that mental properties 
supervene on and are realized by physical properties in the sense described 
above.8 Thus, supervenience (and realization) allow the non-reductive physicalist 
to uphold the physicalist ontology, whilst making room for irreducible and 
distinct mental properties. Kim sums up these physicalist commitments in the 
following passage:   
 
“Stated  as  a  thesis  about  properties,  physical  primacy  in  this  sense  comes  
to this: all mental properties are instantiated in physical particulars. Thus, 
although there can be, and presumably are, objects and events that have 
only physical properties, there can be none that have only mental 
properties alone; mentality must be instantiated   in   physical   systems.”  
(Ibid: 193) 
 
                                                 
8 Although it was the theory of functionalism that first emerged from the multiple realization 
arguments against reduction, it need not be assumed that all non-reductive physicalists who 
endorse supervenience and multiple realization are thereby committed to functionalism. The 
discussion  in  this  thesis  is  neutral  as  to  whether  mental  properties  are  purely  ‘functional’  
properties.   
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What then are the key commitments of non-reductive physicalism? As I 
discuss in Chapter 2, non-reductive physicalists can be defined as minimally 
committed to the following five theses:   
 
1. Mental causation, the thesis that mental properties have physical effects.   
2. Non-identity, the thesis that mental properties are not identical to physical 
properties.   
3. Supervenience, the thesis that mental properties supervene on physical 
properties.   
4. Causal closure, the thesis that every physical effect has a sufficient 
physical cause.  
5. Non-overdetermination, the thesis that the effects of mental causes are 
not systematically overdetermined by two metaphysically distinct, 
sufficient causes.   
 
I will not discuss the thesis of non-overdetermination in detail until 
Chapter 3, but for now, it is worth pointing out why overdetermination would not 
be a plausible model for mental causation. Consider a classic case of 
overdetermination: two riflemen each shoot a victim simultaneously, causing his 
death. In this case, the effect, (namely the death of the victim), would still have 
occurred if the first rifleman had failed to fire and vice versa for the second 
rifleman. Although possible, it seems that such cases of overdetermination would 
be extremely rare. The idea then that the physical effects of mental causes are 
routinely  overdetermined  in  this  way,  i.e.  frequently  caused  ‘twice  over’  by  two  
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metaphysically distinct causes, each of which is sufficient for its occurrence, 
seems highly unlikely and implausible.  
 
1.1.1 The Current Problem 
 
As a theory that is physicalist in its ontology, whilst positing the 
existence of irreducible and distinct mental properties, thereby making room for 
the possibility of mental causation, non-reductive physicalism is the favoured 
view among physicalists today. Ironically though, it is out of non-reductive 
physicalism that the current problem concerning mental causation emerged. This 
is the exclusion problem, advocated most widely by Jaegwon Kim (1998a, 2005).  
So, what exactly is the exclusion problem?   
As an illustration, consider again the apparently paradigmatic example of 
mental causation introduced above: my conscious desire for a cup of tea causes a 
physical effect, namely my reaching for the kettle. Now, the problem according 
to Kim is that the thesis of causal closure states that this physical effect already 
has a sufficient physical cause. Moreover, supervenience states that the supposed 
mental cause of this effect necessarily supervenes on this physical cause. Given 
thesis 2, the thesis of non-identity, it seems that we are left with two causes (one 
mental and one physical) of the same physical effect. Then, in order to avoid 
overdetermination, (thesis 5), we would be forced to exclude one of the causes 
and according to Kim we are a priori9 forced to exclude the mental cause, since 
the physical cause must be preserved in order to uphold causal closure. For Kim, 
it follows that the non-reductive physicalist must accept either 
                                                 
9 A priori in the sense that it follows from theses 1-5, rather than, say, because the thesis of causal 
closure is an a priori thesis, which I deny in Chapter 2.  
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epiphenomenalism or reductionism and since Kim claims that the latter is more 
plausible than the former, the non-reductive physicalist is apparently forced to 
accept some form of reduction.  
If it is correct, the exclusion problem does not therefore just render 
mental causation and non-reductive physicalism incompatible, but it also 
provides an argument against non-reductive physicalism itself. As Kim writes, 
“Non-reductive physicalism, like Cartesianism, founders on the rocks of mental 
causation.”   (Kim,   2003b:   193).   Moreover,   this   conclusion   is   thought   to   be   so  
forceful because it is thought to follow a priori from the minimal commitments 
of non-reductive physicalism.  Since I argue that all of these theses are in fact 
minimal commitments, what solution is available to the non-reductive 
physicalist?  
Before answering this, let us consider why it is important to find a 
solution to this problem. Note that what is at stake in the exclusion problem is the 
idea that our mental states, such as our intentions, beliefs and desires, in virtue of 
their mental properties, have real effects in the physical world. Without this idea, 
concepts such as free will, autonomy and moral responsibility would seem empty 
of content (if what we think and choose does not, after all, have a real effect in 
the world, then in what sense can we be held responsible for the actions that we 
perform?). Moreover, mental causation forms an intrinsic part of our concept of 
rational agency. Given the strong reasons that we have for being physicalists and 
for holding onto mental causation, providing a coherent, non-reductive 
physicalist account of mental causation that avoids the threat of 
epiphenomenalism, or reduction, is therefore an important task to undertake and 
has implications beyond the scope of philosophy of mind.  
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1.1.2 Aim of Thesis  
 
In this thesis, I aim to provide a non-reductive physicalist solution to the 
exclusion  problem.  I  argue  that  Kim’s  exclusion  problem  depends on a particular 
conception of causation as sufficient production10 and that when causation is 
understood in interventionist terms, the exclusion problem can be avoided. After 
identifying the assumptions that I take to underlie the exclusion problem, I argue 
that   Woodward’s   (2003,   2008a,   2011a)   version of interventionism not only 
provides an account of mental causation that avoids the exclusion problem, but 
argue that it also upholds all of the minimal commitments of non-reductive 
physicalism, thereby providing a successful non-reductive physicalist solution to 
the exclusion problem. An important theme of this thesis is therefore providing a 
solution to the exclusion problem that is genuinely physicalist. Moreover, I argue 
that other attempts to solve the exclusion problem that also appeal to broadly 
interventionist theories of causation, such as those proposed by List and Menzies 
(2009) and Campbell (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010) fail to provide satisfactory 
solutions to the exclusion problem, since these theories introduce a problematic 
kind of anti-realism into their theories. I   conclude   that   Woodward’s  
interventionist account of mental causation therefore provides the only 
satisfactory non-reductive physicalist account of mental causation and solution to 
the exclusion problem. 
In order to support this hypothesis, I will need to establish what the 
minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism are and what their 
implications are for the status of mental causation and the exclusion problem. I 
                                                 
10 I examine this concept of causation in detail in Chapter 3.  
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will need to identify the assumptions that underlie the exclusion problem and 
demonstrate how they contribute to this problem. I will also need to present a 
convincing argument to undermine these assumptions. Finally, I will need to 
demonstrate that interventionism provides an account of mental causation that 
not only avoids the exclusion problem, but also upholds all of the minimal 
commitments of non-reductive physicalism and address any objections that arise 
for this theory. 
 
1.1.2.1 Why Interventionism?  
 
Before moving on to present the outline of this thesis, it will be helpful to 
make clear why it is that I appeal specifically to the theory of interventionism to 
provide a solution to the exclusion problem. I examine the theory of 
interventionism in detail in Chapter 4, but for now it will be helpful to make the 
following points.11 Firstly, note that when I refer to interventionism throughout 
this thesis, unless otherwise stated, I refer to the specific version of 
interventionism proposed by James Woodward in his (2003)12. According to 
Woodward, the distinguishing feature of all causal relationships is that they are 
potentially exploitable for the purposes of control and manipulation. Very 
roughly, in order for X to cause Y it is necessary and sufficient that there is some 
intervention on X that changes Y. As Woodward puts it13,  “(M)  X causes Y if and 
                                                 
11 It is important to be clear that in discussing interventionism, my aim in this thesis is not to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of causation itself (any such analysis would be well beyond the 
scope of this thesis), but rather, in appealing to interventionism I hope to shed light on the 
exclusion problem and demonstrate that it provides a successful non-reductive physicalist 
solution to this problem. 
12 In Chapter 6, I appeal to a slightly modified version of interventionism, presented in 
Woodward (2011a).  
13 Woodward  designates  this  definition  with  the  letter  ‘M’  to  capture the idea that interventionism 
is a manipulationist theory of causation. 
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only if there are background circumstances B such that if some (single) 
intervention that changes the value of X (and no other variable) were to occur in 
B, then Y would  change.”  (Woodward,  2008a:  222)   
Why do I appeal to this theory of causation? Firstly, and perhaps most 
importantly, I demonstrate that interventionism is able to uphold all of the 
minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism and therefore provide a 
viable non-reductive physicalist account of mental causation and solution to the 
exclusion problem. Secondly, I demonstrate that Woodward’s  specific version of 
interventionism is the only version of interventionism that provides a satisfactory 
solution to the exclusion problem, since it is the only interventionist account that 
is able to avoid serious problems concerning realism. More generally, I appeal to 
interventionism over other counterfactual theories of causation because it 
provides the most coherent account of causation in general and is able to best 
deal with common objections raised against counterfactual theories (for example, 
the problem of overdetermination).14  
As we will see, this interventionist account of causation (and mental 
causation)  is  “metaphysically  modest”  (Woodward,  2003:  121)15, for example, in 
comparison to a conception of causation that posits the transfer of some 
                                                 
14 In  comparison  to,  for  example,  Lewis’  (1973b,  2000)  counterfactual  theory  of  causation.  There 
have been many responses in recent years (for example, Loewer (2007), Shapiro and Sober 
(2007), Yablo (1992), List and Menzies (2009), Raatikainen (2010), Campbell (2007, 2008a, 
2008b, 2010) to name but a few) that argue somewhat similarly that when causation is 
understood in counterfactual terms (or more specifically, in broadly interventionist terms), the 
exclusion problem can be blocked. I will not discuss all of these alternative theories in this thesis 
(I  do  discuss  List  and  Menzies’  (2009)  and  Campbell’s  (2007,  2008a,  2008b,  2010)  theories  in  
Chapter 5 in relation to the problem of realism), but again appeal to Woodward’s  specific  version  
of interventionism because it provides the most independently coherent account of causation and 
because these theories fail to either provide genuinely non-reductive physicalist solutions to the 
exclusion problem, or fail to provide satisfactory solutions to the exclusion problem. 
15 I explore this issue in detail throughout the thesis.  
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conserved physical quantity as a necessary condition for causation16. However, I 
will argue that this “metaphysically  modest”   (Ibid)  account is the only one we 
can give as serious physicalists,   given   that   it   is   only   by   being   “metaphysically  
modest”  (Ibid)  that  this  account  is  able  to  uphold  all  of  the  minimal commitments 
of non-reductive physicalism. For example, I demonstrate that interventionism 
provides an account of causation by which supervenient mental properties can 
count as genuine causes, in addition to their physical realizers. I show that this 
account respects the theses of causal closure and non-overdetermination by 
guaranteeing that mental properties cannot contribute to or interact with the 
sufficient physical causes of physical effects, or qualify as metaphysically 
distinct productive causes of those effects. I demonstrate that this account also 
upholds causal closure in the sense that it remains true that every physical effect 
has a sufficient physical cause, even when causation is understood in 
interventionist terms. And finally, I demonstrate that this account nonetheless 
upholds the theses of non-identity and mental causation, since it assigns 
genuinely distinct causal roles to mental properties, such as intentions, beliefs 
and desires.  
As I have said, although I argue that this account is the only one we can 
give, given the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism, an 
important theme of this thesis will nonetheless be to demonstrate that this 
“metaphysically   modest”   (Ibid)   account   of   mental   causation   does provide a 
satisfactory account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem.  
There is one further aspect of interventionism that is worth discussing at 
this stage and this concerns the question of what ontology interventionism 
                                                 
16 Such as the theories of Dowe (1999) and Salmon (1984).  
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operates with, or slightly differently, what the causal relata are on the 
interventionist account of causation.  
According to interventionism, the relata of causation can be best 
understood as variables that can take different values. For example, in the causal 
claim   ‘Smoking   causes   cancer’,   the cause variable   ‘smoking’  may take one of 
only   two  values,  namely   ‘smokes’/‘does  not   smoke’,  or  may   take  one  of  many  
different values, for example, ‘smokes   five   cigarettes   a   day’/‘smokes ten 
cigarettes   a   day’,  while   the   effect   variable   ‘cancer’  may   take   one of only two 
values,   namely   ‘develops   cancer’/‘does   not   develop   cancer’.  What   then   is   the  
relationship between variables and property instantiations, which as I mentioned 
above, are most commonly invoked as causal relata in the mental causation 
debate?  
As Woodward explains, we may simply understand variables as 
properties that can have more than one value. For example, the property of 
having mass may take the particular values of having a mass of 10kg, 5kg, or 2kg 
and so on, while the property of having some belief may take one of only two 
values, relating either to the presence or absence of the belief. It will therefore be 
possible to speak both in terms of causation between property instantiations 
(following Kim) and in terms of causation between variables (following 
Woodward). Variables may also represent events or states, which are also 
invoked in the mental causation debate, but for the sake of continuity, I will 
follow Kim and will refer, for the most part, to causation between property 
instantiations.  
Unlike, for example, the theories of Davidson (1967) and Hornsby (2003, 
2004), interventionism does not therefore operate with a pre-defined ontology. 
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For example, we may define an effect on one occasion as a property and on 
another occasion as a complex action or event. This will often be guided by the 
goal of the enquirer and the context of the causal claim. However, there is an 
important  sense   in  which   it  does   ‘matter’   to   interventionism  how  we  ‘pick  out’  
causes and effects. This is because according to interventionism, to the extent 
that two variables enter into exactly the same manipulability relations, or more 
specifically, the same invariance relations, (the notion of invariance will be 
explained in detail in Chapter 417) in relation to some effect, it is appropriate, in 
interventionist terms, to consider them as the same cause. By the same token, in 
so far as two variables enter into distinct manipulability relations (i.e. distinct 
levels of invariance) in relation to some effect, it is appropriate, in interventionist 
terms, to consider them as genuinely causally distinct, i.e. as causes that cannot 
be identified or reduced. These ideas will be explored throughout the thesis. 
 
1.2 Outline of Thesis 
 
The thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, I examine, in detail, the 
five minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism that apparently lead to 
the exclusion problem. After briefly outlining how the exclusion problem is 
generated from these theses, I examine the thesis of causal closure in detail and 
argue that despite facing potentially serious problems and despite having had a 
complex history, it is in fact a minimal commitment of non-reductive 
physicalism. I also examine the thesis of supervenience in order to establish 
exactly which form of supervenience the non-reductive physicalist is minimally 
                                                 
17 For the moment, it will be useful to point out that according to interventionism, invariance is 
the  ‘key  feature’  that  a  relationship  or  generalization  must  possess  if  it  is  to  qualify  as  causal. 
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committed to and examine its implications. Although I will not discuss the thesis 
of non-overdetermination until Chapter 3, assuming that the idea that the 
physical effects of mental causes are not systematically overdetermined is fairly 
plausible, I conclude that all five theses are in fact minimal commitments of non-
reductive physicalism that cannot be rejected in order to avoid the exclusion 
problem. 
Chapter 3 examines the assumptions that I take to underlie the exclusion 
problem.  I  examine  Kim’s  exclusion  argument  in  detail  and  argue  that  despite  its  
apparent inevitability, in order to generate the exclusion problem from these 
minimal commitments, Kim requires the assumption of sufficient production, i.e. 
the assumption that causation is identical to sufficient production. I demonstrate 
that when this assumption is combined with the theses of causal closure, 
supervenience and non-overdetermination, the exclusion problem becomes 
inevitable. However, I show that without this assumption, these minimal 
commitments do not a priori lead to the exclusion problem. Since I go on to 
undermine this assumption, this allows the non-reductive physicalist to put 
forward a positive account of mental causation that upholds all of the minimal 
commitments of non-reductive physicalism, whilst avoiding the a priori threat of 
causal exclusion that follows once one accepts this assumption.  
In Chapter 4, I   introduce  Woodward’s   (2003)   interventionist   theory   of  
causation. The main objectives of this chapter are as follows: 1. To present 
interventionism as a coherent theory of causation and in particular, to examine 
those features of this theory that are especially relevant to my argument in 
Chapter 5, in which I present the interventionist account of mental causation as a 
solution to the exclusion problem. 2. To present an argument that undermines the 
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assumption of sufficient production. 3. To address any potential objections to the 
theory. The goal of this chapter is therefore to be left with a coherent theory of 
causation that  can  be  used  to  provide  a  satisfactory  solution  to  Kim’s  exclusion  
problem and which undermines the assumption of sufficient production, thereby 
demonstrating that the non-reductive  physicalist  need  not  accept  Kim’s  a  priori  
exclusion problem.  
In   Chapter   5,   I   outline   Woodward’s   interventionist   account   of   mental  
causation and demonstrate that it not only avoids the exclusion problem, but also 
upholds all of the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism, thereby 
providing a successful non-reductive physicalist solution to the exclusion 
problem.  
 More specifically, I demonstrate that interventionism not only provides 
an account of mental causation by which both mental and physical properties can 
qualify as causes of the same effect, but that when causation is understood in 
interventionist terms, mental properties can actually be considered as preferable 
causes of their effects, in comparison to their subvenient physical realizers. Most 
importantly, I demonstrate that when causation is understood in interventionist 
terms, the question of mental causation becomes an entirely a posteriori, not a 
priori question. Moreover, I demonstrate that this account provides a satisfactory 
account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem and compare 
this account to two alternative manipulationist accounts of mental causation18, 
which I argue fail to provide satisfactory solutions to the exclusion problem. I 
conclude  that  Woodward’s  interventionist  account  of  mental  causation  therefore  
                                                 
18 List and Menzies (2009) and Campbell (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010). 
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provides the only satisfactory account of mental causation and solution to the 
exclusion problem. 
Chapter 6 then addresses a series of challenges proposed by Michael 
Baumgartner (2009, 2010) to the interventionist response to the exclusion 
problem. Baumgartner claims that far from securing the causal status of mental 
properties and providing a non-reductive physicalist solution to the exclusion 
problem, interventionism actually generates a new kind of exclusion problem, 
which rests on weaker premises than the original Kimian formulation of the 
problem. Moreover, Baumgartner (2010) argues that the proposed interventionist 
solution to this novel interventionist exclusion problem leads to an 
‘underdetermination’  of  mental  causation,  making  this  supposed  solution  not  fit  
for the purposes of the non-reductive physicalist.   
I begin by providing an outline and analysis of the debate between 
Baumgartner (2009) and Woodward (2011a). I demonstrate that although 
Woodward’s   solution   involves modifying the definition of interventionism 
proposed in his (2003), (which I appeal to in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis), it 
does offer  a  genuine  solution  to  Baumgartner’s  a  priori  interventionist  exclusion  
argument. In the second half of the chapter, I present my argument against 
Baumgartner’s   (2010)   underdetermination   argument. I demonstrate that by 
clarifying the metaphysical implications of interventionist mental causation and 
by clarifying the conditions under which we can acquire empirical evidence for 
mental causation, the non-reductive physicalist who hopes to use interventionism 
as   a   solution   to   the   exclusion   problem   can   avoid   Baumgartner’s  
underdetermination argument. In fact, I will demonstrate that this discussion 
actually provides further support for the “metaphysically modest”   (Woodward,  
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2003: 121) account of mental causation that I will outline in Chapter 5. I 
conclude that the interventionist is therefore able to defend her position against 
both of  Baumgartner’s  objections  and  uphold   the   interventionist   solution   to   the  
exclusion problem outlined in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 7 follows with some concluding remarks. 
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2. The Exclusion Problem and 
Non-Reductive Physicalism  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 It is claimed, most notably by Jaegwon Kim (1998a, 2005), that the 
exclusion problem arises specifically for non-reductive physicalists because of 
their commitment to the following five apparently inconsistent theses:  
 
1. Mental causation, the thesis that mental properties have physical effects.   
2. Non-identity, the thesis that mental properties are not identical to physical 
properties.   
3. Supervenience, the thesis that mental properties supervene on physical 
properties.   
4. Causal closure, the thesis that every physical effect has a sufficient 
physical cause.  
5. Non-overdetermination, the thesis that the effects of mental causes are 
not systematically overdetermined by two metaphysically distinct, 
sufficient causes.   
  
How then, according to Kim, does the exclusion problem follow from 
these five theses of non-reductive physicalism?1 In order to illustrate this, 
                                                 
1 I  examine  Kim’s  exclusion  argument  in  detail  in  Chapter  3.   
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consider again the example introduced in the previous chapter: suppose that on 
some occasion my desire for a cup of tea causes me to reach for the kettle. This 
seems to be a paradigmatic case of mental causation; my conscious desire for a 
cup of tea causes a physical effect, namely my reaching for the kettle. Now, the 
problem according to Kim is that causal closure (thesis 4) states that this physical 
effect already has a sufficient physical cause and supervenience (thesis 3) states 
that the supposed mental cause of this effect necessarily supervenes on this 
physical cause. Given thesis 2, the thesis of non-identity, it seems that we are left 
with two causes (one mental and one physical) of the same physical effect. Then, 
in order to avoid overdetermination (thesis 5), we would be forced to exclude one 
of the causes and according to Kim we are a priori forced to exclude the mental 
cause, since the physical cause must be preserved in order to uphold causal 
closure. For Kim, it follows that the non-reductive physicalist must accept either 
epiphenomenalism or reductionism and since Kim claims that the latter is more 
plausible than the former, the non-reductive physicalist is apparently forced to 
accept some form of reduction. There seems, therefore, to be a distinctive 
problem of mental causation for non-reductive physicalism. How then can the 
non-reductive physicalist avoid this problem? 
 One obvious solution would be to argue that one (or more) of the five 
theses is not actually a minimal commitment of non-reductive physicalism. 
Given that theses 1 and 2 are the theses that non-reductive physicalists are 
interested in defending, it would seem that the only option would be to reject one 
of the remaining theses, namely causal closure, supervenience or non-
overdetermination. This could, in theory, provide the non-reductive physicalist 
with a solution to the exclusion problem. For example, if we were to reject the 
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thesis of causal closure, mental properties would not necessarily stand in causal 
competition with the physical properties that realize them. Or, without the thesis 
of supervenience, we would not be forced to accept that mental causation entails 
physical causation, which appears to lead to the exclusion problem when 
combined with the other minimal commitments. 
 However, in the remainder of this chapter I argue that causal closure and 
supervenience are in fact minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism 
that cannot be rejected in order to overcome the exclusion problem. The chapter 
is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, I examine causal closure in detail and 
argue that despite facing potentially serious problems (Section 2.2.1) and despite 
having had a complex history (Section 2.2.2), it is in fact a minimal commitment 
of non-reductive physicalism (Section 2.2.2.1). In Section 2.3, I examine 
supervenience in detail and establish exactly which form of supervenience the 
non-reductive physicalist is minimally committed to. In Section 2.3.2.1, I 
examine the implications of this form of supervenience and in Section 2.3.2.2, I 
examine some problems that arise. Although I will not discuss the thesis of non-
overdetermination until the next chapter, assuming that the idea that the physical 
effects of mental causes are not systematically overdetermined is fairly plausible, 
I conclude that all five theses are in fact minimal commitments of non-reductive 
physicalism that cannot be rejected in order to avoid the exclusion problem. 
Much of the discussion in this chapter therefore provides the  ‘framework’  for  my 
arguments in subsequent chapters.   
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2.2 Commitments of Non-Reductive Physicalism: Causal Closure  
 
Before examining the thesis of causal closure in detail, it is important to 
establish exactly which formulation of causal closure we are dealing with. This is 
because, as E.J Lowe (2000) observes, there are in fact many formulations of 
causal closure that can be found in the literature, each of which is not necessarily 
equivalent to the others. For the purposes of the argument in this thesis, the 
following formulation will be sufficient:     
  
Causal Closure: every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause.2 
 
The implications of this formulation will become clearer in the sections 
below, but it essentially implies that every physical effect has a physical cause 
that is sufficient, i.e. enough to determine or explain3 its occurrence. Lowe 
provides the following definition of the notion of a ‘sufficient’  cause:  
                                                 
2 I  define  causal  closure  in  this  specific  way,  rather  than,  for  example,  as  the  thesis  that  ‘every  
physical  effect  is  sufficiently  determined  by  purely  physical  prior  occurrences’  (which, as will 
become clear, is entailed by causal closure) because Kim appeals to this formulation in his 
exclusion argument. So, although the arguments in this thesis do not depend on any particular 
formulation of causal closure, this formulation will be most useful for the purposes of my 
argument. However, it is important to emphasise that although I define causal closure in this 
specific way (as the  thesis  that  ‘every  physical  effect  has  a  sufficient  physical  cause’), it should 
not be assumed that causal closure thereby entails a particular conception of causation as 
sufficient production, or determination, since I argue (in Chapter 3) that it is precisely this 
assumption that leads Kim to generate the exclusion problem. Nevertheless, I suggest that it is 
still possible (and useful) to define causal closure in this specific way, since I demonstrate in 
Chapter 5 that it is true that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, even when 
causation is understood in interventionist terms. I argue that the crucial difference between the 
interventionist and Kim is that for the former, the fact that physical causes are, by their very 
nature, sufficient to determine the occurrence of their effects, is simply an empirical fact about 
physical causation, rather than something that constitutes their causal status. Importantly, I 
demonstrate that it is only when one makes this latter assumption that the exclusion problem 
becomes inevitable for the non-reductive physicalist. These ideas will be explored in further 
detail throughout the thesis.   
3 By explanation here I only mean that physical causes are sufficient to explain the occurrence of 
their effects (i.e. sufficient to explain what brought about, or determined those effects) rather than 
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“…I  understand  a  sufficient  physical  cause  of  a  given  event  to  be  a  non-
empty set of physical events, each of which is a cause of the given event 
and all of which jointly causally necessitate the occurrence of the given 
event.”  (Ibid: 575) 
 
 One also finds the thesis of causal closure described as the view that the 
physical  domain  is  ‘closed’  in  the  sense  that  one  never  has  to  leave  that  domain  
in order to explain any physical effect. For example, it is possible to provide a 
sufficient explanation of the movement of my arm towards the tea cup on my 
desk in purely physical terms, for example, by referring to the neuronal processes 
in my brain, the stimulation of my nerve fibres, the contraction of my muscles 
and so on. By contrast, for example, note that the economic realm is not closed, 
since there are economic effects that have non-economic causes, such as the 
effect of a natural disaster on the state of the economy. With this formulation of 
causal closure in mind, I will now examine this thesis in detail.  
 
2.2.1  What  Does  ‘Physical’  Mean?     
 
To begin, it is first necessary to address the question of exactly what is 
meant  by  the  term  ‘physical’  in  the  thesis  ‘every  physical effect has a sufficient 
physical cause’.  Now, this question needs to be addressed since some (Crane and 
                                                                                                                                    
implying that physical causes are sufficient to explain their effects in any richer sense of causal 
explanation. The relevance of this point will become clearer in the next chapter. It is also worth 
pointing out that there is on-going debate as to whether quantum indeterminacy undermines 
physical determinism (and hence undermines causal closure, as it is formulated above).  
However, Papineau (2009, especially pp. 59-60) and Lowe (2000) put forward convincing 
arguments to suggest that quantum indeterminacy would not have such an effect on the truth of 
physical determinism and causal closure. This is an interesting issue, but is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  
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Mellor, 1990) have argued that it is not actually possible to formulate a coherent 
definition of the physical on which to ground causal closure (and, as I argue, to 
consequently ground physicalism). As David Papineau concisely captures the 
problem,   “The   causal-closure thesis presupposes some prior concept of the 
physical realm. Some commentators argue that the unclarity of this concept 
empties the causal-closure thesis of content…”  (Papineau,  2009:  57) 
Now, one answer to the question of what the physical is appeals to the 
idea that we should define the physical by reference to those properties that are 
expressed by paradigmatic physical theories, such as chemistry and physiology. 
If we then define the physical by reference to the properties that are expressed by 
what is arguably the paradigm physical theory, namely physics, we seem to have 
two options. We can either define physical properties as those properties that are 
expressed by our best current theory of physics, or else we could define physical 
properties as those properties that would be expressed by an ideal or future 
physics. However, this presents us with a dilemma, which is formulated by Crane 
and Mellor (1990)4: if we define physical properties as those properties that can 
be expressed by our best current theory of physics, it implies that any properties 
that we may discover at a later time could not count as physical and also implies 
that current physics is complete and completely accurate, which most accept is 
simply not true. On the other hand, if we define physical properties as those 
properties that would be expressed by an ideal or future physics then we will not 
know what the physical is until we know which properties such a future theory 
would cover. Thus, if we try to define the physical in terms of the paradigm 
physical theory, namely physics, we have the choice of either accepting that our 
                                                 
4 Hempel (1969) presents a similar argument.  
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best current theory of physics is complete and completely accurate (which most 
accept is simply not true) or accepting that we do not know what the physical is; 
hence the dilemma.   
It seems that this dilemma would have fairly serious consequences for 
causal closure, given that this thesis makes essential reference to the notion of the 
physical. As Papineau put it, without a prior, coherent definition of the physical, 
this thesis would appear to be empty of content.  
In order to avoid this conclusion, what the physicalist will therefore need 
to prove is that they can provide a definition of the physical that can feature in 
the thesis of causal closure (and consequently ground physicalism), which does 
not appeal to the properties of either a current or future physics. What this will 
essentially involve is resisting the idea that all physical properties can be reduced 
to (i.e. explained exhaustively in terms of) the properties of physics5, an idea that 
Papineau  (2008)  calls  ‘microphysicalism’6, as opposed to physicalism. Luckily, I 
do not think that the physicalist need be committed to any such view.  
Before demonstrating this, it is worth considering where the motivation 
for microphysicalism might come from. As Papineau (Ibid) points out, the idea 
of physicalism does seem prima facie distinct from the idea of microphysicalism; 
the latter says that all properties that have physical effects are either identical to 
or supervene on the microphysical properties of physics, whilst the former says 
that all properties that have physical effects are either identical to or supervene 
                                                 
5 This follows since we need only be committed to a definition of the physical which appeals to 
physics if we think that all physical properties ultimately reduce to the properties of physics.  
6 This theory is called microphysicalism because it states that all physical properties (biological, 
chemical, etc.) are reducible to the microphysical properties of physics. Papineau (2008) presents 
a comprehensive argument against this view. However, for the purposes of my argument, the 
example presented below will be sufficient.   
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on physical properties, but leaves unspecified which kinds of physical properties 
they are. 
Nevertheless, there is something intuitively appealing about the idea that 
physics can provide a complete explanation of all physical properties, in a way 
that other physical sciences cannot. This intuition seems to be based on the fact 
that physics tells us that all matter is constituted by small particles and are 
subject to fundamental laws, which are the subject matter of physics. There is 
therefore   a   sense   in  which   physics   deals  with   the   ‘ultimate’   reality of objects, 
which in turn are the subject matter of macro-level physical sciences, such as 
physiology and biology. This appears to give physics a certain ontological 
authority over other physical sciences and may lend support to the idea that all 
physical properties ultimately reduce to the properties of physics.7 
  
2.2.1.1 An Argument Against Microphysical Reduction 
 
However, many physicalists reject the idea that all physical properties are 
reducible to the microphysical properties of physics. For example, Kim (1998a: 
85) argues that macro-level physical properties, such as the property of having a 
mass of 10kg, or the property of being a H2O molecule, have causal powers that 
do not reduce to the properties of physics.  
Is Kim right to argue that macrophysical properties are not reducible to 
the microphysical properties of physics? In order to demonstrate that Kim is 
correct, we can appeal to Putnam’s  famous  example of the square peg, captured 
in the following passage by Bill Brewer (2011):  
 
                                                 
7 Crane and Mellor (1990) put forward a similar idea.  
Chapter 2, The Exclusion Problem and Non-Reductive Physicalism   29  
 
“…compare   Putnam’s   (1978)   famous   observation   that   the   best  
explanation of the fact that a given one inch square peg passes through a 
one inch square hole and not through a one inch round hole is given by 
citing its size and shape. All other things being equal, it is precisely this 
property – one inch squareness – whose presence facilitates, and absence 
obstructs, its passage. Any proposed move in the direction of scientific-
physical explanation by appeal to lattices of elementary particles and the 
like reduces this robust modal generality. For one inch square pegs of 
quite different materials equally pass through a one inch square hole and 
not through a one inch round hole, regardless of the fact that the 
scientific-physical properties involved in explanation of their motion and 
interaction are quite different; and whatever their scientific-physical 
differences may be – within reason – appropriately sized pegs that are not 
square will not pass through a one inch square hole, and square pegs 
greater than one inch in side will not do so either. Thus, all other things 
being equal, the scientific-physical differences between pegs that do, and 
pegs that do not, pass through a one inch square hole but not through a 
one inch round hole, are explanatorily unified as those in which the peg is 
one  inch  square  versus  those  in  which  it  is  not.”  (Brewer,  2011:  78) 
 
What this example illustrates, and what Brewer captures so concisely, is 
that there are macrophysical   properties,   such   as   the   property   of   ‘one-inch 
squareness’,  which  cannot be reduced to the microphysical properties of physics. 
For example, there are certain facts about this macrophysical property, such as its 
“robust   modal   generality”   (Ibid),   which simply cannot be reduced to, or 
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explained in terms of the microphysical properties of physics, thereby 
undermining the microphysicalist thesis. This example therefore offers a solution 
to Crane  and  Mellor’s  dilemma,  since  it  illustrates that it is possible, in theory, to 
provide a definition of the physical that does not appeal to the properties of either 
current or future physics.  
 How then should we define the physical if it is not by reference to the 
properties of physics? This question needs to be addressed, since although I have 
suggested that it is possible to avoid Crane  and  Mellor’s  dilemma,  we  still  need  
to provide a positive definition of the physical if we are to avoid the charge that 
the  theses  of  causal  closure  and  physicalism  are  ‘empty’  of  content.     
 
2.2.1.2  The  ‘Object  View’   
 
One promising option is to appeal to what Daniel Stoljar (Fall 2009, 
2010)  calls  the  ‘Object  View’  of  the  physical,  which  defines  physical  properties  
as follows:   
 
“A  property  is  physical  iff:  it  either  is  the  sort  of  property  required  by  a  
complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects 
and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or 
logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete 
account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their 
constituents.”  (Stoljar,  Fall  2009) 
 
 According to this view, we should define physical properties as those 
properties that are required to provide a complete account of the intrinsic nature 
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of paradigmatic physical objects, such as tables, rocks and chairs. For example, if 
it is true that the properties of having mass and extension are properties required 
to provide a complete account of the intrinsic nature of tables and rocks, then 
these properties should be counted as physical.  
Now, the immediate appeal of this theory is that it defines physical 
properties by reference to our ordinary, common sense conception of a physical 
object and since we do seem to have a pre-theoretical understanding of what 
physical objects are, for example, they are the ordinary objects that we are 
presented with in perceptual experience8, the Object View will accord with our 
ordinary, intuitive understanding of what it is to be physical. However, two 
immediate worries arise.   
 Firstly, there is the worry that this definition is viciously circular, since it 
appeals to the properties of physical objects to define what a physical property is. 
In response, we can appeal to the following point from Stoljar. As Stoljar 
explains, this definition avoids the problem of being viciously circular since we 
are not strictly using the same definition of the physical in both cases. This is 
because although we have a clear understanding of what it is for an object to be 
physical, (physical objects are the objects that we are presented with in ordinary 
perceptual experience), we do not likewise have a clear understanding of what it 
is for a property to be physical. For example, although we can easily understand 
what it is for an object to be square (through perceptual experience), we do not 
likewise have a clear understanding of what it is for a property to be square, 
since a property is simply not the kind of thing that can be square.   Stoljar’s  
solution is to suggest that although properties are not physical in exactly the 
                                                 
8 Brewer (2011) provides a defence of this view.  
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same way that objects are, they are derivatively similar in the sense that we can 
define   a  physical   property   as  one   that   is   a   ‘distinctive’  property  of   a  paradigm  
physical object. This definition therefore avoids the problem of being viciously 
circular.   
 Secondly, there is the worry that this view could not provide us with a 
complete definition of the physical, since there are presumably intrinsic 
properties of paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic physical objects that we are not 
aware of. Moreover, without such a complete definition, it seems that we would 
once again run into the problem identified by Crane and Mellor, since one could 
argue that without a complete definition of the physical, we would not know 
what the physical is.  
 Once again, in response, I suggest that we can appeal to the following 
point from Stoljar. As Stoljar correctly observes, this objection, and the one 
noted above, would only be fatal to the Object View if we supposed that it could 
provide a complete and exhaustive definition of the physical. However, there is 
no reason to suppose that the Object View should provide such a definition. 
Instead, what Stoljar suggests we should expect from the Object View is that it 
simply provides a deeper understanding of what it is to be physical. 
 
2.2.1.3  The  ‘Via  Negativa’  View 
 
There is another way to avoid the problem that the Object View could not 
provide us with a complete definition of the physical, which is to appeal to the 
Via Negativa argument proposed by David Spurrett and David Papineau 
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(Spurrett & Papineau 1999)9. According to Spurrett and Papineau, for the 
purposes of the thesis of causal closure (and for the purpose of appealing to 
causal closure as a key premise in the argument for physicalism) it is not vital 
that we know exactly what the physical domain does include, but rather it is only 
vital that we know exactly what it will not include. More specifically, it is only 
vital that we know that the physical will be non-mental. For example, if we begin 
with  an  idea  of  what  we  mean  by  ‘mental’,  such  as  intentional or sentient, we can 
then define the physical as specifically non-intentional and non-sentient.  
This would help us to avoid the problem identified above, since although 
the Object View cannot provide a complete inventory of all physical properties, 
the Via Negativa argument claims that this is not necessary in order to provide a 
definition of the physical that can feature in the thesis of causal closure, since for 
that purpose, we only need to know that physical properties are non-mental, for 
example non-intentional, non-sentient, etc.10  
It is important to be clear that I am not suggesting that this negative 
definition could provide an exhaustive definition of the physical. Stoljar 
identifies some obvious problems that would arise from this position. Firstly, it 
would suggest that everything non-physical is mental, which is not something 
that the physicalist would want to be committed to, given that there do appear to 
be genuinely non-physical and non-mental properties, such as mathematical 
properties. Secondly, if we wanted to avoid this problem by extending the list of 
                                                 
9 Montero & Papineau (2005) put forward a similar argument.  
10 As Papineau (2001) explains, this definition of the physical is helpful for the purposes of causal 
closure since if we define physical properties as specifically non-mental, then assuming that the 
physical domain is in this specific sense complete, causal closure will be sufficient to ground 
physicalism.  As  Papineau  puts  it,  “provided  we  can  be  confident  that  the  ‘physical’  in  this  sense  
is complete, that is, that every non-mental effect is fully determined by non-mental antecedents, 
then we can conclude that all mental states must be identical with something non-mental 
(otherwise mental states couldn't have non-mental  effects).”  (Ibid:  11).     
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all things that are paradigmatically non-physical and use this list to define the 
physical, then such a list would risk being arbitrary and would not be very 
helpful in defining the physical for the purposes of causal closure.   
Instead, what I have suggested is that the Object View provides a useful 
and intuitive definition of the physical in terms of the properties that are required 
to provide a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical 
objects and that although this account may not be able to provide a complete 
inventory of all physical properties, the Via Negativa argument explains that for 
the purposes of causal closure and physicalism, it is not necessary that we know 
exactly what the physical domain does include, so long as we know that it will 
not include mental properties. Moreover, by defining physical properties, at least 
in part, by reference to the properties of paradigmatic physical objects, this 
definition has the benefit of being in line with our pre-theoretical, common sense 
conception of the physical, rather than claiming to somehow follow a priori from 
the theory of physics. Further still, this definition also avoids the dilemma posed 
by Crane and Mellor, since it does not refer to the properties of either a current or 
future physics to define the physical. 
 
2.2.2 Is Causal Closure True?    
 
Now, one consequence of appealing to this definition of the physical, 
which rejects the view that the physical can   be   defined   in   terms   of   a   ‘bottom  
level’   physical   theory,   such   as   physics,   which   is   closed   in   the   sense   that   it  
requires no further explanation and can explain all other physical theories, is that 
it rules out the idea that causal closure follows a priori from the very definition 
of the physical. In other words, it rules out the idea that the physical can simply 
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be  defined  as  ‘that  which  is  closed’.  However,  if  causal  closure  does  not  follow  a  
priori from the very definition of the physical, what reason do we have for 
accepting causal closure?  
In this section, I argue that despite having had a complex history, the 
thesis of causal closure is a true a posteriori thesis, supported by empirical 
discoveries in science. In order to demonstrate this, I explore the historical 
account of causal closure provided by Papineau (2001)11. Then, in Section 
2.2.2.1, I examine the implications of this thesis for non-reductive physicalism 
and argue that it is a minimal commitment of non-reductive physicalism, since it 
provides the grounds for physicalism itself. I conclude that causal closure cannot 
therefore be rejected by the non-reductive physicalist in order to avoid the 
exclusion problem, but rather that any successful non-reductive physicalist 
account of mental causation must uphold this thesis. 
It is typically thought that causal closure follows from the discovery of 
the conservation laws of physics, for example, the conservation laws of energy, 
mass and momentum. As Papineau explains, this seems to follow since these 
laws tell us that important physical quantities are conserved suggesting that the 
later states of a physical system are fully determined by prior, purely physical 
occurrences. However, as Papineau explains, not just any conservation laws will 
generate this conclusion.   
For instance, while the conservation laws of Leibniz, which replaced 
those of Descartes, guarantee causal closure, the conservation laws proposed by 
Newtonian  physics,  which  replaced  Leibniz’s  theory,  do  not. 
                                                 
11 This discussion draws heavily on the historical account provided by Papineau. See Papineau 
(2001) for further details.  
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For   example,   Descartes’   conservation   laws   specified   that   the   total  
quantity of motion must be conserved within a physical system, but not that the 
total quantity of momentum needs to be conserved, which left open the 
possibility that non-physical forces (possibly the mind) could interact with and 
alter the momentum of physical particles in the brain without violating the 
conservation of quantity of motion. 
Leibniz then replaced   Descartes’   conservation   laws   with   two   modern  
conservation laws, the conservation of linear momentum and kinetic energy. 
Now, these two modern conservation laws did guarantee the causal closure of the 
physical domain.12 This is because the first conservation law, the conservation of 
linear momentum, guaranteed the preservation of the total sum of quantity of 
motion for any given direction, which ruled out the possibility that extra mental 
forces could influence the movement of physical particles. The second 
conservation law, the conservation of kinetic energy, guaranteed that the speed 
and direction of these physical particles were fully determined after impact. Very 
roughly, these laws guaranteed causal closure since they left no room for any 
non-physical influence on the motion of matter and guaranteed that the later 
values of any physical quantity were fully determined by the earlier values of 
that physical quantity.   
However,  Newtonian  physics,  which  came   to   replace  Leibniz’s  physics,  
refuted   the   ‘mechanical   philosophy’   proposed   by   Leibniz.   Importantly,  
Newtonian physics supposed that there could be disembodied forces, such as 
friction and gravity that could exert force on a physical system without any 
                                                 
12 As Papineau notes, however, only given the standard 17th century  assumption  of  ‘no  action at a 
distance’.   
Chapter 2, The Exclusion Problem and Non-Reductive Physicalism   37  
 
impact between physical matter. Newtonian physics also allowed for the 
possibility of many other disembodied forces, such as magnetic force, chemical 
force and even vital and mental forces, which could potentially interact with and 
influence the physical domain. It seems therefore that Newtonian physics 
undermined causal closure, since it allowed for the possibility that non-physical 
(possibly mental) forces could influence the physical domain.  
Furthermore, as Papineau notes, Newtonian conservation laws did not 
help to preserve causal closure either. This is because although Newton 
formulated a conservation law of momentum, he did not formulate a 
corresponding conservation law of energy and so Newtonian conservation laws 
did not rule out the possibility that special mental forces could interact with and 
influence the states of a physical system. Since Newtonian conservation laws do 
not seem to support causal closure does this mean, contrary to popular thought, 
that causal closure is not supported by the conservation laws of physics after all? 
Not necessarily.   
This is because the conservation law of energy was finally accepted into 
Newtonian physics in the mid-19th century and this fact, together with other 
scientific discoveries of the late 18th and 19th centuries did eventually provide 
support for and lead to the acceptance of the thesis of causal closure.  
Firstly, as Papineau explains, the rational mechanics developed by 
mathematicians in the 18th and 19th centuries helped to develop the Newtonian 
conservation law of energy by providing mathematical support for the idea that 
the total sum of kinetic plus potential energy remains constant. Secondly, 
empirical discoveries in the 19th century, such as the discovery that heat is simply 
molecular motion, discovered by James Joule, suggested that different natural 
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processes, such as heat and friction, were simply manifestations of a single 
underlying quantity, which were subject to conservation laws. Thirdly, these 
discoveries lent support to the idea that apparently non-conservative, 
disembodied forces such as friction and gravity do, after all, conserve the total 
amount of kinetic and potential energy. Papineau describes these three elements 
as   distinct   ‘strands’   that   came   together   to   eventually   provide   support   for   a  
universal conservation law of energy. Finally, Papineau explains that it was the 
work of Hermann von Helmholtz that eventually led to the formulation of the 
universal conservation law of energy, which Helmholtz took to apply to all 
natural phenomena, including living systems.  
However, this was not the end of the story and certainly did not lead to 
the widespread acceptance of causal closure. This is because the conservation of 
energy  did  not  necessarily   rule  out   the  possibility   that   special  mental   or   ‘vital’  
forces could exist and influence a physical system, so long as those special forces 
were deterministic. However, it was during the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
that evidence finally became available to cast doubt on the existence of these 
special deterministic forces and to support the acceptance of causal closure. 
Papineau provides two main arguments that illustrate why vital and mental forces 
were finally refuted and why causal closure was finally accepted as a part of 
common scientific knowledge. I outline these arguments below.  
The first argument,  the  ‘Argument  from  Fundamental  Forces’,  appeals  to  
the  fact  that  many  so  called  ‘special  forces’,  such  as  friction,  turned  out  to  reduce  
to  a  ‘small  stock’  of  fundamental  forces,  which  were  subject  to  the  conservation  
of energy. Because these special forces turned out to be nothing more than 
“macroscopic   manifestations”   (Ibid:   28)   of   more   fundamental   forces,   this  
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provided inductive grounds for thinking that other supposed special forces would 
similarly turn out to reduce to a small stock of fundamental forces.  
The   second  argument,   ‘The  Argument   from  Physiology’,   appeals   to   the  
fact that as we have gained increasing knowledge of physical systems and the 
processes which operate at the most basic level of those systems, nothing like 
deterministic vital or mental forces have been discovered. Moreover, all of the 
knowledge that we have gained of the processes operating in living bodies 
suggests that they can be accounted for by appealing to ordinary physical 
processes.  
So, although it may be true that the first argument on its own, even in 
combination with the acceptance of Newtonian conservation laws, could not rule 
out the possibility of vital and mental forces, it is the addition of this second 
argument which finally provided the evidence needed to rule out the possibility 
of deterministic vital and mental forces and support causal closure. As Papineau 
puts   it,  “In  this  way,   the  argument  from  physiology  can  be  viewed  as  clinching  
the case for completeness of physics, against the background provided by the 
argument  from  fundamental  forces”  (Ibid:  31).   
What picture of the physical domain does this leave us with? It entails 
that every physical effect is sufficiently determined by purely physical prior 
occurrences, since it does not leave any room for non-physical forces to interact 
with or determine physical effects in any way. In other words, this discussion 
should have demonstrated that causal closure is true and does entail that every 
physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, i.e. a cause that is enough to 
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determine the occurrence of the effect13 and that the physical domain is in this 
specific sense closed. Thus, although causal closure has had a complex history, I 
hope to have shown that it is in fact supported by the conservation laws of 
physics, in addition to relatively recent discoveries in science.14  
   
2.2.2.1 Implications for Non-Reductive Physicalism  
   
What then are the implications of causal closure for non-reductive 
physicalism? In the following section I argue that causal closure provides the 
grounds for physicalism itself and that it is therefore a minimal commitment of 
non-reductive physicalism. In order to illustrate this, let us again consider the 
Causal Argument for physicalism that was introduced in the previous chapter:  
 
1. Mental properties have physical effects.  
2. All physical effects have sufficient physical causes.   
3. The   physical   effects   of  mental   properties   aren’t   always   overdetermined  
by metaphysically distinct, sufficient causes. 
Conclusion: Mental properties are identical to, or supervene on, physical 
properties.  
 
                                                 
13 Again, it should not be assumed that causal closure thereby entails a conception of causation as 
sufficient production, or determination. (See footnote 2 above.)  
14 As I briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, for Papineau, this progressive emergence of 
empirical support for causal closure explains the relatively recent rise of physicalism over the last 
60 years, since although Newtonian conservation laws were around in the centuries before, the 
empirical discoveries that supported the adoption of a universal conservation law of energy and 
the rejection of vital and mental forces were not available until much later. As Papineau himself 
accepts, although this by no means provides definitive proof for causal closure, or definitive 
proof for the non-existence of vital or mental forces, these discoveries do nonetheless provide 
overwhelming support for causal closure.  
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 Consider again the example in which my conscious desire for a cup of tea 
causes me to reach for the kettle. Now, according to causal closure, this physical 
effect, namely my reaching for the kettle, already has a sufficient physical cause, 
which is, by definition enough to bring about the occurrence of the effect. If we 
then want to avoid the systematic overdetermination of physical effects (by two 
metaphysically distinct, sufficient causes) we must either identify mental causes 
with physical causes or accept the supervenience of mental causes on physical 
causes, hence the physicalist conclusion of the Causal Argument.   
 Now, one way of understanding the role that causal closure plays in the 
Causal Argument for physicalism is to recognise that causal closure limits the 
role that mental properties can play in the physical domain. This is because 
causal closure implies that mental properties cannot affect the energy, mass or 
momentum of a physical system in order to bring about their physical effects. E.J 
Lowe captures this point in the following quote,  
 
“…appeal  to  [conservation]  laws  can  at  best  only  be  used  to  attack  dualist  
models of psychophysical causation which attribute to the non-physical 
mind  an  ability  to  affect  the  energy  or  momentum  of  a  physical  system.”  
(Lowe, 2000: 571) 15 
 
 So, if we want to say that mental properties somehow bring about the 
occurrence of their physical effects we cannot say that they contribute to or 
interact with the sufficient physical causes of those effects, since this would 
                                                 
15 This point will be especially important to the argument in the next chapter, since it suggests 
that causal closure does not imply that the mental cannot play any causal role in relation to 
physical effects, but only rules out the possibility that mental properties can cause physical 
effects by exerting additional force or energy into a physical system.  
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violate causal closure. Moreover, if we also want to avoid overdetermination (i.e. 
avoid the idea that mental properties are metaphysically distinct, sufficient 
causes of physical effects, in addition to sufficient physical causes) we must 
accept that mental properties are either identical to physical properties or accept 
that they are connected via some other dependency relation, for example, 
supervenience. While the reductive physicalist opts for the type-identity of 
mental and physical properties and while the non-reductive physicalist, who 
wants to hold onto irreducible mental properties, opts for the supervenience of 
mental properties on physical properties, neither position would be generated 
without the thesis of causal closure. This is because without the idea that physical 
causes are sufficient to bring about, or determine the occurrence of their effects 
we would have no reason to accept the identity or supervenience of the mental on 
the physical. Since causal closure provides the grounds for physicalism itself it is 
therefore a minimal commitment of non-reductive physicalism that cannot be 
rejected by the non-reductive physicalist in order to avoid the exclusion problem.  
 
2.3 Commitments of Non-Reductive Physicalism: Supervenience  
 
As I have explained, the Causal Argument generates two broadly 
physicalist conclusions: one being that mental properties are identical to physical 
properties (accepted by reductive physicalists) and the other being that mental 
properties are not type-identical to physical properties, but are related to physical 
properties via some weaker dependency relation, the most popular option of 
which for non-reductive physicalists is supervenience. Thus, it is commonly 
thought that supervenience is a minimal commitment of non-reductive 
physicalism. However, it is widely accepted that supervenience comes in a 
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variety of forms and degrees of modal force. It is therefore necessary to establish 
exactly which form of supervenience the non-reductive physicalist is minimally 
committed to and what its implications are.  
 In this final section, I outline and examine two forms of supervenience 
discussed by Kim (1984). In Section 2.3.1, I examine a weaker formulation of 
supervenience and argue that it is too weak for the purposes of non-reductive 
physicalism. In Section 2.3.2, I examine a stronger formulation of supervenience 
and argue that a version of strong supervenience is a minimal commitment of 
non-reductive physicalism. In Section 2.3.2.1, I examine the implications of this 
form of supervenience and in Section 2.3.2.2, examine some potential problems 
with this strong form of supervenience. I argue that the non-reductive physicalist 
can avoid these problems and that this form of supervenience is therefore a 
minimal commitment of non-reductive physicalism that cannot be rejected in 
order to avoid the exclusion problem.   
 
2.3.1 Weak Supervenience  
 
As Kim (1984) notes, the thesis of supervenience16 comes in a variety of 
forms:   it   can   be   both   ‘weak’   and   ‘strong’ and both of these forms can vary 
according to the modal force with which they are thought to hold.17 For example, 
both weak and strong forms of supervenience can vary according to whether the 
                                                 
16 Kim distinguishes between two forms of supervenience, namely individual and global 
supervenience. As the name suggests, individual supervenience expresses the idea that no two 
individuals could differ in respect to their mental properties without also differing in respect to 
their physical properties. In contrast, global supervenience expresses the idea that no two worlds 
could differ in respect to their worldwide distribution of mental properties without also differing 
with respect to their worldwide distribution of physical properties. In this thesis, I appeal to the 
notion of individual supervenience  and  hereafter  ‘supervenience’  should  be  taken  to  refer  to  this  
specific form of supervenience. 
17 I use Lewis-style possible worlds to assess the modal force of the different forms of 
supervenience.  
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range of individuals that they cover is limited by either nomological or 
metaphysical necessity. To begin, let us examine the weaker formulation of 
supervenience. What exactly does weak supervenience (hereafter WS) state? 
Kim formulates WS as follows:  
 
“A weakly supervenes on B if and only if necessarily for any x and y if x 
and y share all properties in B then x and y share all properties in A that 
is, indiscernibility with respect to B entails indiscernibility with respect to 
A.”  (Ibid:  158) 
 
As an illustration, consider the following example from Kim (Ibid): take A to be 
a set of supervening properties, which contains the property of being a good man 
(G) and take B to be a set of subvenient properties, which contains the properties 
of being courageous (C), benevolent (V), and honest (H).18 We may then ask 
what it would mean for A to weakly supervene on B. According to Kim,   
 
“This  means  that  if  two  men  share  the  same  properties  in  B,  say,  both  are  
honest and benevolent but lack courage (this will insure they share all 
other properties in B), then they must both be good men or neither is 
(they of course cannot differ in regard to the tautological or impossible 
property). Or, what is the same, if one is a good man but the other is not, 
there must be some property in B with respect to which they differ (say, 
                                                 
18 Kim specifies that all forms of supervenience only follow if we assume that the sets of 
supervening and subvening properties are closed under Boolean property-forming operations, for 
example, complementation, conjunction, and disjunction. Although this is controversial (see 
McLaughlin and Bennett, Summer 2010), for the purposes of this argument I will follow Kim in 
assuming that both sets are closed in this way. 
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the first is courageous but the second is not). Any differences in A must 
be  accounted  for  by  some  difference  in  B.”  (Ibid)   
 
 Now, we can see from the definition above that WS entails that no two 
individuals in a particular world could differ in respect to their A-properties 
without also differing in respect to their B-properties. Or slightly differently, it 
entails that no two individuals in a particular world could share the same B-
properties and yet differ in respect to their A-properties.  
However, WS does not entail that no two individuals could differ in 
respect to their A-properties without also differing in respect to their B-properties 
in another possible world. As it has been formulated above, WS clearly leaves 
this possibility open, since it only requires that A supervenes on B within a 
particular world. This degree of modal force, which holds with only nomological 
necessity (i.e. at worlds with laws of nature similar to our own), leaves open the 
possibility that in nearby, nomologically distinct worlds, two individuals could 
share the same B-properties, for example the same physical properties, and yet 
differ in respect to their A-properties, for example in respect to their mental 
properties. Similarly, WS leaves open the possibility that two individuals could 
differ in respect to their (mental) A-properties without also differing with respect 
to their (physical) B-properties.   
 The relevant question to answer is whether WS meets the requirements of 
the non-reductive physicalist. It seems, at least at first glance, that it does not. 
This is because, as Kim explains, WS fails to meet a basic, presumptive 
desideratum of supervenience, which is that base properties should determine or 
fix   their   supervenient  properties   in   the   stronger   sense   that  once   an   individual’s  
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base properties have been fixed, the supervenient properties follow with 
metaphysical necessity across all possible worlds. As noted above, although WS 
guarantees supervenient determination within a particular world, it does not 
guarantee supervenient determination across all possible worlds. Since WS 
consequently allows for the possibility that in nearby possible worlds, mental and 
physical properties routinely come apart, it seems that it would not be sufficient 
for the purposes of the non-reductive physicalist.      
 Now, although it seems prima facie reasonable that the non-reductive 
physicalist would require a form of supervenience that holds with metaphysical, 
rather than merely nomological necessity, could one not argue that for the 
purposes of non-reductive physicalism, it is in fact sufficient that mental 
properties are determined or fixed by physical properties at our world? Indeed, 
why should the non-reductive physicalist be committed to any view about the 
supervenience of mental and physical properties across other possible worlds?  
In order to see why, consider the following point made by Brian 
McLaughlin and Karen Bennett (McLaughlin and Bennett, Summer 2010). As 
McLaughlin and Bennett explain, the problem for the physicalist is that if one 
accepts only WS, which states that the mental supervenes on the physical only at 
a particular world, but denies that this supervenient relationship holds across all 
other possible worlds, it seems to undermine the status of the supervenient 
relationship  at  that  particular  world.  As  McLaughlin  and  Bennett  put  it,  “if  there 
can be things in different worlds that are A-discernible but not B-discernible, why 
can't there be two such things within a single world? If everything within each 
world that is B-indiscernible is A-indiscernible, how can different worlds enforce 
different B→A property  pairings?”  (Ibid)  In  other  words,  the  fact  that  WS  fails  to  
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hold across all possible worlds makes the claim that supervenience holds as a 
matter of necessity at a particular world look dubious and it certainly seems that 
for the purposes of non-reductive physicalism, something stronger would be 
required.   
 
2.3.2 Strong Supervenience  
 
Although it is clear that the non-reductive physicalist requires a stronger 
formulation of supervenience than is offered by WS, it is not immediately clear 
exactly what this stronger version of supervenience must entail. In this section, I 
examine the strong formulation of supervenience (hereafter SS) put forward by 
Kim and argue that the non-reductive physicalist requires, and hence is 
minimally committed to, a form of strong supervenience that holds not merely 
with nomological necessity, but with metaphysical necessity across all possible 
worlds, (hereafter SSmn).  
To begin, note that Kim formulates SS at the most basic level as the 
following thesis:      
 
 “A   strongly supervenes on B just in case, necessarily, for each x and 
each property F in A, if x has F, then there is a property G in B such that 
x has G, and necessarily if  any  y  has  G,  it  has  F.”  (Kim,  1984:  165)   
 
Now, we can see that in order to generate this stronger form of 
supervenience  SS  includes  an  extra  modal  operator,  namely  an  extra  ‘necessary’,  
which ensures not only that if any x has some property F in A, it necessarily has 
some property G in B, but that necessarily if any y has some property G in B it 
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necessarily has some F in A. This level of bi-directional determination ensures 
that A necessarily supervenes on B across all possible worlds.   
However, this leaves open the degree of modal force with which SS holds 
across all worlds. For example, does SS entail that A-properties supervene on B-
properties across all nomologically possible worlds? Or does it entail that they 
supervene as a matter of metaphysical necessity across all possible worlds? 
Moreover, which of these formulations is the non-reductive physicalist 
committed to? 
In order to demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist is committed to 
a form of SS that holds with metaphysical necessity, consider the following point 
made by McLaughlin and Bennett (Summer 2010), in which they claim that SS 
that holds with only nomological necessity would be consistent with dualism:   
  
“…Dualists   can   accept   [strong   supervenience   that   holds   with   only  
nomological necessity], because dualists can maintain that there are 
fundamental psychophysical  laws…While  dualists  think  that  zombies  are  
metaphysically possible, they need not hold that zombies are 
nomologically   possible…Physicalists,   of   course,   do   not   think   that  
zombies are possible at all. Capturing physicalism therefore requires a 
supervenience thesis that holds with full-blown  metaphysical  necessity.”  
(Ibid)  
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Since this example suggests that SS that holds with only nomologically 
necessity would be consistent dualism19, it seems that the non-reductive 
physicalist would be committed to a version of strong supervenience that holds 
as a matter of metaphysical necessity across those worlds (SSmn).20 In 
subsequent chapters, unless otherwise stated, I simply take the term 
‘supervenience’  to  refer  to  this  specific  form  of  supervenience.   
 
2.3.2.1 The Implications of SSmn  
 
However, SSmn does not as yet tell us anything about the nature of the 
dependency relation between A-properties and B-properties. As Kim explains, a 
supervenience claim like SSmn simply states a pattern of co-variation between 
properties, but does not explain the nature, or specific implications of that 
relationship. For example, it is not clear whether, according to SSmn, B-
properties necessarily entail A-properties, or whether A-properties necessarily 
depend on B-properties.  
Firstly, does SSmn imply that A-properties are entailed by B-properties? 
The simple answer appears to  be  ‘yes’.  After  all,  if  A-properties supervene on B-
properties with metaphysical necessity across all possible worlds, then B-
properties will simply entail A-properties.21  
                                                 
19 Note that this point is essentially the same one that was raised against WS above. This suggests 
that SS that holds with only nomological necessity is actually equivalent to WS and that neither 
are therefore suitable for the purposes of the non-reductive physicalist. 
20 Kim (1987) discusses the way in which SS could accommodate externalism about mental 
content (as discussed in Putnam (1975b))  by  ‘widening’  the  supervenience  base  of  supervening  
mental properties to include, for example, relational properties. While this is an interesting issue, 
it is not directly relevant to the argument in this thesis and is beyond the scope of our discussion.    
21 As McLaughlin and Bennett (Summer 2010) point out, the entailment of A-properties by B-
properties only follows from SSmn if both sets of properties are closed under Boolean operations. 
Once again, we may assume with Kim that the property sets are closed in this way and that 
entailment does follow from SSmn. 
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However, it is not equally clear that SSmn implies that A-properties 
metaphysically depend on B-properties. As Kim explains,  
 
“For   when   we   look   at   the   relationship   as   specified   in   the   definition 
between a strongly supervenient property and its base property, all that 
we have is that the base property entails the supervenient property. This 
alone does not warrant us to say that the supervening property is 
dependent on, or determined by, the base, or that an object has the 
supervening  property  in  virtue  of  having  the  base  property.”  (Kim,  1984:  
166)  
 
Now, this could be potentially problematic for the non-reductive 
physicalist, since the idea that the supervenient relationship between mental and 
physical properties is one of asymmetric dependence (whereby physical 
properties determine mental properties, but not vice versa) is a fairly basic and 
plausible assumption of physicalism. Since it is not immediately clear that this 
level of asymmetric dependence follows from SSmn (even with entailment), 
what solution is available for the non-reductive physicalist?  
Kim offers the following plausible solution: one can assume the 
individual supervenient dependence of supervenient properties on their 
subvenient bases on the grounds that those individual properties belong to a 
larger set of supervenient properties, which stand in an asymmetric dependence 
relationship to their subvenient bases. In other words, so long as we have 
independent grounds for accepting that mental properties, in general, supervene 
on physical properties, but not vice versa (which the non-reductive physicalist 
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has in the form of the Causal Argument), we can infer the asymmetric 
dependence of individual supervenient properties on their base properties. The 
specific implications of supervenience for mental causation and the role that it 
plays in the exclusion problem will be made clear in the next chapter.  
 
2.3.2.2 Some Potential Problems with SSmn 
 
In this final section, I consider some potential problems that arise for the 
non-reductive physicalist from this formulation of supervenience. Firstly, one 
could argue that this formulation of supervenience is too strong. For example, 
one could argue that as an a posteriori doctrine about the actual world, 
physicalism should not a priori rule out the possibility of things such as 
Cartesian souls, zombies and ghosts. However, according to the formulation of 
SSmn proposed above, such non-physical entities could not, as a matter of 
metaphysical possibility, exist.  
I think that we can solve this problem by appealing to a point that I made 
in the previous chapter (see footnote 1), which was that physicalism, as it follows 
from the Causal Argument, does not necessarily entail the view that everything is 
physical, but need only entail the view that everything that interacts causally in 
the world must be identical to, or supervenient on the physical. This is because 
causal closure, which features as a premise in the Causal Argument, states that 
every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, but leaves open the 
possibility that there may be non-physical properties, such as mathematical, or 
even spiritual properties, so long as these properties do not exert any causal 
influence on the world. The non-reductive physicalist who is persuaded by the 
Causal Argument is not therefore committed to the view that non-physical 
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entities, such as disembodied souls, could not as a matter of metaphysical 
possibility exist, but is only committed to the view that if these non-physical 
entities did exist they could exert no causal influence in the world. SSmn is not 
therefore in tension with the a posteriori nature of physicalism.22  
The second problem that needs to be addressed is whether SSmn entails 
the reduction of supervenient properties on their subvenient base properties. This 
issue is extremely important for the non-reductive physicalist, since if it turns out 
that the form of supervenience that I argue is a minimal commitment of non-
reductive physicalism entails reduction, then non-reductive physicalism will be a 
priori ruled out by this definition of supervenience.  
 Now, although I have argued that SSmn entails the strong metaphysical 
dependence and entailment of supervenient properties on their subvenient bases, 
it is not clear that reduction straightforwardly follows from this form of 
supervenience. In order to see this, consider the following points.     
Firstly, note that SSmn is consistent with the multiple realizability of 
supervenient properties, i.e. consistent with the idea that a supervenient property 
from set A will supervene on a variety of subvenient bases from set B, such that 
it will not be possible to type-identify and hence reduce supervenient property 
types with subvenient property types. Although the issue of multiple realization is 
by no means straightforward, it does seem that multiple realization makes type-
reduction, even with SSmn, implausible. 
                                                 
22 There is a further worry, which is highlighted by Papineau (2009), which is that if it were true 
that non-physical properties, such as mathematical properties, did exist but did not exert any 
causal influence on the world it is not clear how we could acquire any knowledge of them, given 
the plausible assumption that we normally acquire knowledge of the external world through some 
kind of causal interaction between properties and our cognitive system. However, as Papineau 
(Ibid) points out, so long as it is plausible that there are non-causal forms of knowledge, such as a 
priori knowledge, the physicalist can avoid this problem. 
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What about reduction at the level of token instantiated properties? SSmn 
states  that  every  particular,  or  ‘token’  instantiation  of  a  mental  property,  such  as  
the property of having a desire for a cup of tea, call it D1, which causes some 
physical effect, for example, reaching behaviour B1, is dependent on and entailed 
by a token instantiation of a physical property, for example, N1, which is also a 
cause of B1. Does this degree of supervenient dependence and entailment mean 
that D1 is thereby reducible to N1? Not necessarily.  
In order to see   this,   consider   Kim’s   (1984)   point   that   as   an   epistemic 
activity, reduction does not necessarily follow from this level of entailment and 
dependence. For example, by knowing that D1 supervenes on N1 with 
metaphysical necessity and that it is entailed by and wholly dependent on N1 we 
do not thereby acquire an explanation of D1, for example of its intentional nature.    
Moreover, as Kim points out, even though SSmn does guarantee that 
every mental property will be entailed by and wholly dependent on some 
physical property, it does not follow that those mental-to-physical relationships 
will be available to analyse for reductive or explanatory purposes. As Kim 
explains,   
 
“Where   strong   supervenience   obtains,   [this]   gives   us   the   assurance   that  
such connections in the form of necessary equivalences are there to be 
discovered, without of course the further assurance that we shall succeed 
in discovering them or that they will be representable in an explanatory 
theory.”  (Ibid:  176)   
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What both of these points suggest is that although SSmn entails the 
metaphysical dependence and entailment of supervenient properties on their 
subvenient bases, this does not necessarily entail the reduction of those 
supervenient properties. SSmn is not therefore incompatible with non-reductive 
physicalism.  
One final point that I will consider is whether SSmn entails that 
supervenient   properties   are   nothing   ontologically   ‘over   and   above’   their  
subvenient bases. Or as McLaughlin and Bennett (Summer 2010) put it, whether 
SSmn entails that   supervenient   properties   are   ‘ontologically   innocent’   with  
respect to their subvenient bases. It is clear that the non-reductive physicalist 
requires  the  ‘ontological  innocence’  of  supervenient  properties  in  relation  to  their  
subvenient bases, since to accept any kind of ontological distinction between 
mental and physical properties would be to endorse a form of dualism.  
However, if the implications that have been discussed thus far really are 
implications of SSmn it would seem to rule out the possibility that supervening 
mental properties could be anything ontologically over and above their 
subvenient bases, in accordance with the requirements of physicalism. This is 
because the degree of modal force with which SSmn holds, which ensures that 
supervenient properties are entailed by and wholly dependent on physical 
properties, guarantees that those supervenient properties could not be 
ontologically distinct from those subvenient base properties.  
In this section I have argued that the non-reductive physicalist is 
minimally committed to a form of strong supervenience, which holds with 
metaphysical necessity across all possible worlds and which implies that mental 
properties are entailed by and dependent on physical properties. I argued that any 
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weaker form of supervenience would not be suitable for the purposes of the non-
reductive physicalist, since it would be consistent with dualism. I finally 
addressed some potential problems with this form of supervenience, but argued 
that the non-reductive physicalist can avoid them. It is therefore possible to 
conclude that SSmn is a minimal commitment of non-reductive physicalism that 
cannot be rejected in order to avoid the exclusion problem.  
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
 In this chapter, I began by presenting the exclusion problem as following 
from five apparently inconsistent theses of non-reductive physicalism and 
examined two of these theses in detail, namely causal closure and supervenience. 
I began by examining the thesis of causal closure and argued that despite facing 
the problem of defining what it means to be physical and despite having had a 
complex history, causal closure is a true a posteriori thesis that does entail that 
every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. Since I argued that this 
thesis provides the grounds for physicalism itself, I concluded that it is a minimal 
commitment of non-reductive physicalism that cannot be rejected in order to 
overcome the exclusion problem.  
I then examined the thesis of supervenience in detail in order to determine 
exactly which formulation of supervenience the non-reductive physicalist is 
minimally committed to and what its implications are. I argued that the non-
reductive physicalist is minimally committed to a form of strong supervenience 
that holds with metaphysical necessity across all possible worlds and which 
implies that mental properties are entailed by and dependent on physical 
properties. After addressing some potential problems with this thesis, I concluded 
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that it too is a minimal commitment of non-reductive physicalism that cannot be 
rejected in order to avoid the exclusion problem. As I explained above, although 
I do not discuss the thesis of non-overdetermination until the next chapter, 
assuming that this thesis is a plausible one, it is possible to conclude that all five 
theses are in fact minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism that cannot 
therefore be rejected in order to avoid the exclusion problem. 
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3. The Exclusion Problem and Its 
Assumptions 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter I argued that the exclusion problem appears to 
follow a priori from five minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism, 
namely mental causation, non-identity, supervenience, causal closure and non-
overdetermination. Given that I concluded that each of these theses is in fact a 
minimal commitment of non-reductive physicalism, what solution is available to 
the non-reductive physicalist? In this chapter I argue that despite its apparent 
inevitability, the exclusion problem only follows a priori from these minimal 
commitments when they are combined with an assumption regarding causation, 
this being the assumption that causation is identical to production, generation or 
determination and that causes are sufficient for the occurrence of their effects.1 I 
call this the assumption of sufficient production, (hereafter the assumption of 
SP). Since I go on, in Chapter 4, to undermine this assumption, this allows me, in 
Chapter 5, to present interventionism as providing an account of mental 
causation that not only avoids the exclusion problem, but that also upholds all of 
                                                 
1 A similar argument is put forward in Woodward (2008a) and in Loewer (2007). Very roughly, 
Woodward  (2008a)  argues  that  Kim’s  exclusion  problem  depends  on  a  conception  of  causation  as  
‘nomological sufficiency’  and  suggests  that  when  causation  is  understood  in  interventionist  
terms,  Kim’s  exclusion  problem  does  not  go  through.  Loewer  (2007)  argues  that  Kim’s  exclusion  
problem  depends  specifically  on  a  conception  of  causation  as  ‘production’  and  attempts to 
provide a solution to the exclusion problem by providing a critique of this productive concept of 
causation and by proposing a counterfactual approach to causation, roughly along the lines of 
Lewis’  account  of  counterfactual  dependence,  in  its  place. See Woodward (2008a) and Loewer 
(2007) for further details.  
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the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism, thereby providing a 
successful non-reductive physicalist solution to the exclusion problem.  
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, I establish exactly 
what the sufficient production (hereafter SP) concept of causation entails and in 
Section 3.2.1, I demonstrate that Kim makes the assumption of SP2. In Section 
3.3,   I   examine   Kim’s   exclusion   argument   in   detail   and   in   Section   3.3.1,   I 
demonstrate that Kim crucially depends on this assumption to generate the 
exclusion problem. Lastly, in Section 3.3.2, I address some outstanding issues 
regarding overdetermination, which further demonstrate that Kim crucially 
depends on the assumption of SP to generate the exclusion problem. It is 
important to point out that the purpose of this chapter is not to prove that this 
assumption is false, but only to prove that the exclusion problem crucially 
depends on this assumption and that without it, the minimal commitments of 
non-reductive physicalism do not lead to the a priori exclusion of the mental. 
 
3.2 The SP Concept of Causation    
 
To begin, we must first establish exactly what the SP concept of 
causation entails. As I understand it, according to this concept, in order for X to 
cause Y it is necessary and sufficient that X produces, generates or determines 
Y’s  occurrence  and  that  X  is  a  sufficient cause of Y, where ‘cause’  is  understood  
in this productive/generative sense.  
                                                 
2 In arguing for this I am not claiming that this provides a fully accurate and definitive account of 
Kim’s  personal  view  of  causation,  since  this  is  not  made  explicit  or  clear  in  Kim’s  writings. For 
example, the exclusion problem at times appears to rely on the assumption that causation is 
identical to nomological sufficiency (see Kim, 2003b: 204), but at other times clearly depends on 
a conception of causation as sufficient production. So, although the SP concept of causation may 
not be the concept of causation that Kim advocates in all of his writings, I do argue that Kim 
advocates this concept in the context of the exclusion problem and relies on it to generate this 
problem.  
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How then should we understand the concept of causation as production, 
generation or determination?3 Kim defines this concept as follows:  
 
“On  this  conception,  a  cause  is  something  that  produces,  or  generates,  or  
brings about its effects, something from which the effects derive their 
existence  or  occurrence.”  (Kim,  2010a:  235)   
 
Now, this definition is not by itself very illuminating, since one could 
argue   that   the   notions   of   ‘bringing   about’   and   ‘generating’   are   simply  
synonymous with causation. Nevertheless, I suggest that we can define this 
productive concept of causation more precisely by making clear which further 
features are entailed by this concept. Firstly, there is the idea that cause and 
effect   are   connected   via   a   spatiotemporally   continuous   ‘chain’   or   ‘process’   of  
‘causal  intermediaries’,  where  these  ‘causal  intermediaries’  are  understood  in  the  
productive sense. (The idea here is presumably that an entire chain or process is 
sufficient to produce or generate the effect.) Secondly, this concept is closely 
connected to the idea that causation involves some kind of transfer of energy or 
momentum, via these productive processes and chains.4 Lastly, this concept of 
causation sharply contrasts with and in fact rules out the possibility that 
omissions and absences can count as genuine causes, on account of their failing 
to instantiate any such productive chain or process. We can therefore think of 
these features as the definitive features of the productive concept of causation.   
                                                 
3 Ned Hall (2004) provides a comprehensive analysis of this productive concept of causation. 
4 This idea can be found in the theories of, for example, Dowe (1999) and Salmon (1984).    
Chapter 3, The Exclusion Problem and Its Assumptions   60  
 
This productive concept of causation is common in the literature on 
causation and is typically associated with particular, well-known examples. For 
example, it is typically invoked to describe the relationship that obtains when one 
billiard ball strikes another and produces movement in the other ball. Or, it is 
invoked to describe the relationship that obtains when a baseball strikes a fragile 
window and produces the resultant physical effect, namely the shattering of the 
window. Although these examples feature in a wide variety of causal theories, I 
take it that they are specifically invoked to illustrate the productive concept of 
causation because they illustrate the primary role that physical processes and 
transactions play on this account.  
The idea that causes are sufficient for their effects can then simply be 
understood as the idea that causes are enough to produce, generate, or determine 
the occurrence of their effects.5  
In the remainder of this thesis, I refer to this concept of causation as the 
sufficient production, or SP concept of causation, but it should be noted that the 
SP concept of causation entails the broader views that causation involves 
generation or determination, that cause and effect are connected via 
spatiotemporally continuous productive processes and chains, presumably 
involving some kind of transfer of energy and that those productive causes are 
sufficient for their effects. The assumption that is at issue in this chapter is 
simply the assumption that sufficient production is identical to causation. 
Moreover, as we will see below, there is an explanatory counterpart to this 
                                                 
5 As Barry Loewer (2007) points out, we should actually understand the idea that causes are 
sufficient for their effects as entailing the view that causes are nomologically sufficient for their 
effects, since it is only with the laws of nature and the entire physical state of that system that 
causes  can  be  considered  ‘sufficient’  for  their  effects. I will not address this nomological issue of 
the  role  of  laws  in  Kim’s  account  of  causation  here,  since  it  is  not  directly  relevant  to  the  
argument in this chapter. However, I will return to this issue in the next chapter.   
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assumption, which assumes that providing a causal explanation of some effect is 
simply a matter of identifying such sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the 
effect. 
Lastly, although I have presented this as one assumption, I will 
demonstrate that each aspect of the assumption of SP (namely the sufficiency 
aspect   and   the   productive   aspect)   plays   a   distinctive   role   in   Kim’s   a   priori  
exclusion argument. For example, I will demonstrate that Kim’s   original  
formulation of the exclusion problem depends specifically on the sufficiency 
aspect   of   the   assumption   of   SP,   while   Kim’s   alternative   formulation   of   the  
exclusion problem, which he advances after acknowledging that 
overdetermination is not possible between the mental and the physical, depends 
specifically on the productive aspect of the assumption of SP and even more 
specifically, on the closely related idea that causation necessary involves some 
kind of productive process. To be clear, I am not suggesting that each aspect 
represents a distinct concept of causation and a distinct assumption about 
causation, but rather, I am suggesting that each aspect plays a distinctive role in 
Kim’s  a  priori  exclusion  argument.     
 
3.2.1 Kim and the Assumption of SP 
 
 The relevant question to answer is whether Kim makes this assumption 
about causation and moreover, what the implications of this assumption are for 
the exclusion problem.  
That Kim makes the assumption that causes must be sufficient for their 
effects is made clear in Section 3.3 below when I outline the way in which this 
assumption   motivates   Kim’s   exclusion   problem.   Nevertheless,   I suggest that 
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evidence   of   Kim’s   assumption   can   be   found   elsewhere   in   his   writings.   For  
example, consider the following passage in which Kim explains the causal role 
that a mental property must play if it is to be considered as a genuine cause of 
some physical effect:  
 
“If   M is a mental property, therefore, M must have some new causal 
powers. This must mean, let us suppose, that M manifests its causal 
powers by being causally efficacious with respect to another property, N; 
that is, a given instance of M can cause N to be instantiated on that 
occasion. We shall assume here a broadly nomological conception of 
causality, roughly in the following sense: an instance of M causes an 
instance of N just in case there is an appropriate causal law that 
invokes the instantiation of M as a sufficient condition for the 
instantiation of N.” (My emphasis, Kim, 2003b: 204) 
 
It is clear from this passage that Kim identifies causality with sufficiency, or 
more accurately, with the idea that causes are nomologically sufficient for the 
occurrence of their effects (see footnote 5 above).6  
It is also apparent that Kim accepts the explanatory counterpart of the 
assumption of SP. Consider, for example, the following passage:     
 
                                                 
6 What this passage also  importantly  illustrates  is  that  Kim  equates  the  notion  of  causal  ‘efficacy’  
with the SP concept of causation. Thus, when Kim states, as he often does (see especially Kim, 
2003a),  that  mental  properties  must  be  causally  ‘efficacious’  with  respect  to  their effects, rather 
than  merely  causally  ‘relevant’,  I  take  it  that  Kim  is  implying  that  mental  properties  must  be  
sufficient productive causes of their effects.     
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“Thus  a  car  accident  is  explained  by  a  highway  designer  as  having  been  
caused by the incorrect camber of the highway curve, and by a police 
officer as caused by the inattentive driving of an inexperienced driver. 
But in a case like this we naturally think of the offered causes as partial 
causes; they together help make up a full and sufficient cause of the 
accident.”  (Kim,  1998a:  66)   
 
As well as further illustrating that for Kim a cause should simply be understood 
as a sufficient condition for the occurrence of its effect, this passage also 
suggests that for Kim, causal explanation is also simply a matter of providing 
sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an effect. According to this view, it 
seems that there is nothing epistemically richer to causal explanation than 
providing such sufficient conditions.  Moreover, given Kim’s   assumption   that 
causal  explanations  simply  cite  ‘full’  and sufficient conditions for the occurrence 
of effects, it naturally follows that it is not possible to have more than one causal 
explanation of a single event, without running into the problem of 
overdetermination.7 This leads Kim to accept the following view:   
 
“…there   can   be   no   more   than   a   single   complete   and   independent  
explanation of any one event, and we may not accept two (or more) 
explanations of a single event unless we know, or have reason to believe, 
that they are appropriately related—that is, related in such a way that one 
                                                 
7 This also naturally leads to the view, captured in the previous quote, that if a cause is not itself 
sufficient  for  its  effect,  we  should  consider  it  as  a  ‘part  cause’,  which  somehow  adds  together  
with  other  ‘part  causes’  to  ‘fully’  and  sufficiently  cause  and  explain  the  effect.    Helen  Steward  
(1997b) puts forward a detailed and convincing critique of this view. I also critique this view in 
the next chapter. 
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of the explanations is either not complete in itself or dependent on the 
other.”  (Kim,  2010b:  160)   
 
I discuss the implications of this concept of causal explanation further in the next 
chapter.    
As well as assuming that causes must be sufficient for their effects, it is 
also apparent that Kim assumes that causation necessary involves production, 
generation and determination. More specifically, he assumes that mental 
properties must cause their effects in this productive sense if they are to be 
considered as genuine causes of their effects. This is evident in the following 
passage:     
 
“Causation  as  generation,  or  effective  production  and  determination,  is  in  
many ways a stronger relation than mere counterfactual dependence, and 
it is causation in this sense that is fundamentally involved in the problem 
of  mental  causation.”  (Kim,  2005:  18) 
 
Kim also makes explicit the fact that he accepts the closely related 
assumption that causation necessarily involves some kind of continuous 
productive chain or process and again assumes that mental properties must bring 
about their supposed effects via such productive chains and processes if they are 
to be considered as genuine causes. This assumption is captured in the following 
passage in  which  Kim  summarises  the  ‘worries’  or  problems  of  mental  causation  
that supposedly face the non-reductive physicalist:   
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“Fundamentally  these  worries  arise,  I  believe,  from  the  question  whether  
mentality has the power to bring about its effects in a continuous process 
of generation and production—or the question whether we can show that 
this  is  so.”  (Kim,  2010a:  236) 
 
 I make clear the relevance of this assumption to the exclusion problem in 
Section 3.3 below, but it is important to emphasise that given the strong 
metaphysical implications of this productive concept of causation, this 
assumption commits Kim to a fairly metaphysically demanding conception of 
mental causation. For example, it implies that in order for mental properties to 
qualify as genuine causes of their effects, those mental properties must be 
sufficient to produce, generate or determine the occurrence of their effects and 
presumably do so via metaphysically distinct productive chains and processes. I 
spell out the implications of this metaphysically rich notion of mental causation 
below (and explore this issue further in Chapter 5). 
 
3.3 The Assumption of SP and the Exclusion Problem 
 
What then are the implications of the assumption of SP on the exclusion 
problem? In this section, I argue that despite its apparent inevitability, the 
exclusion problem only follows a priori from the minimal commitments of non-
reductive physicalism when they are combined with the assumption of SP. In 
order to demonstrate this, let us look closely at how Kim formulates his 
exclusion argument. 
 Kim presents his exclusion argument in two stages. In stage 1 we are 
presented with a supposed case of mental-to-mental causation, in which an 
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instance of mental property M causes an instance of mental property M*. To 
begin, Kim points out that it is guaranteed by supervenience that M* supervenes 
on  a  physical  base,  P*,  which  necessitates  M*’s  occurrence.  Kim’s  next  move  is  
to ask what causes M* to be instantiated on this occasion, M or P*?  
It   is   at   this   stage   that   Kim   introduces   ‘Edwards’   Dictum’   into   the  
argument, which states that a tension is created in any case in which there is 
‘vertical  determination’,   (represented  by   the  metaphysical  supervenience  of M* 
on   P*),   and   a   claim   of   ‘horizontal   causation’,   (represented   by   the   supposed  
causal relation between M and M*). For Kim, a tension arises for the supposed 
causal relationship between M and M* because supervenience guarantees that the 
instantiation of P* alone necessitates   M*’s   occurrence   and   would   do   so  
regardless of whether M preceded P* as a supposed cause of M*. In fact, Kim 
goes   as   far   as   to   claim   that   “…vertical   determination   excludes horizontal 
causation.”  (My  emphasis,  Kim,  2005:  36)  For Kim, it follows that M could have 
no  causal   role   to  play   in   the   instantiation  of  M*,  given  M*’s  supervenience  on  
P*; that is of course unless M somehow contributes to the occurrence of P*. 
Kim’s  solution  to  this  tension  is  therefore  to  claim  that  M  can  cause  M*,  but only 
by causing its subvenient base, P*. In other words, Kim concludes stage 1 of the 
argument with the claim that supervenience guarantees that mental-to-mental 
causation entails mental-to-physical causation.  
At this stage of the argument, Kim claims that no metaphysical 
assumptions are made and that the conclusion of stage 1 simply follows from the 
thesis of supervenience, (which I argued in Chapter 2 is a minimal commitment 
of non-reductive  physicalism).  However,  contrary  to  Kim’s  claim,   I believe that 
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this conclusion does rely on a metaphysical assumption, this being the 
assumption that causation is identical to sufficient production.       
In order to see this, note that the supposed causal tension created by 
Edwards’  Dictum  could  not  simply  arise  from the fact that M* supervenes on P*, 
since it is widely accepted, and Kim himself recognises (Kim, 1998a: 44) that 
supervenience is not a causal relationship. So, even if it is true that P* is 
sufficient   to   determine   M*’s   occurrence   on   this   occasion   and would do so 
whatever else happened to precede P* as a supposed cause of M*, P* does not 
cause M* and could not therefore causally exclude any other property from 
causing M*. In other words, since supervenience is not a causal relation it could 
not have any such exclusionary causal implications. 
I suggest that one  would  only  accept  Edwards’  Dictum  and  hence  accept  
that  supervenience  creates  a  causal  tension  for  ‘horizontal’  (i.e.  mental)  causation  
if one assumed that both supervenience and causation are relations of sufficient 
determination. This is because once one makes this assumption one could argue 
that by being sufficient to determine the occurrence of M*, P* would simply 
capture all there was to causally explain regarding  M*’s  occurrence  and  would  
create a causal tension for any additional purported cause of M*. Moreover, it 
would also suggest that M* would necessarily be overdetermined by any 
additional cause, since then M* would apparently be caused by two 
metaphysically distinct, sufficient causes.   Without this assumption, it is difficult 
to  see  why  one  would  accept  Edwards’  Dictum  and   the supposed causal tension 
that it creates.   
Given that I have suggested that stage   1   of   Kim’s   exclusion   argument  
does depend on a metaphysical assumption, does this mean that Kim’s exclusion 
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argument fails at stage 1? Not necessarily. This is because the conclusion of 
stage 1 can be reached by appealing to a much simpler argument, which also 
relies on the thesis of supervenience, but does not rely on the assumption of SP. 
Consider the following argument: 
1. M is thought to cause M*. 
2. Because M* supervenes on P*, whatever causes P* also causes M*.8 
3. If M were to cause M* other than by causing P*, M* would be 
overdetermined: M would be a cause of M* in addition to whatever 
causes P*.  
4. Therefore, to avoid the overdetermination of M*, M must cause P*.  
Thus, it is possible to conclude, in accordance with Kim, that if M is to cause M* 
it must do so via P*. Or, in other words, we may agree with Kim that mental-to-
mental causation does entail mental-to-physical causation.9   
In any case, it is not until stage 2 that Kim reaches the conclusion of the 
exclusion argument and demonstrates that he crucially relies on the assumption 
of SP. In stage 2, Kim explains that according to supervenience it would also be 
true  that  M  supervenes  on  a  physical  base,  P,  which  necessitates  M’s  occurrence.  
Furthermore, since in stage 1 Kim concluded that if M were to cause M*, it 
would have to cause P*, he claims that we have good reason to accept that P is 
also a cause of P*. Very roughly, the reason that Kim offers for this is that since 
                                                 
8 This  follows  since  if  P*  necessitates  M*’s  occurrence,  whatever  causes  P*  will  also  presumably  
cause M* to be instantiated.   
9 It is important to point out that even if one does not agree with the argument offered above (for 
example, the concept of causation that I examine in Chapter 4 does not generate the kind of 
overdetermination that is required in premise 3), so long as one finds the claim that mental-to-
mental causation entails mental-to-physical causation at least plausible, (which non-reductive 
physicalists should do, considering their commitment to causal closure and supervenience), this is 
sufficient  for  the  purposes  of  Kim’s  argument.  This  is  because  the  rest  of  Kim’s  argument  is 
concerned with providing an a priori argument against mental-to-physical causation. As Kim 
explains, he only introduces the case of mental-to-mental causation to begin with in order to 
show that the exclusion problem also arises for the purely mental case.   
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M is dependent upon and determined by P on this occasion and since, ex 
hypothesi, M causes P*, it is plausible to assume that P is also a cause of P*. 
Thus, it looks as though P* has two causes, M and P.  
Now, I take it that this conclusion actually follows from the minimal 
commitments of non-reductive physicalism, since according to causal closure, P* 
must have a sufficient physical cause and in order to avoid overdetermination, 
the non-reductive physicalist claims that the mental cause necessarily supervenes 
on this sufficient physical cause. Thus, according to non-reductive physicalism, 
for any case of mental causation we would be left with two causes of the effect 
under consideration, one mental and one physical. Nevertheless, regardless of 
how  one  reaches  this  conclusion,  we  may  agree  with  Kim’s  conclusion  at  stage  2  
that for any case of mental causation, we would be left with two causes of the 
effect, one mental and one physical.   
The  crucial  move  in  Kim’s  argument  comes  next  with  the  introduction  of  
the  ‘exclusion  principle’  (hereafter EP). Kim formulates the EP as follows:  
 
“If  an  event  e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can 
be a cause of e (unless this is a genuine case of causal 
overdetermination).”  (Kim,  2005:  17)   
 
Now, it does seem, at least at first glance, that when this principle is 
combined with the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism, the 
exclusion problem becomes inevitable. This is because, as Kim has explained, 
for any supposed case of mental causation, for example, between mental property 
M and physical effect P*, supervenience states that M necessarily supervenes on 
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a physical property, P, which causal closure states is a sufficient cause of P*. In 
any case of mental causation we would therefore be left with two causes of the 
physical effect, one mental cause and one sufficient physical cause. However, at 
this point it appears that the EP would kick in and state that unless this was a 
case of overdetermination, (which the non-reductive physicalist must avoid), one 
of the causes would have to go. It then looks as though we would be a priori 
forced to exclude mental property M, since P would have to be preserved as a 
cause of P* in order to uphold causal closure.  
Consider  Kim’s  conclusion  of  the  exclusion  argument:     
 
“The  final  picture  that  has  emerged  is  this:  P  is  a  cause  of  P*,  with  M  and  
M* supervening respectively on P and P*. There is a single underlying 
causal process in this picture, and this process connects two physical 
properties, P and P*. The correlations between M and M* and between M 
and P* are by no means accidental or coincidental; they are lawful and 
counterfactual  sustaining  regularities  arising  out  of  M’s  supervenience  on  
the causally linked P and P*. These observed correlations give us an 
impression of causation; however, that is only an appearance, and there is 
no more causation here than between two successive shadows cast by a 
moving   car,   or   two   successive   symptoms   of   a   developing   pathology.”  
(Ibid: 21)  
 
I illustrate this conclusion in Figure 3.1 below.  
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Figure 3.1: Exclusion 
Solid arrows represent genuine causal relationships, while the broken arrows 
represent excluded causal relationships. Broken lines represent supervenient 
relationships. According to this illustration, the only genuine causal relationship 
that exists goes from P to P*.  
 
 According to Kim, any supposed causal relationship between M and M*, 
or  between  M  and  P*  is  excluded,  or  ‘pre-empted’  by  the  causal  relationship  that  
exists between P and P*. Any attempt to hold onto both M and P as causes of M* 
or P* would result in the application of the EP and because of the commitment to 
causal closure, would once again appear to result in the exclusion of the mental 
cause.   
  
3.3.1 The Assumption of SP and the Exclusion Principle 
 
 Now, it is important to recognise that without the EP, the exclusion 
problem would not follow a priori from these minimal commitments. Remember 
that  Kim’s  conclusion  of  stage  2,  which  I accepted, was only that causal closure 
and supervenience guarantee that for any case of mental causation we would be 
left with two causes of the effect, one mental cause and one sufficient physical 
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cause. Without the introduction of the EP into the argument, we would have no a 
priori reason to exclude either cause.10        
Where then does the motivation for the EP come from? Is it, as Kim 
claims,   a   “general   metaphysical   [constraint]”   (Ibid:   22)   that   cannot   be  
‘successfully   challenged’,   or   do   we   have   good   reason   to   reject   this   principle?  
Remember that without the EP the exclusion problem does not follow from the 
minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism, since they only guarantee 
that for any case of mental causation we would be left with two causes of the 
effect. We may therefore rightly ask whether the non-reductive physicalist is 
committed to this principle, which has such serious implications for her theory.  
Note that the EP does not follow from the thesis of causal closure. 
Remember that causal closure only states that every physical effect has a 
sufficient physical cause, but does not state that if an effect has a sufficient cause 
at t then it could have no other cause at t unless it is overdetermined. Causal 
closure simply states that the physical effect has a sufficient cause at t. 
Furthermore, the EP does not follow from the thesis of supervenience. 
Remember that supervenience only states that mental properties metaphysically 
supervene on physical properties, but does not state that if those physical 
properties are sufficient for the purported effects of those supervenient mental 
properties, then the mental properties could play no causal role in addition to 
their subvenient bases without resulting in overdetermination.   
If the EP is not motivated by causal closure or supervenience, where does 
the motivation for the EP come from? In the remainder of this section I argue 
                                                 
10 I demonstrate below that the conclusion of the exclusion argument would not follow here (as 
Kim seems to assume) simply from the thesis of non-overdetermination, but crucially requires the 
assumption of SP. I also address a further important issue regarding overdetermination in Section 
3.3.2 below.  
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that in order to motivate the EP and generate the exclusion problem, Kim 
crucially depends on the assumption of SP.  
Take, for example, physical property P, which is a sufficient cause of 
physical effect P*. The first, more implicit way that I suggest that the assumption 
of SP motivates the EP is in the sense that if one assumes that causation is 
identical to sufficient production it suggests that by being sufficient to produce 
its effect, P simply exhausts all there is to cause regarding P*’s  occurrence and 
implies that there would literally be nothing left for any additional property to 
causally contribute; hence the motivation for the EP, which states precisely that 
if an effect has a sufficient cause at t, it can have no other cause at t whatsoever, 
unless   it   is   overdetermined.   This   motivation   is   reflected   in   Kim’s   appeal   to  
Edwards’   Dictum,   which   Kim   admits   is   his   underlying   motivation   for   the  
exclusion problem (Ibid: 36). Moreover, on the assumption that causal 
explanation is also simply a matter of identifying sufficient conditions for the 
occurrence of some effect, it implies that by being sufficient, P would simply 
exhaust all there is to causally explain regarding the occurrence of P*, providing 
further motivation for excluding any purported additional cause of P*.  
It is then easy to see how the EP, motivated by this assumption, causes 
trouble for the non-reductive physicalist. As I explained above, this is because 
supervenience guarantees that M necessarily supervenes on a physical property, 
P, which causal closure states is a sufficient cause of P*. Then, given that the 
non-reductive physicalist must avoid overdetermination, whereby both M and P 
could count as metaphysically distinct, sufficient causes of P*, it seems that there 
really   would   be   ‘nothing   left’   for   M   to   causally   contribute   given   P’s  
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occurrence.11 On the assumption that causation is identical to sufficient 
production, physical causation, by its very definition would capture all there is to 
causally contribute and explain regarding the occurrence of some effect and 
would provide the motivation for excluding the causal role that any additional, 
mental property might play. Woodward (2008a) captures this point in the 
following passage:  
 
“It would seem that physical causation already supplies all of the 
sufficient conditions (and hence all of the causation) that [is] needed. By 
definition,  a  sufficient  condition  does  not  require  anything  “more”  to  do  
its  work.”  (Ibid: 252) 
 
The fact that Kim uses the assumption of SP to motivate his argument in 
this way is, I suggest, evidenced further in the language that he uses to describe 
the exclusion problem. For example, Kim often frames the exclusion problem in 
terms of the fact that there is literally  ‘nothing  left’  for  the  mental  to  cause,  given  
the nature of physical causation. Consider, for example, the following passages12:  
 
“But  to  acknowledge  that  p has also a physical cause p*, at t is to invite 
the question: Given that p has a physical cause p*, what causal work is 
left for m to contribute? The physical cause therefore threatens to 
exclude,  and  preempt,  the  mental  cause.”  (Kim,  1998a:  37)   
 
                                                 
11 Of course, this relies on the related assumption that M would have to cause P* by being a 
metaphysically distinct, sufficient cause of P*, which I go on to reject.   
12 The second passage also clearly demonstrates  Kim’s  assumption  that  causation  involves  a  
productive process or chain.  
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“…given  that  P is a sufficient physical cause of P*, how could M also be 
a cause, a sufficient one at that, of P*? What causal work left is over for 
M, or any other mental property, to do? M’s  claim  as  a  cause  of  P* will 
be weakened further especially if, as we would expect in real-life 
neurobiological research, there is a continuous causal chain, a 
mechanism, connecting P with P*.”  (Kim,  2003b:  208)   
 
It is difficult to see why one would accept this conclusion unless one assumed 
that causation is identical to sufficient production. Once one makes this 
assumption it is easy to see why one would accept the EP, which simply states 
that if an effect has a sufficient cause at t, it could have no other cause at t 
whatsoever. Moreover, it is even easier to see how once one accepts the EP and 
its implicit motivation, the exclusion problem becomes inevitable for the non-
reductive physicalist, given that causal closure states that physical causes are, by 
definition, sufficient to produce, or determine their effects.13 
The second, more direct way that I suggest the assumption of SP 
motivates the EP is in the sense that by assuming that causation is identical to 
sufficient production (with its strong metaphysical implications), it suggests that 
the only way for any property to cause some effect is by being a metaphysically 
distinct, sufficient productive cause of that effect. According to this assumption 
then, it would simply not be possible for an effect to have a sufficient cause at t 
and have an additional cause at t (where   ‘cause’   is   understood   in   terms   of  
                                                 
13 As I hope to have made clear in the previous chapter, this is again not to imply that causal 
closure entails the SP concept of causation, since causal closure is a modal claim, which states 
that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause and does not entail any particular 
concept of causation. Rather, the problem that I have identified arises because Kim seems to 
assume that the physical determinism entailed by causal closure (which guarantees that physical 
causes are sufficient to produce or determine their effects) is simply identical to causation.  
Chapter 3, The Exclusion Problem and Its Assumptions   76  
 
sufficient production, with its strong metaphysical implications) without 
resulting in the overdetermination of that effect; hence the motivation for the EP.  
Again, it is easy to see how the EP, motivated by this assumption, causes 
trouble for the non-reductive physicalist: on the assumption that causation is 
identical to sufficient production, in order for M to cause P*, it would have to be 
a metaphysically distinct, sufficient productive cause of P*, in addition to  P*’s  
sufficient productive physical cause, P, automatically resulting in a case of 
overdetermination. Then, the EP would kick in and state that unless we were 
willing to accept that this is a case of overdetermination, we would be forced to 
exclude one of the causes and once again, in order to uphold causal closure it 
looks like we would be forced to a priori exclude mental cause M. This is closest 
to how Kim formulates the exclusion problem himself14 and it is how the 
exclusion problem was formulated above.  
Without the assumption of SP, it is once again difficult to see why one 
would accept the EP, which states that if an effect has a sufficient cause at t it 
could have no other cause at t unless it is overdetermined. This is because 
without this assumption, one could claim, for example, that an additional 
property could cause its effect without being a metaphysically distinct, sufficient 
cause of that effect and hence without resulting in the automatic 
overdetermination of that effect, which is necessary to generate the exclusion 
problem. (This is, in effect, the strategy that I adopt in Chapter 5.)15 Thus, 
                                                 
14 See Kim (2005: 42-43).   
15 Crane (1995) argues that by attempting to solve the problem of mental causation by arguing 
that  mental  properties  do  not  cause  their  effects  ‘in  the  same  way’  as  physical  properties  (i.e.  by 
denying  what  he  calls  the  ‘homogeneity’  of  causation),  we  lose  the  original  motivation  for  
physicalism and that these accounts, far from solving the problem of mental causation, actually 
undermine physicalism itself. Very roughly, Crane argues that premise 1 of the Causal Argument 
for physicalism- the premise of mental causation- must involve the idea that mental properties are 
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without the assumption of SP, the EP seems unmotivated and without the EP, as 
Kim himself accepts, the non-reductive physicalist would only be committed to 
accepting that for every case of mental causation we would be left with two 
causes of the effect, one mental and one physical, with no a priori reason, 
however, to exclude either cause.    
One might object at this point that I have simply missed the crucial point 
that Kim is using the EP as a kind of overdetermination principle and that since I 
have argued that the non-reductive physicalist is minimally committed to the 
thesis of non-overdetermination, the exclusion problem follows even without the 
assumption of SP. For example, since I have accepted that for every case of 
mental causation we would be left with two causes of the effect, one mental and 
one physical, this would seem to result in a case of overdetermination. In order to 
avoid overdetermination, the EP, simply understood as an overdetermination 
principle, would then kick in and state that one of the causes has to go. Then, 
given the commitment to causal closure, it would seem that we would once again 
be forced to a priori exclude the mental cause. Thus, it may seem as though the 
EP is motivated by the thesis of non-overdetermination alone and that it is 
                                                                                                                                    
sufficient to determine the occurrence of their effects, since it is only then do we generate the 
tension between mental and physical properties when combined with the theses of causal closure 
and non-overdetermination that is required to motivate the physicalist conclusion of the Causal 
Argument. However, I do not think that the problem that Crane identifies is a lack of 
homogeneity per se, since I demonstrate that interventionism provides an account of causation 
whereby both mental and physical properties cause their effects ‘in  the  same  way’. Rather, what 
Crane’s  argument  highlights  is  that  we  do  initially  require  a  productive  conception  of  mental  
causation to motivate physicalism. However, if physicalists then choose to adopt an 
interventionist conception of mental causation it does not thereby undermine their physicalist 
position that this concept of causation cannot be used to motivate physicalism, since what the 
Causal Argument proved is precisely that mental properties cannot cause their effects in this 
productive, generative sense (and that we must therefore accept some form of identity or 
supervenience between the mental and the physical). In other words, the fact that the 
interventionist concept of causation cannot be used to motivate the Causal Argument for 
physicalism merely reflects the fact that this account of mental causation is constrained by the 
commitments of physicalism. It is no wonder then that it cannot be used to generate physicalism. 
This is an interesting issue, but is one which cannot be pursued further here. See Crane (1995) for 
further discussion.  
Chapter 3, The Exclusion Problem and Its Assumptions   78  
 
therefore possible to generate the exclusion problem without the assumption of 
SP.      
However, despite initial appearances, the EP is not equivalent to the 
thesis of non-overdetermination. In order to see this, remember that the thesis of 
non-overdetermination only states that the effects of mental causes are not 
systematically overdetermined by two metaphysically distinct, sufficient causes, 
but does not state that if an effect has a sufficient cause at t then it could have no 
other cause at t, unless it is overdetermined. Stated as such, the thesis of non-
overdetermination clearly leaves open the possibility that a mental property, such 
as  M,  could  cause  some  physical  effect,  such  as  P*,  in  addition  to  P*’s  sufficient  
physical cause without overdetermining P*, so long as M was not a 
metaphysically distinct, sufficient cause of P*. However, the EP clearly rules out 
this possibility, since it states that if an effect has a sufficient cause at t it could 
have no other cause at t without resulting in overdetermination. I suggested 
above that the only way to motivate this stronger claim and generate the a priori 
exclusion of the mental that inevitably follows once one accepts this claim is to 
assume that causation is identical to sufficient production and hence to assume 
that the mental cause must be a metaphysically distinct, sufficient cause of its 
effect, in addition to the sufficient physical cause. Thus, the exclusion problem 
does not simply follow from the thesis of non-overdetermination, but in order to 
generate the exclusion problem, Kim requires the stronger claim made by the EP, 
which appears to be motivated solely by the assumption of SP.  
Confusion may arise concerning the connection between the EP and the 
thesis of non-overdetermination because Kim also formulates the EP in such a 
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way that it appears equivalent to the thesis of non-overdetermination. Consider 
Kim’s  alternative  formulation  of  the  EP,  which  he  also advances: 
 
“No   single   event   can   have  more   than   one   sufficient   cause   occurring   at 
any given time- unless  it  is  a  genuine  case  of  overdetermination.”  (Kim,  
2005: 42)  
  
Notice, however, that this formulation of the EP is not strictly equivalent 
to the thesis of non-overdetermination either. As I explained above, this is 
because the thesis of non-overdetermination leaves open the possibility that a 
single event could have more than one sufficient cause occurring at a given time, 
so long as the additional cause was not a metaphysically distinct, sufficient cause 
of its effect. By contrast, this formulation of the EP clearly rules out this 
possibility. Once again, I suggest that the only way to motivate this stronger 
claim, which inevitably leads to the exclusion problem for the non-reductive 
physicalist, is to assume that the additional cause must be a metaphysically 
distinct, sufficient cause of its effect (since this makes it impossible for some 
effect to have more than one sufficient cause without resulting in 
overdetermination) and I hope to have shown that one would only accept this if 
one assumed that causation is identical to sufficient production.   
What this discussion should have demonstrated is that without the 
assumption of SP, the EP (on either of its formulations) is unmotivated and that 
without the EP, the exclusion problem does not follow a priori from the minimal 
commitments of non-reductive physicalism, since as Kim himself accepts, they 
only commit the non-reductive physicalist to the claim that mental causation 
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entails physical causation. Thus, without the assumption of SP, the exclusion 
problem does not follow a priori from the minimal commitments of non-
reductive physicalism. 
 
3.3.2 Overdetermination: Some Further Issues 
 
One may be wondering whether I have missed an even more important 
point regarding overdetermination and the exclusion problem, which is that the 
kind of overdetermination that Kim requires to generate the exclusion problem 
(which requires the overdetermination of P* by two metaphysically distinct, 
sufficient causes) is not actually possible given a supervenience relation between 
mental   and   physical   properties.   One   could   then   argue   that   Kim’s   exclusion  
argument can be blocked without having to make any claims about its 
dependence on the assumption of SP. Karen Bennett (2003) puts forward one 
such argument in which she claims that one of the necessary conditions for 
overdetermination, namely that the effect is caused by two metaphysically 
distinct, sufficient causes, cannot be met in the case of mental causation and that 
the kind of overdetermination that is required for the exclusion problem is simply 
not possible.  
In  this  final  section,  I  outline  Bennett’s  argument  and  agree  that  the  kind  
of overdetermination that is required for the exclusion problem, as it has been 
outlined above, is not possible in the case of mental causation. However, I go on 
to demonstrate that rather than providing conclusive proof against the exclusion 
problem, for Kim, the fact that overdetermination is not possible in the case of 
mental causation actually provides even greater support for his a priori exclusion 
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problem.   I   demonstrate   that   this   conclusion   depends,   once   again,   on   Kim’s  
assumption that causation is identical to sufficient production.   
 
3.3.2.1  Bennett’s Argument against Overdetermination 
 
In a recent paper, Bennett (Ibid) argues that being caused by two 
properties or events, each of which is sufficient for the occurrence of that effect, 
is not sufficient for that effect to be overdetermined, since there is a further 
necessary condition for overdetermination, namely distinctness, which is not met 
in the case of mental causation. As we shall see, the reason why cases of mental 
causation fail to meet this requirement and hence fail to result in cases of genuine 
overdetermination is because of the tight metaphysical connection between the 
mental and the physical, namely supervenience. 
To begin, Bennett discusses what she takes to be a basic presumptive 
requirement of overdetermination: that it should be possible to consider what the 
outcome of the effect would have been if one of the causes had occurred without 
the other. As an illustration, take the classic case of overdetermination involving 
the firing squad: for the effect (namely the death of the prisoner) to be genuinely 
overdetermined it must be true that if the first rifleman had failed to fire, the 
prisoner would still have died and vice versa for the second rifleman. For 
Bennett, this necessary condition for overdetermination can be expressed in the 
form of a simple counterfactual test:  
 
“(O1)   if  m had happened without p, e would still have happened: (m & 
~p)  
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  e, and  
(O2) if p had happened without m, e would still have happened: (p & 
~m)   e.”16 (Ibid: 480) 
   
Why should we accept that counterfactuals (O1) and (O2) provide 
necessary   conditions   for   overdetermination?   Bennett’s   plausible   suggestion   is  
that it is because these two counterfactuals capture the natural reasoning that we 
engage in when we distinguish cases of genuine overdetermination from cases 
that are not overdetermined, such as cases of joint causation, or exclusionary 
causation. As Bennett explains,    
 
“If  we  needed  to  decide  whether  or  not  the  death  was  overdetermined,  we  
would ask precisely whether these two counterfactuals are true. Would 
the victim have died if the first gunman had fired without the second? 
Would he have died if the second gunman had fired without the first? If 
the  answer  to  both  questions  is  ‘no’—if both counterfactuals are false—
then the death was not overdetermined, for it was jointly caused by the 
two gunshots. If only one of the counterfactuals is false, at most one of 
the gunmen is guilty. So the truth of the counterfactuals does play an 
important role in our willingness to say that some effect is 
overdetermined.”  (Ibid:  477)   
 
                                                 
16 Although in this passage Bennett takes m to refer to a mental property and p to refer to the 
physical property that realizes m, for the moment, we can let m and p represent any kinds of 
properties, since (O1) and (O2) are intended to provide necessary conditions for any case of 
overdetermination. I refer to m and p as mental and physical properties below.   
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Bennett is right to suggest that this kind of simple counterfactual 
reasoning plays an important role in our willingness to state a case of 
overdetermination. In fact, it is difficult to understand what overdetermination 
could amount to in the absence of the truth of these counterfactuals. Moreover, 
one only has to review the way in which overdetermination is discussed in the 
literature17 to see that it is widely accepted that the truth of these counterfactuals 
provide a necessary condition for overdetermination. 
The important question to answer of course is whether mental and 
physical properties meet this necessary requirement. Now, as Bennett explains, 
in order for this requirement to be met it would need to be true that if mental 
property m had occurred without physical property p, effect e would still have 
occurred and if p had occurred without m, e would still occur. However, because 
of the nature of the supervenient relationship between m and p, namely SSmn, or 
strong supervenience that holds with metaphysical necessity, it is impossible for 
p to occur without m and impossible for m to occur without p (or more precisely, 
some physical  realizer  p’).  Consequently,  at  least  one  of  the  counterfactuals  will 
turn out false and/or vacuous18, given that they have impossible antecedents and 
there is a strong sense in which the vacuity of even one of the counterfactuals 
means that genuine overdetermination is not possible. As Bennett puts it,   
 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Kim (1998a: 44-45), Papineau (2004: 18) and Crane (1995: 5).   
18 I differ here in my opinion from Bennett as to which counterfactual is false and/or vacuous. 
Although I agree with Bennett that O2 is false and vacuous, Bennett claims that O1 is true, 
whereas I think we have good reason to think that both counterfactuals are false and vacuous. 
Very roughly, this is because although because of multiple realization O1 will strictly turn out 
true, because of the implications of supervenience and causal closure, it is necessary that m 
supervenes on some physical  base  (call  it  p’)  and  it  would  be impossible for m to occur and cause 
e  without  p’,  hence  O1  would turn out false/vacuous. Nonetheless, for the sake of this argument 
this issue is not crucial, since I agree with Bennett that the vacuity of even one of the 
counterfactuals is enough to make overdetermination impossible.   
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“To   put   the   point more formally: if one of the causes necessitates the 
other, if it is at least metaphysically impossible for the one to occur 
without the other, then one of the overdetermination counterfactuals will 
come out vacuous. And there is something to be said for the idea that the 
vacuity   of   one   of   them   means   that   the   effect   is   not   overdetermined.”  
(Ibid: 479)  
 
 What   Bennett’s   argument   suggests   is   that   because   of   the   ‘tight  
metaphysical   connection’   between   mental   and   physical   properties,  
overdetermination is simply not possible in the case of mental causation. What 
this means is that when we are presented with a case in which some physical 
effect supposedly has both a mental and a physical cause, such as in the case of 
P*, we can be sure that although both properties may be sufficient19 for that 
effect, they do not run the risk of overdetermining that effect, since they fail to be 
metaphysically distinct in the way required for genuine overdetermination to 
occur.  
 Moreover, it is clear that without the idea that the physical effects of 
mental causes are always overdetermined by two metaphysically distinct, 
sufficient causes, Kim cannot reach the conclusion of the exclusion problem20. 
This is because without a claim of overdetermination, there would be no 
motivation for claiming that when faced with a case of supposed mental 
causation, involving both a mental and a physical cause, the non-reductive 
physicalist must exclude one of the causes (which, it turns out, must be the 
                                                 
19 We have, of course, yet to provide a positive account of how to understand the causal relevance 
of mental property M. For example, I go on to suggest that M can only be considered as a 
sufficient cause of its effect in virtue of the fact that it supervenes on sufficient physical cause P.   
20 As it has been presented above.  
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mental cause given the commitment to causal closure) in order to avoid 
overdetermination. Put slightly differently, once one realises that mental and 
physical properties cannot genuinely overdetermine their effects, both 
formulations  of  Kim’s  exclusion  principle  appear  to  be  either  irrelevant  or  simply 
false.  (This  is  because  Bennett’s  argument  shows  precisely  that  it  is possible for 
an effect to have a sufficient cause at t and have an additional sufficient cause at t 
without that effect being overdetermined, so long as those causes are not 
metaphysically distinct causes of that effect, which they cannot be in the case of 
mental causation.) And without the exclusion principle, as Kim himself accepts, 
the non-reductive physicalist would merely be forced to accept that the physical 
effects of mental causes have both a mental and a physical cause, without, 
however, facing the threat of a priori exclusion that follows once one assumes 
that those properties are overdetermining causes.  
 It is also clear that Kim acknowledges that overdetermination, in the 
standard sense, is not possible in the case of mental causation. As Kim writes,   
 
“In   standard   cases   of   overdetermination,   like   two   bullets   hitting   the  
victim’s   heart   at   the   same   time,   the   short   circuit   and   the   overturned  
lantern causing a house fire, and so on, each overdetermining cause plays 
a distinct and distinctive causal role. The usual notion of 
overdetermination involves two or more separate and independent causal 
chains intersecting at a common effect. Because of Supervenience, 
however, that is not  the  kind  of  situation  we  have  here.”  (Kim,  2005:  48) 
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3.3.2.2 Exclusion All Over Again 
 
 However, rather than recognising the serious implications that this has for 
the exclusion problem, Kim claims that the fact that overdetermination is not 
possible in the case of mental causation actually provides further support for his 
a priori exclusion argument. In this final section, I demonstrate that this 
conclusion  depends,  once  again,  on  Kim’s  assumption  that  causation  is  identical  
to sufficient production.   
 The first way that I suggest that the   assumption  of  SP  motivates  Kim’s  
exclusion argument, even after Kim acknowledges that overdetermination is not 
possible,  can  be  seen   in  Kim’s   (2005)   response   to  Ned  Block,  who  also  points  
out that genuine overdetermination is not possible in the case of mental 
causation. In this discussion, Kim explains that although it is not strictly true that 
it is impossible for mental property M to occur without physical property P 
(since, because of multiple realization, M may be realized by another physical 
property on another occasion), supervenience and causal closure do guarantee 
that M is realized by some physical  property,  call  it  P’,  and  according  to  Kim,  the  
causal  exclusion  of  M  follows  all  over  again  as  a  result  of  M’s  supervenience  on  
P’.  As  Kim  writes,   
 
“…we  have  a  replay  of  exactly  the  same  situation  with  which  we  began- 
M  has  a  physical  base,  P’,  threatening  to  preempt  it  as  a  cause  of  P*.  In  
any world in which Supervenience holds and M causes P*, some physical 
property, instantiated at the same time, can claim to be a sufficient cause 
of P*. As long as Supervenience is held constant, there is no world in 
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which M by itself, independently of a physical base, brings about P*; 
whenever M* claims to be a cause of P*, there is some physical property 
waiting to  claim  at  least  an  equal  causal  status.”  (Ibid:  47) 
 
 What Kim seems to be suggesting in this passage is that the occurrence of 
P’   generates   a   tension   for   the   supposed   causal   role   that   supervening   mental  
property M can play in relation to P*. In fact, Kim makes it clear that the mere 
occurrence  of  P’  (which  he  correctly  observes  is  guaranteed  by  supervenience  to  
be   instantiated  whenever  M  is   instantiated)   threatens   to   ‘pre-empt’  and  exclude  
M’s  causal  role.21 As  we  saw  in  Kim’s  argument  above,  this  supposed tension is 
reflected   in   his   appeal   to   Edwards’   dictum,   which   states   that   supervenience  
excludes ‘horizontal’  (i.e.  mental)  causation. 
 Once again, I suggest that this conclusion depends crucially on the 
assumption of SP. This is because, once one makes this assumption, then by 
being  sufficient  to  bring  about  its  effect,  P’,  just  like  P,  would  simply  exhaust  all  
there   is   to   cause   and   causally   explain   regarding   P*’s   occurrence   and   would  
provide the motivation for excluding the causal role that any additional, mental 
property might play. Moreover, given that it has now been recognised that P* 
cannot be   overdetermined   by   M   and   P’   (whereas   Kim’s   original   exclusion  
argument relied on the fact that the non-reductive physicalist must merely avoid 
overdetermination) it seems that there  really  would  be  ‘nothing   left’   for  mental  
property  M   to   causally  contribute  given   the  occurrence  of  P’22. As Kim puts it 
elsewhere,  “in  making  a  physical  cause  available   to  substitute  for  every  mental  
                                                 
21 More  accurately,  since  P’  is  a  disjunctive  physical  property,  it  would  be  one  of  the  disjuncts  of  
P’,  instantiated  on  some  particular  occasion  that causes this supposed tension.   
22 This again relies on the related assumption that M would have to cause P* by being a distinct, 
sufficient cause of P*.  
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cause, it appears to make mental causes  dispensable  in  any  case.”  (Kim,  1998a:  
44-45) However, as I argued above, one would only reach this conclusion if one 
assumed that causation is identical to sufficient production; without this 
assumption, there is no a priori reason that P or P’  would   automatically   ‘pre-
empt’  or  make  ‘dispensable’  the  causal  role  of  mental  property  M  in  relation  to  
P*. 
 The second way that I suggest the   assumption   of   SP   motivates   Kim’s  
exclusion argument, even after Kim acknowledges that overdetermination is not 
possible, can be seen in the following passage23: 
  
“In   the   actual   world,   we   may   suppose   that   a   continuous   causal   chain  
connects   P   with   P*…And   it   would   be   incoherent   to   suppose   there   is  
another causal chain from M to P* that is independent of the causal 
process connecting P with P*; the only plausible supposition is that if 
there is a causal path from M to P*, that must coincide with the causal 
path   from   P   to   P*…To   be   a   cause   of   P*,   M   must   somehow   ride  
piggyback  on  physical  causal  chains…And  we  may  ask:  In  virtue of what 
relation it bears to physical property P does M earn its entitlement to a 
free ride on the causal chain from P to P* and to claim this causal chain to 
be its own? Obviously, the only significant relation M bears to P is 
supervenience. But why should supervenience confer this right on M? 
The fact of the matter is that there is only one causal process here, from P 
to  P*,   and  M’s   supposed   causal   contribution   to   the   production   of  P*   is  
                                                 
23 As we will see, this argument depends specifically on the productive aspect of the assumption 
of SP and more specifically, on the closely related idea that causation necessary involves some 
kind of productive process or chain.  
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totally mysterious…The usual notion of overdetermination involves two 
or more separate and independent causal chains intersecting at a common 
effect. Because of Supervenience, however, that is not the kind of 
situation we have here. In this sense, this is not a case of genuine causal 
overdetermination, and Exclusion applies   in   a   straightforward   way.”  
(Ibid: 47-48) 
 
What Kim seems to be suggesting in this passage is that since it has been 
recognised that this supposed case of mental causation could not be a case of 
overdetermination, whereby M could produce P* via a metaphysically distinct, 
productive chain or process, M could therefore have no causal role to play in 
relation  to  P*,  unless  it  somehow  rode  ‘piggyback’  on  the  only  productive  chain  
(and hence the only apparently genuine causal chain) that goes from P to P*.24 
Kim then questions whether we should accept that supervenience can 
legitimately confer a causal role on M in this way and concludes that given that 
this cannot be a case of overdetermination, the exclusion of M applies in a more 
‘straightforward  way’. 
Now, there is a lot going on in this passage, but it is important to 
recognise that the exclusion of the mental depends, once again, on the 
assumption of SP. In order to see this, note that although Kim is correct to point 
out that this cannot be a case of overdetermination, whereby M could cause P* 
via a metaphysically distinct, sufficient productive chain or process, without the 
assumption that this kind of sufficient production is identical to causation, there 
                                                 
24 Remember that M cannot somehow contribute to the causal process that goes from P to P*, 
given that P is supposed to be sufficient for P* (i.e. given that this would violate causal closure).  
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would be no reason to conclude that M could have no causal role to play in 
relation  to  P*  unless  it  rode  ‘piggyback’  on  the  productive  chain  that  goes  from  P  
to  P*.  Without   this   assumption,   one   could   claim,   for   example,   that  M’s   causal  
relevance to P* should be understood in terms of counterfactual dependence, 
which claims precisely that properties can be causally relevant to their effects 
without causing those effects via metaphysically distinct, productive chains or 
processes. This is, in effect, the strategy that I adopt in Chapter 5, in which I 
demonstrate   that   Woodward’s   interventionist   account   of   mental   causation  
provides an account by which mental properties can be causally relevant to their 
effects without being metaphysically distinct from the physical causes of those 
effects.  
In response to a paper by Barry Loewer, Kim (2002) does in fact 
acknowledge that his exclusion problem depends on a conception of causation as 
‘production’   or   ‘generation’,   but   rejects   the   possibility   that a counterfactual 
approach to causation could provide a satisfactory account of the causal 
relevance of mental properties and provide a solution to the exclusion problem. I 
will   not   discuss   Kim’s   general   worries   with   the   counterfactual   approach   to  
causation here, since I demonstrate in Chapters 4 and 5 that interventionism 
simply avoids these problems. However, it is worth considering why Kim thinks 
that counterfactual dependence could not, in general, provide a satisfactory 
account of the causal relevance of mental properties, since it sheds light on 
Kim’s  reasoning  behind  his a priori exclusion problem and further suggests how 
we might avoid this problem.  
Why then does Kim think that counterfactual dependence could not 
provide a satisfactory account of the causal relevance of mental properties and 
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that the SP concept of causation is required to ground the causal status of mental 
properties? I suggest that the answer lies in the following passage from Kim: 
 
“Why   should   we   resort   to   this   “thick”   variety   of   causation   in   thinking  
about mental causation? My answer is pretty simple: We care about 
mental causation because we care about human agency, and agency 
requires the productive/generative conception of causation. I don't have a 
knock-down argument to prove that agency requires productive 
causation; I hope what I will say here makes my claim at least plausible. 
It seems to me that mere counterfactual dependence is not enough to 
sustain the causal relation involved in our idea of acting upon the natural 
course of events and bringing about changes so as to actualize what we 
desire and intend. An agent is someone who, on account of her beliefs, 
desires, emotions, intentions, and the like, has the capacity to perform 
actions in the physical world—that is, to cause her limbs and other bodily 
parts (e.g., the vocal cords) to move in appropriate ways so as to bring 
about changes in the arrangement of objects and events around her—open 
a door, pick up the morning paper, and make a cup of coffee. It seems to 
me that without productive causation, which respects the 
locality/contiguity condition,   such   causal   processes   are   not   possible.”  
(Kim, 2010a: 236) 
 
Is Kim right to suggest that without productive causation there would be 
no  agency?  The  short  answer,  quite  simply,  is  ‘no’.  In  order  to  see  this,  note  that  
the non-reductive physicalist who endorses a counterfactual account of causation 
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would not be committed to denying that the physical effects of mental causes are 
also caused by subvenient physical properties, which are sufficient to produce, or 
determine those effects (presumably via a continuous productive process of some 
kind), but in fact, given her commitment to causal closure and supervenience, she 
would be minimally committed to this idea.25  
When we are presented with a supposed case of mental causation, in 
which causal relevance is understood in terms of counterfactual dependence, I 
suggest that we can therefore be certain that the physical effects of those causes, 
such as the movements involved in picking up the morning paper, or making a 
cup of coffee, are still produced, or determined by the subvenient physical 
realizers of those mental causes, since this is guaranteed by causal closure and 
supervenience. The key difference between the non-reductive physicalist in this 
case and Kim is that the former denies, while the latter insists, that this kind of 
sufficient production is identical to causation and I hope to have shown that it is 
only once one makes this assumption that the exclusion problem becomes 
inevitable.  
Of course, given that Kim assumes that this kind of sufficient production 
is identical to causation and mistakenly assumes that mental properties must be 
sufficient to produce their effects in order to qualify as genuine causes, it is easy 
to see why Kim concludes that M could have no causal role to play in relation to 
P*, other than the one that it acquires by supervening on P, since it really is true 
that M cannot cause P* in this productive sense, but rather, can only produce P* 
in virtue of the fact that it supervenes on P. This assumption  is  reflected  in  Kim’s  
‘Causal  Inheritance  Principle’,  which  he  defines  as  follows:       
                                                 
25 I argued for this at length in the previous chapter.  
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“If  M is instantiated on a given occasion by being realized by P, then the 
causal powers of this instance of M are identical with (perhaps, a subset 
of) the causal powers of P.”  (Kim,  2003b:  208) 
  
 According to Kim, the implications of the Causal Inheritance Principle 
for the non-reductive  physicalist   are  “devastating”   (Ibid:  209).  For  Kim,   this   is  
because   once   we   realise   that   the   ‘causal   powers’   of   mental   properties   are  
identical to those of their subvenient bases, it brings into question the non-
reductive physicalist’s   claim   that   mental   properties   are   genuinely   distinct,  
irreducible properties. For Kim, the natural consequence of the Causal 
Inheritance Principle is therefore reduction:   
 
“…mental   events   and   states   have   the   causal   efficacy   that   they   have  
because their neural/physical realizers have causal efficacy. In fact, a 
mental state, occurring on a given occasion, in virtue of being realized by 
a certain neural/physical state, has exactly the causal powers of that 
physical  state…once  we  are  prepared  to  say  what we have just said, the 
next natural step to take—in my view, a step we are compelled to take— 
is to reductively identify this particular mental state with its 
neural/physical   realizer.  This   of   course   is   to   jettison   the   “nonreductive”  
part of nonreductive  physicalism.”  (Kim,  2010a:  239)     
  
As Kim goes on to explain,  
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“To   resist   the   reductive   move   of   identification   is   to   recognize   the  
existence of something whose causal work is at best superfluous, and 
nonexistent  at  worst.”  (Ibid:  263) 
 
Once again, I suggest that this conclusion depends crucially on the 
assumption of SP. This is because one would only be forced to accept the Causal 
Inheritance Principle and accept that the causal powers of a supervenient mental 
property are identical and hence reducible to those of its subvenient base if one 
assumed that causation is identical to sufficient production, since Kim is right 
that   supervenient   mental   properties   could   have   no   ‘new   causal   powers’,  
independent of their subvenient bases in this sense.26  Without this assumption, 
however, there would be no reason to conclude that the causal relevance of the 
mental  is  at  best  ‘superfluous’,  or  worse  still,  ‘non-existent’.    
Lastly, it is important to emphasise that as non-reductive physicalists we 
should not actually be surprised to discover that mental properties can only 
produce their effects, or be considered as sufficient causes of those effects, in 
virtue of the fact that they supervene on physical properties. As I explained in 
                                                 
26 There  is,  therefore,  a  sense  in  which  Kim’s  Causal  Inheritance  Principle  is  correct,  since  it  is  
true that mental properties only have the power to produce or determine their effects in virtue of 
the fact that they supervene on sufficient physical causes. However, what I have argued is that 
one would only be forced to accept that the causal powers of mental properties are thereby 
identical and hence reducible to those of their subvenient physical realizers if one assumed that 
this kind of sufficient production is identical to causation. (Without this assumption, for example, 
the non-reductive physicalist would merely be committed to accepting that mental properties 
derive  their  ‘productive  power’  from  their  subvenient  physical  realizers,  rather  than  their  ‘causal 
power’.)  Consider,  for  example,  Kim’s  discussion  (2010a:  238-239)  of  Terrence  Horgan’s  non-
reductive account of mental causation. According to Horgan, the mental can be said to have 
genuine  causal  ‘efficacy’  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  mental  properties supervene on physical 
properties, which are sufficient to produce and determine their effects. In this case, it seems Kim 
is  right  to  claim  that  the  ‘causal  powers’  of  Horgan’s  mental  properties  would  be  reducible  to  
those of their subvenient physical realizers. However, it is important to recognise that this is only 
because Horgan also assumes that causation is identical to sufficient production. Without this 
assumption,  there  would  be  no  reason  to  accept  this  conclusion.  See  also  Kim’s  worries  (Kim,  
1998a: 72-77)  with  Frank  Jackson  and  Philip  Pettit’s  theory  of  ‘Program  Explanation’  (1990a,  
1990b).    
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detail in Chapter 2, this is because it was our commitment to causal closure 
(which implies that mental properties cannot exert any force or energy into the 
physical domain to produce or determine physical effects) and our commitment 
to the idea that the widespread overdetermination of physical effects by two 
metaphysically distinct, sufficient causes would be implausible, that we accepted 
that the mental must supervene on the physical and hence that we should be 
physicalists in the first place (c.f. the Causal Argument from Chapter 2). In other 
words,  these  ‘limitations’  on  mental  causation  are,  I  suggest,  direct  consequences  
of the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism. What I hope to have 
shown in this chapter is that while for Kim, who assumes that this kind of 
sufficient production is identical to causation, this is the end of the story for non-
reductive physicalists (given that the exclusion of the mental seems inevitable 
once one accepts this assumption), for non-reductive physicalists who reject this 
assumption, this is just the beginning of the story.  
What I think this discussion therefore suggests is that the real challenge 
that faces the non-reductive physicalist regarding mental causation is how to 
provide an account of mental causation that explains how mental properties can 
have genuinely distinct causal roles (thus avoiding the threat of reduction), whilst 
being ontologically identical with and metaphysically inseparable from their 
subvenient physical realizers, which are sufficient to produce their effects. This, I 
believe,   is   the   real   remaining   ‘problem’   of  mental   causation   for   non-reductive 
physicalism, but I hope to have shown that there is no a priori barrier to 
providing such an account unless one assumes that causation is identical to 
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sufficient production.27 My task in the remainder of this thesis is to provide such 
an account.   
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have argued that the exclusion problem only follows a 
priori from the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism when they 
are combined with an assumption regarding causation, this being the assumption 
that causation is identical to sufficient production. I began by examining the SP 
concept of causation itself and demonstrated that Kim makes the assumption of 
SP.  I  then  demonstrated  how  Kim’s  exclusion  problem,  as  it  is  most  commonly  
presented, depends crucially on this assumption and that without it, the minimal 
commitments of non-reductive physicalism do not lead to the a priori exclusion 
of the mental. In the final section, I demonstrated that even once Kim 
acknowledges that overdetermination is not possible in the case of mental 
causation, rather than recognising the serious implications that this has for the 
exclusion problem, Kim once again generates this problem because of the 
assumption of SP. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the exclusion problem 
(either in its original formulation, or as Kim presents it after recognising that 
overdetermination is not possible) does not follow a priori from the minimal 
                                                 
27 There are some, for example Burge (2003) and Baker (2003), who argue that exclusion 
arguments place too much importance on metaphysics and not enough importance on actual 
explanatory practice, which they claim would reveal that the mental is genuinely causal and 
explanatory. However, I agree with Kim (1998a) that the relevant issue in exclusion argument 
debates is not whether mental causation is real, but how mental causation is possible given the 
metaphysical implications of non-reductive physicalism. Although I argue that the mental plays 
an  important  explanatory  role  that  is  simply  missing  on  Kim’s  account  of  causation,  the  argument  
that I present in this thesis does attempt to provide a solution to the exclusion problem that 
acknowledges the real metaphysical challenges that are posed by a commitment to non-reductive 
physicalism. 
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commitments of non-reductive physicalism, but depends crucially on the 
assumption of SP.  
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4. Interventionism 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter I argued that the exclusion problem only follows a 
priori from the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism when they 
are combined with an assumption regarding causation, this being the assumption 
that causation is identical to sufficient production. All of this of course says 
nothing about whether the non-reductive physicalist is in fact committed to the 
assumption of SP, or whether the non-reductive physicalist must therefore accept 
the exclusion problem.  
In this chapter I outline and examine an alternative theory of causation, 
this being the theory of interventionism proposed by James Woodward (2003) 
and present an argument that undermines the assumption of SP. More 
specifically, I aim to do the following three things in this chapter: Firstly, I 
outline Woodward’s  version  of  interventionism and in particular, examine those 
features of this theory that are especially relevant to my argument in Chapter 5, 
in which I present the interventionist account of mental causation as a solution to 
the exclusion problem. Secondly, I highlight some problems that the SP concept 
of causation faces and present interventionism as a coherent alternative theory of 
causation that avoids these problems, undermining the assumption of SP and 
hence demonstrating that the non-reductive physicalist need not accept Kim’s  a  
priori exclusion problem. Lastly, I address some general objections raised against 
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counterfactual theories of causation, of which interventionism is an example. It is 
important to address these general problems if interventionism is to provide a 
coherent account of mental causation and satisfactory solution to the exclusion 
problem.  
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, I outline and examine 
the central features of interventionism and in particular, examine those features 
that are especially relevant to my argument in Chapter 5. In Section 4.2.1, I 
examine the central interventionist notion of invariance, in Section 4.2.2, I 
examine the technical notion of an intervention and in Section 4.2.3, I explore the 
interventionist conception of causal explanation. In Section 4.3, I highlight some 
problems for the SP concept of causation and demonstrate that interventionism 
avoids these problems, thereby undermining the assumption of SP. In order to 
demonstrate this, I argue, in Section 4.3.1 that the SP concept of causation does 
not provide necessary conditions for causation. In Section 4.3.2, I argue that 
providing nomologically sufficient conditions for the occurrence of some effect 
is not sufficient for causal explanation and demonstrate that interventionism is 
able to avoid these problems. In Section 4.4, I address the worry that despite the 
problems that the SP concept faces, interventionism fails to provide a viable 
alternative to this theory and hence fails to undermine the assumption of SP, 
since it faces serious problems of its own, which the SP concept avoids. These 
are problems concerning cases of overdetermination (Section 4.4.1), non-
paradigmatic causation and causation by omissions (Section 4.4.2). I argue that 
not only can interventionism overcome these problems, but it is actually able to 
deal with some of these problems in a more satisfying way than the SP concept. I 
conclude that interventionism does, after all, provide a viable alternative theory 
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of causation to the SP concept and does therefore undermine the assumption of 
SP. Lastly, in Section 4.5, I discuss some remaining problems concerning the 
potentially anthropocentric (Section 4.5.1), anti-realist (Section 4.5.2) and 
circular nature of interventionism (Section 4.5.3). I conclude that interventionism 
can avoid these problems and that it can be used to provide a coherent account of 
mental causation and satisfactory solution to the exclusion problem. An in depth 
analysis and defence of interventionism is well beyond the scope of this thesis, so 
I focus only on those features of the theory that are most relevant to my 
argument.  
 
4.2 Interventionism Outlined and Clarified  
 
 According to the interventionist theory of causation proposed by James 
Woodward (2003, 2008a, 2011a), the distinguishing feature of all causal 
relationships is that they are potentially exploitable for the purposes of control 
and manipulation. Very roughly, in order for X to cause Y it is necessary and 
sufficient that there is some intervention on X that changes Y. Woodward 
provides the following, more precise definition of interventionism1:  
 
                                                 
1 Remember that according to interventionism, the relata of causation can be best understood as 
variables that can take different values and that variables can represent properties, events and 
states. See Chapter 1 for further details. It is also important to point out that this definition (and a 
definition relating to the notion of an intervention) will be amended slightly in Chapter 6 in order 
to deal with an objection raised by Michael Baumgartner (2009, 2010). For now, I continue to use 
Woodward’s  original  definition,  since  I  demonstrate  in  Chapter  6  that  the  validity  of  the 
arguments  in  this  chapter  and  the  next  are  not  affected  by  Baumgartner’s  objections.  
Nevertheless, it will become clear that the interventionist must make this amendment in order to 
address the objections raised by Baumgartner. Lastly, although this definition only provides 
necessary and sufficient conditions for type-level causation, I will discuss the interventionist 
approach to token-level causation below.  
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“(M) A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level) direct 
cause of Y with respect to a variable set V is that there be a possible 
intervention on X that will change Y or the probability distribution of Y 
when one holds fixed at some value all other variables Zi in V. A 
necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level) contributing 
cause of Y with respect to variable set V is that (i) there be a directed path 
from X to Y such that each link in this path is a direct causal 
relationship…and   that   (ii)   there   be   some   intervention   on   X that will 
change Y when all other variables in V that are not on this path are fixed 
at some value. (Woodward, 2003: 59)2 
 
The notion of an intervention is examined in more detail below, but for 
now it will be helpful to illustrate the basic idea of interventionism with an 
example   of   Woodward’s:   it   has   been   found   that   students   who   attend   private  
school tend to score higher on tests that measure scholastic achievement than 
students who attend a government funded school.3 Now, this raises the question 
of whether the relationship between attendance at private school and scholastic 
achievement is genuinely causal, in that private school attendance causes 
scholastic achievement or whether it is merely correlative, in that both attendance 
at private school and scholastic achievement are joint effects of a common cause, 
such  as  parents’  attitude  to  education,  or  their  socio-economic status. According 
to interventionism, the question of whether attendance at private school causes 
scholastic achievement, or whether it is merely correlated with it, can be 
                                                 
2 Woodward differentiates between the notions of direct and contributing causes to accommodate 
the complexities of causation. However, this distinction is not directly relevant to the argument in 
this thesis. Woodward (2003), especially pp. 45-61, provides further details.  
3 Based on figures from the US school system.  
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identified with the question of whether scholastic achievement would change 
under a suitable intervention on attendance at private school (Woodward, 2008a: 
219-220). In general, if intervening on whether a student attends private school is 
a way of intervening on scholastic achievement, while other causes of scholastic 
achievement are held fixed, then this relationship will qualify as causal. 
Conversely, if scholastic achievement does not change under an intervention on 
private school attendance, while other causes of scholastic achievement are held 
fixed, then this relationship will fail to qualify as causal.4   
Put slightly differently, in order for X to cause Y there must exist some 
possible intervention, understood very roughly as an idealised experiment, either 
hypothetical or actual, on X that changes Y. If such a relationship of potential 
control and manipulation exists between X and Y then it will be true that the 
relationship between X and Y is in fact causal. Woodward captures this 
distinguishing   feature  of   interventionism   in   the   form  of   the   slogan,   “No   causal  
difference without a difference in manipulability relations, and no difference in 
manipulability  relations  without  a  causal  difference.”  (Woodward,  2003:  61) 
This example also highlights the important practical focus of 
interventionism and its relationship to the notions of control and manipulation. 
Now, this practical focus follows naturally from the interventionist definition of 
causation, since knowing that intervening on X is a way of intervening on Y has 
a potential practical benefit in that it allows us to potentially use X as a means of 
controlling or manipulating Y. For example, knowing that intervening on 
                                                 
4 It  is  worth  noting  that  Woodward’s  main  concern  in  his  2003  exposition  of  interventionism  is  
with deterministic causation, for which these kinds of counterfactuals will be appropriate. 
Woodward does note that interventionism can also apply to indeterministic causation, but that the 
counterfactuals that are appropriate for assessing causation in this case will be different. This is 
an interesting issue, but is beyond the scope of this thesis.   
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attendance at private school is a way of changing scholastic achievement, allows 
us to use attendance as a means of controlling scholastic achievement (we might, 
for example, choose to send our children to a private school, given this causal 
knowledge).  As I argue in Section 4.3, this potential practical payoff is missing 
on the SP concept of causation and as I explain in Chapter 5, this practical payoff 
plays an important role in the interventionist account of mental causation.  
Moreover, as Woodward notes, because of this practical focus, this 
concept of causation is invoked in a wide variety of the sciences, including 
statistics, economics, computer science and molecular biology, as evidenced by 
the fact that the standard for proving causation in these theories implies 
something like an interventionist concept of causation.5 Although the fact that 
interventionism is invoked by a broad range of the sciences does not guarantee 
that this theory provides a correct analysis of causation, I suggest that it is 
nonetheless a virtue of the theory that it seems to reflect the causal practices and 
judgements of a broad range of the sciences.   
Given that interventionism understands the information that is relevant 
for determining6 whether a relationship is causal or non-causal in modal, or 
                                                 
5 For  example,  the  ‘gold  standard’  for  determining  whether  X  causes Y in many of these 
disciplines involves the notion of a randomised controlled experiment, whose features are 
relevantly similar to the technical notion of an intervention, to be spelled out below.  
6 Although much of the language that Woodward uses to define interventionism is somewhat 
epistemic in nature (e.g. Woodward often focuses on how we, as humans, can determine or 
establish whether X causes Y), this is not to say that interventionism is thereby problematically 
subjective or anthropocentric. I discuss this issue in detail in Section 4.5 below, but for now, it is 
worth noting the following point from Woodward (2003: 22). As Woodward rightly points out, 
although a theory of causation should distinguish between issues having to do with the content or 
meaning of causal claims and issues about how we test such claims, this is not to overlook the 
fact that a theory of causation should explain how these two issues fit together. As Woodward 
puts  it,  “In  particular,  our  theory  of  the  content  of  causal  and  explanatory claims should be 
accompanied by some epistemological story that makes it understandable how human beings can 
sometimes learn whether claims with that content are true or false from evidence that is actually 
available  to  them.”  (Ibid:  22)  We  should therefore expect a certain amount of epistemic language 
to feature in interventionism, although this should not lead the reader to conclude that 
interventionism is problematically subjective or anthropocentric for the reasons I outline below.   
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counterfactual terms (it states that we should consider what would happen to the 
effect under a suitable intervention of its purported cause) interventionism can be 
classed as a counterfactual theory of causation.7 I highlight some of the 
consequences of this below.8  
Firstly, according to interventionism, all causal claims and causal 
explanations provide counterfactual information about what would happen to the 
effect under a suitable manipulation of its purported cause, rather than only 
providing information about what actually did happen to the effect given the 
occurrence of its cause. Consequently, all causal explanations share the feature of 
being able to answer  what  Woodward   calls   ‘what-if-things-had-been-different‘  
questions,   (or   ‘w-questions   for   short’).   The   practical   implications   of   this  
constraint on causal explanation are made clear later in this chapter and its 
importance to the interventionist account of mental causation is made clear in 
Chapter 5.  
Secondly,   all   causal   claims   and   explanations   have   ‘built   into   them’   a  
contrastive   structure   or,   as   Woodward   calls   it,   a   ‘contrastive   focus’.   This  
naturally follows from the interventionist account of causation, since as 
Woodward explains,  
                                                 
7 There is on-going debate as to the kind of counterfactuals that are involved in causation. For 
example, can they be indicative counterfactuals, or are they limited to counterfactuals expressed 
in the subjunctive mood? These issues are not directly relevant to the argument in this thesis, but 
are discussed in detail in Hoerl, C. McCormack, S. Beck, S. R. (eds.) (2011).  
8 One may worry that since this account appeals to the truth of various counterfactuals to define 
causation, it needs to provide an account of what makes these counterfactuals true (i.e. what their 
truth-makers  are),  given  that  counterfactuals  cannot  be  ‘barely  true’.  It  is  usually  thought  that  
laws fulfil this role, but as we will see, interventionism rejects the idea that laws are required for 
causation and explanation and replaces the notion of a law with the notion of an invariant 
generalization.  Although  I  do  think  that  it  is  possible  to  provide  an  account  of  the  ‘truth-makers’  
of interventionist counterfactuals in terms of invariant generalizations, as Woodward points out, 
providing  such  an  account  will  not  be  crucial,  since  “…what  matters  for  the  arguments  that  
follow is whether causal claims and explanations are related to interventionist counterfactuals in 
the way that I have claimed—any account of the truth conditions for counterfactuals that is 
consistent  with  these  relationships  will  be  acceptable  for  the  purposes  of  this  essay.”  (Woodward,  
2003: 10) 
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 “Any  manipulation   of   a   cause  will   involve   a   change   from   one   state   to  
some specific alternative, and how, if at all, a putative effect is changed 
under this manipulation will depend on the alternative state to which the 
cause is changed. Thus, if causal claims are to convey information about 
what will happen under hypothetical manipulations, they must convey the 
information that one or more specific changes in the cause will change 
the  effect…This  in  turn  means  that  all  causal claims must be interpretable 
as  having  a  contrastive  structure,  and  it  also  has  the  implication…that  to  
causally explain an outcome is always to explain why it rather than some 
alternative occurred.”  (Woodward,  2003:  145-146) 
 
In other words, given that interventionism necessarily understands causation as 
involving a manipulation (hypothetical, or actual), which changes the cause 
variable from one state to another, causal claims and causal explanations will 
always have built into them a contrastive focus, which tells us that it is the fact 
that the cause variable took this value rather than that value, which caused the 
effect variable to take the value it did. As Woodward (2008a: 225) explains, the 
notion of contrastive focus thus captures the central interventionist idea that 
causes essentially ‘make a difference’ to their effects. The important practical 
implications of the notion of contrastive focus are explored in more detail below 
and in the next chapter, but it is important to recognise that contrastive focus is 
thus built into the interventionist concept of causation and is therefore a feature 
that all causal claims and explanations should exhibit.  
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4.2.1 Invariance 
 
With this discussion as a background, I will now examine, in detail, the 
central interventionist notion of invariance. According to interventionism, it is 
invariance  that  is  “the  key  feature  a  relationship  must  possess  if  it  is  to  count  as  
causal   or   explanatory”   (Woodward,   2003:   239)   and   hence   it   is   invariance that 
distinguishes genuinely causal from non-causal relationships. Moreover, as we 
shall see, invariance plays a central role in the argument against the SP concept 
of causation and in the interventionist account of mental causation outlined in the 
next chapter.   
The basic idea of invariance is captured in the following passage:  
  
“…if  a  causal  relationship  between  C and E holds at all, then it must be 
true that (and the relationship must correctly describe how) for some 
interventions and background circumstances, E will change under those 
interventions on C. This in turn implies that there must be some 
relationship between C and E and some interventions on C such that if 
these were to be carried out, that relationship between C and E would not 
break down but rather would continue to hold. When this is true, I say 
that the relationship is invariant under such interventions and background 
circumstances. Thus, according to a manipulationist account of causation, 
if a relationship is to qualify as causal, it must be invariant under some 
interventions.”  (Ibid:  69)   
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In other words, according to interventionism, if the relationship between 
two variables is genuinely causal, we should expect a certain degree of stability 
in the response of the effect to interventions on the purported cause variable. If 
no such stable response (to interventions) exists, then that relationship will fail to 
qualify as causal. For example, in order for it to be true that attendance at private 
school causes scholastic achievement, it must be true that the relationship 
between attendance and achievement is invariant, i.e. that it holds under at least 
some intervention on attendance. If this relationship fails to hold under any 
interventions on attendance, then the relationship will fail to be invariant and 
hence fail to qualify as causal.  
Woodward provides the following precise definition of invariance:   
 
“A  generalization  G (relating, say, changes in the value of X to changes in 
the value of Y) is invariant if G would continue to hold under some 
intervention that changes the value of X in such a way that, according to 
G, the value of Y would change- ‘continue   to  hold’   in   the   sense   that  G 
correctly describes how the value of Y would change under this 
intervention.”  (Ibid:  15)   
 
Now, as the passages above suggest, in order for a relationship or 
generalization to be invariant and hence causal according to interventionism, it is 
not necessary that that relationship is invariant under all changes and background 
conditions, but it is only necessary that it is invariant under a specific kind of 
change, namely an intervention.   
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The reason why it is invariance under interventions that takes a privileged 
role in determining whether X causes Y is simply because it is possible for mere 
correlations to remain invariant under some changes to background conditions.9 
As an illustration, consider the following example (originally due to Lewis, 
1973b): the relationship between a barometer reading, B, and the occurrence of a 
storm, S, is invariant under certain changes, for example, changes to whether it is 
a Tuesday, or a Wednesday, whether the barometer is in London or Beijing and 
so on. However, despite being invariant under these changes, it is clear that B 
does not cause S, since both B and S are joint effects of a common cause, namely 
atmospheric pressure. It is for this reason that Woodward stipulates that it is only 
invariance under interventions (and more specifically, invariance under 
interventions on the variables that feature in the generalization or claim itself) 
that are necessary for determining whether the relationship between X and Y is 
causal.10 
As the passages above also suggest, in order for some relationship or 
generalization to qualify as invariant and hence causal, it is not necessary that 
that relationship is invariant across all interventions, but it is sufficient that it is 
invariant under at least some intervention. In other words, there is a threshold of 
                                                 
9 In Section 4.4 below, I discuss the interventionist notion of insensitivity, which does consider 
changes to background conditions as relevant for assessing the degree of insensitivity.  
10 In fact, it is a specific kind of  intervention  on  those  variables,  namely  a  ‘testing  intervention’  
that is relevant for assessing invariance. Very roughly, the notion of a testing intervention 
captures the idea that interventions should test the discriminating features of a relationship, if 
they are to determine whether that relationship is causal. Consider the following example adapted 
from Woodward (2003: 248-249): imagine that a light is attached to a switch and consider the 
generalization that the light will remain off if the switch is in any position less than 57 degrees 
and will turn on if the switch is in any position greater than 57 degrees. In order to determine 
whether this relationship is causal, the intervention should change the discriminating feature of 
the switch, i.e. change the position of the switch from any position below 57 degrees to any 
position greater than 57 degrees. For the remainder of  Woodward’s  discussion,  he  simply  takes  
the   term   ‘intervention’   to   refer   to   this   specific   kind   of   testing   intervention   and   I   follow  
Woodward in this usage. 
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invariance that a generalization or relationship must pass if it is to qualify as 
causal: those generalizations and relationships that are invariant under at least 
some intervention will pass the threshold of invariance and hence qualify as 
causal11, whereas those generalizations and relationships that are not invariant 
under any interventions will fail to pass the threshold of invariance and hence fail 
to qualify as causal. This captures the intuitive idea that it is possible for X to 
cause Y even though it is not true that X causes Y in every situation and in all 
background conditions. Moreover, it also captures the idea that there is a minimal 
degree of invariance that a relationship or generalization must possess if it is to 
qualify as causal. These points will be especially relevant to our later discussion.    
As well as having a threshold, a feature of invariance that is also relevant 
to the discussion in the next chapter is that invariance comes in varying degrees. 
Significantly, it is the contrast between highly invariant generalizations and 
relationships, on the one hand, and relatively unstable generalizations and 
relationships, on the other, that tracks the difference between highly explanatory 
generalizations and relationships and relatively explanatorily shallow 
generalizations and relationships.12 The reason why highly invariant 
generalizations and relationships are also highly explanatory is fairly simple: by 
being invariant over a wide range of interventions, those generalizations and 
relationships will simply be able to answer a wider range of w-questions. 
Moreover, by being invariant over a wider range of changes, those relationships 
                                                 
11 In saying this I do not mean that X can cause Y even if there is only one single intervention on 
X (that occurs just once, either hypothetically or actually and could never occur again) that 
changes Y, since it is built into the notion of invariance that if X causes Y, the invariant 
relationship between X and Y would be potentially reproducible in the sense that under this 
specific intervention, X would change Y.  
12 The other feature of interventionism that also tracks the difference between better or worse 
causal claims and explanations, and which will be extremely relevant to the argument in this 
thesis, is the notion of contrastive focus, which I will discuss in detail later in this chapter and in 
the next. 
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and generalization will also be more potentially exploitable for the purposes of 
control and manipulation, in the sense that they will continue to hold and hence 
continue to provide a potential means of control, over a wide range of 
interventions. 
By contrast, those generalizations and relationships that are less invariant 
will qualify as less explanatory, since by being invariant over a much more 
limited range of interventions, they will be able to answer a much more limited 
range of w-questions. Moreover, those relationships that display a relatively low 
degree of invariance, whilst allowing some measure of control and manipulation, 
will be less potentially useful since they will break down outside a narrow range 
of interventions. By way of further contrast, note that those relationships that fail 
to be invariant under any interventions and hence fail to qualify as causal, will 
not be potentially useful for the purposes of control and manipulation 
whatsoever, in line with the manipulationist account of causation outlined thus 
far.  
The notion of invariance thus explains how certain generalizations and 
relationships can fail to qualify as causal and explanatory (by failing to pass the 
threshold of invariance), but also explains how generalizations and relationships 
that do pass this threshold (and hence qualify as causal) can come in varying 
degrees and explains the relative explanatory depth of a generalization or 
relationship and its potential for control and manipulation in terms of its degree 
of invariance. As we will see in the next chapter, this feature of interventionism 
plays a central role in the interventionist account of mental causation, since it 
explains how mental properties can often be considered as preferable causes of 
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their effects in comparison to their physical realizers, given their relatively high 
degree of invariance. 
As the discussion above should have made clear, in order for it to be true 
that X causes Y according to interventionism, there must exist some (at least 
minimally) invariant relationship between X and Y, which ensures that X causes 
Y, rather than being merely correlated with it. As Woodward (Ibid: 16) explains, 
we can therefore think of invariance as the feature, in virtue of which certain 
relationships and generalizations qualify as causal; a role that is usually assigned 
to laws of nature on other accounts of causation. What then is the relationship 
between laws and invariant generalizations? (Note that this issue is especially 
relevant to the argument in Section 4.3 below.) 
It is immediately apparent that invariant generalizations do not meet one 
of the presumptive criteria for lawfulness, namely being exceptionless. Now, 
although some (Cartwright, 1980) argue that there are no truly exceptionless 
laws, even at the level of fundamental physics, it is usually thought that genuine 
laws hold without exception and that it is, at least in part, in virtue of being 
exceptionless that generalizations qualify as laws. For example, since the 
generalization   ‘all   inertial   bodies   have   no   acceleration’   is   thought   to   be  
exceptionless and hence is thought to qualify as a genuine physical law, the 
status of this generalization as a law would be undermined by even one instance 
of an inert accelerating body (Carroll, Spring 2012).  
By contrast, generalizations can qualify as invariant and genuinely causal 
and explanatory, even if there are some, if not many exceptions to those 
generalizations. This is because, as I explained above, it is only necessary for 
some generalization to qualify as invariant that there is some intervention on the 
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cause variable that changes the effect variable, allowing for the possibility that 
there are some (possibly many) exceptions to those generalizations.  
For   example,   the   generalization   ‘Smoking   causes   cancer’   would   be  
invariant and hence qualify as causal and explanatory to the extent that the 
variable   ‘cancer’   occurs   more   frequently   when   the   variable   ‘smoking’   is  
introduced via interventions than when smoking is absent.13 This remains true 
even though this relationship has exceptions (for example, some individuals may 
smoke and yet fail to develop lung cancer). Moreover, although this 
generalization may well be explanatorily shallow in comparison to a 
generalization which cites the biological mechanisms14 involved in the 
relationship between smoking and cancer, it is important to emphasise that both 
kinds of generalizations can qualify as genuinely causal and explanatory 
according to interventionism, given that they both qualify as minimally invariant.  
We can therefore see that whether a generalization qualifies as invariant 
and hence causal and explanatory is fairly independent of whether it meets one of 
the presumptive criteria for lawfulness, namely being exceptionless. For 
Woodward, this is significant because it means that interventionism is able to 
avoid a dilemma that other accounts of causation that appeal to a traditional 
account of laws inevitably face. As Woodward (2003: 239) explains, a dilemma 
arises because on the traditional account, it is assumed that laws (understood to 
be exceptionless) are required for causation and successful explanation. Then, 
                                                 
13 Citing prior research, Woodward (2003: 312) explains that since this relationship does remain 
invariant across a range of circumstances, which control for confounding variables, such as 
gender, genetic background, variations in environment and diet and so on, it can be considered as 
a genuine causal generalization.  
14 This is not to imply that mechanistic causal explanations are guaranteed to provide preferable 
explanations of some effect in  comparison  to  ‘higher-level’ (for example, sociological, 
psychological) explanations of some effect, since this depends on the degree of invariance that 
the relationships cited in those explanation possess, and/or on which explanation captures the 
correct contrastive focus.  
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given that special science generalizations do not appear to meet this criterion, it 
seems that one would be forced to conclude either that special science 
generalizations are not laws and hence are not genuinely causal or explanatory, 
or that they are laws, but that they need to be qualified, hence the many complex 
arguments for ceteris paribus laws. Interventionists are simply able to avoid this 
dilemma, since according to interventionism, special science generalizations can 
qualify as invariant and hence causal and explanatory, even if they do not meet 
the traditional criteria for lawfulness. Consequently, interventionism provides a 
useful and convincing account of the generalizations of the special sciences and 
most importantly for our purposes, of the generalizations of psychology.15  
Does this mean that there are no such things as laws according to 
interventionism? Not necessarily. As Woodward notes, there may be examples of 
invariant generalizations, such as the gas laws in fundamental physics that do 
meet the traditional criteria for lawfulness and that may rightly be called laws, or 
even laws of nature. However, the crucial point to emphasise is that these laws of 
nature are not fundamentally different in kind to  the  ‘loose  generalizations’  of  the  
special sciences; laws of nature are simply generalizations that display a very 
high degree of invariance, whereas the generalizations of the special sciences 
will typically display a lower degree of invariance. As Woodward  puts  it,  “rather  
than thinking of all invariant generalizations as laws, I urge instead that we think 
of  laws  as  just  one  kind  of  invariant  generalization.”  (Ibid:  267)  
                                                 
15 Note also that if one does think that laws are required for causation and explanation, then the 
generalizations of the physical sciences, especially physics, will be considered as preferable, 
given that it is arguably only at this level that one is likely to find generalizations that possess the 
standard criteria for lawfulness. By contrast, according to interventionism, there would be no 
automatic preference for the generalizations of the physical sciences, given that invariant 
generalizations can exist at any level.       
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One final feature of interventionism that will be useful to highlight is the 
distinction   between   type   and   token   causation   (or   as  Woodward   calls   it   ‘actual  
causation’  or  AC).     As  should  be  clear   from   the  discussion  above,  a   type-level 
causal   claim,   such   as   ‘Smoking   causes   cancer’,   implies   that   some   token-level 
causal   claim,   such   as   ‘Smith’s   smoking   caused   his   cancer’,  would be true, but 
does not depend for its truth on the actual obtaining of any such particular 
occurrence. This is because all that matters for whether this type-level claim 
qualifies as causal is that there exists some intervention on smoking that changes 
the occurrence of cancer and this may be true even if the intervention is merely 
hypothetical, or even if it is not practically, physically, or even nomically 
possible (more on this below).  
By contrast, token causation does imply the truth of some type-level 
generalization. This is because, in order for it to be true that X is a token, or 
actual cause of Y according to interventionism, there must exist some (type-
level) invariant relationship between the variables. It is important to be clear on 
two things, the relevance of which will become clear in Section 4.3 below. 
Firstly, this is not to say that the associated type-level generalizations will always 
be highly invariant and hence law-like. For example, the type-level 
generalization associated with the token-level   causal   claim,   ‘Smith’s   smoking  
caused  his  cancer’,   (namely  ‘Smoking  causes  cancer’)  displays  a   relatively   low  
degree of invariance and, as discussed above, does not meet one of the standard 
criteria for lawfulness, namely being exceptionless.  Secondly, this is not to say 
that the user of the token causal claim will always be explicitly aware of the 
associated type-level generalization, or that it is only in virtue of this explicit 
knowledge that a subject can acquire causal understanding of token-level causal 
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claims. This is because according to interventionism, in order for X to qualify as 
an actual cause of Y, there must exist some intervention that changes the actual 
value of X to some other value that changes the actual value of Y to some other 
value and although this implies the truth of some invariant type-level 
generalization between X and Y, we can consider the truth of these 
interventionist counterfactuals independently of any explicit knowledge of this 
associated type-level generalization.  
Now, this is obviously not to say that our causal understanding of token-
level causal claims is never explicitly accompanied or supported by knowledge 
of some type-level generalization. For example, the token causal claim,  ‘Smith’s  
smoking   caused   his   cancer’,   may   be   accompanied   and   explained   by   the   type-
level  generalization  ‘Smoking  causes  cancer’. Rather, the point is simply that it 
will often not be accompanied or supported by any such explicit knowledge.16 To 
use Woodward’s  example,  “I  may  know  with  confidence  that  a  blow  on  the  head  
caused Jones's death, even though I do not know any relevant nontrivial 
deterministic generalization about the circumstances under which blows on the 
head   are   followed   by   death.”   (Ibid: 75) The relevance of these points will 
become clear in Section 4.3 below.  
                                                 
16 This issue of causal understanding and in particular, the relationship between singular 
causation and type-level generalizations is a complex one (these issues are discussed at length in, 
for example, Anscombe (1981), Strawson (1992), Hitchcock (1995) and more recently, in 
Roessler (2011)). Although an in depth discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it is sufficient for the purposes of my argument that the reader finds it at least plausible 
that a subject can acquire causal understanding of singular causal claims without at least any 
explicit knowledge of an associated type-level generalization. The reason why this is sufficient 
will become clear in Section 4.3 below. 
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4.2.2 Interventions  
 
The definition (M) of interventionism outlined above states that it is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for X to cause Y that there exist a possible 
intervention on X that changes Y. The notion of an intervention is therefore 
central to interventionism and I will now examine this notion in detail.    
As noted above, it is useful to think of an intervention as an idealised 
experiment (either hypothetical17 or actual) that determines whether X causes Y. 
Woodward captures the basic idea of an intervention in the following passage: 
 
“…an   intervention   on   some   variable   X with respect to some second 
variable Y is a causal process that changes the value of X in an 
appropriately exogenous way, so that if a change in the value of Y occurs, 
it occurs only in virtue of the change in the value of X and not through 
some  other  causal  route.”  (Ibid:  94)   
 
 This passage raises several important questions: What are the precise 
criteria that an intervention must meet if it is to be considered as a suitable means 
for determining whether X causes Y? What is it for an intervention to be 
exogenous? In what sense must an intervention be possible?  
 Before answering the first question and outlining the specific criteria that 
a  ‘suitable’  intervention  must  meet,  it  is  important  to  point out that in specifying 
such criteria, I take it that Woodward’s  intention  is  not  to  provide  conditions  for  
                                                 
17 Williamson (2007, see especially Chapter 5) argues that the imagination can be (and often is) 
successfully used to evaluate the truth of counterfactuals and consequently can be used to acquire 
genuine (and as interventionists suppose, causal) knowledge.  
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a  ‘perfect’  experiment  for  determining  whether  X  causes  Y,  but  rather,  to  provide  
idealised conditions that specify what must be true in order for X to cause Y (i.e. 
specifying the truth conditions for interventionist causation). An intervention 
should   therefore   be   understood   as   an   ‘idealised’   experiment,  which   determines  
what would happen to an effect under a suitable intervention, rather than being 
thought  of  as  a  ‘perfect  experiment’  that  actually  must  take  place  in  order  for us 
to be able to make a causal judgement.18 
What then are the conditions for such an idealised experiment? 
Woodward  provides  the  following  criteria  for  a  ‘suitable’  intervention19:   
 
“(IV)  
I1. I causes X.  
I2. I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X. That is, 
certain values of I are such that when I attains those values, X ceases to 
depend on the values of other variables that cause X and instead depends 
only on the value taken by I. 
I3. Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. That is, I does not 
directly cause Y and is not a cause of any causes of Y that are distinct 
                                                 
18 Note that interventionism does not claim that the only way to learn about causal relationships 
is through performing an actual or hypothetical intervention. As Roessler (2011) argues, we can 
acquire causal knowledge through passive observation or perceptual experience, for example. 
Nonetheless, interventionism does claim that the causal knowledge that one acquires in these 
kinds of cases is still interpretable in interventionist terms, i.e. they provide us (perhaps only 
implicitly) with information about what would happen were we to perform an intervention. This 
issue concerning the psychology of counterfactual reasoning is interesting, but is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. This issue is discussed in detail in Hoerl, C. McCormack, S. Beck, S. R. 
(eds.) (2011) and in Woodward (2011b).  
19 It is also worth noting that by appealing to these precise criteria to define the notion of an 
intervention and to determine whether some relationship is genuinely causal, interventionism 
does  not  need  to  appeal  to  a  similarity  metric  between  possible  worlds,  as  Lewis’  (1977a)  account  
does. It is therefore able to avoid the problems that are associated with this account, such as 
problems concerning the apparent vagueness of similarity judgements (Fine 1975) and problems 
concerning the potential subjectivity of judgements of similarity. 
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from X except, of course, for those causes of Y, if any, that are built into 
the I-X-Y connection itself; that is, except for (a) any causes of Y that are 
effects of X (i.e., variables that are causally between X and Y) and (b) any 
causes of Y that are between I and X and have no effect on Y 
independently of X. 
I4. I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that causes Y and that 
is on a directed path that does not go through X.”  (Ibid:  98)20  
  
 To begin with the second criterion21, this essentially expresses the idea 
that the intervention on X should act alone in manipulating X, as this ensures that 
any causal relation that is established between X and Y is known to be a result of 
intervention I alone, rather than a result of some other cause of X that could also 
cause Y. This essentially ensures that the idealised experiment is a controlled one 
in that it is only the influence of I on X that is under consideration at any one 
time.  
 The third criterion ensures that the intervention must go through the cause 
variable that is under consideration, rather than directly causing the effect itself, 
or causing some other variable that also causes the effect. For example, imagine 
that we are trying to establish whether some drug is effective in treating a 
particular disease. The third criterion rules out the possibility of any kind of 
‘placebo   effect’,   in which the intervention of administering the drug directly 
causes recovery itself, potentially confounding any relationship between the drug 
                                                 
20 Again, it is important to point out that although this definition is accurate, I present a slightly 
modified definition of these criteria in Chapter 6 in order to deal with the objection raised by 
Baumgartner (2009, 2010).  
21 I address a potential problem of circularity that arises as a result of the first criterion in Section 
4.5 below.  
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and recovery. Or alternatively, imagine that we want to find out whether 
attendance at private school causes scholastic achievement, but that the 
experiment that divided the children into two groups (one of which attended 
private school and one of which attended a government funded school) failed to 
be suitably randomised, such that the group of children selected to attend private 
school also belonged to households with a higher socio-economic status. Since 
this intervention affects attendance and socio-economic status, which is a cause 
of achievement that is independent of the attendance-achievement relationship, it 
would not be a suitable intervention for establishing whether attendance causes 
achievement. 
 Similarly to the third criterion, the fourth criterion rules out the possibility 
that intervention I could directly cause some other variable Z that is also a cause 
of Y that does not go through X, again ruling out the possibility that Z could 
confound the relationship between X and Y.   
The   idea   that  an   intervention  should  be  ‘exogenous’   is  also  captured  by  
the criteria above in the sense that intervention I must  come  from  ‘outside’   the  
system under consideration in order to ensure that its influence is independent of, 
and breaks any ties with, any endogenous, confounding variables.  
This leaves us with the following definition of an actual intervention:  
 
“(IN) I's assuming some value I = zi, is an intervention on X with respect 
to Y if and only if I is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y and 
I = zi is an actual cause of the value taken by X.”  (Ibid)   
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 With the notion of an intervention outlined, we can now say that a 
relationship between X and Y is minimally invariant and hence causal, so long as 
there exists a possible intervention on X, which meets these specific criteria, and 
which brings about changes in Y.  
The definition of an intervention outlined above makes reference to the 
existence of a possible intervention. How should we understand this notion of 
possibility? Firstly, as I have noted above, in order for X to cause Y, the 
intervention on X need not actually be carried out, but may instead take the form 
of a hypothetical intervention that considers what would happen to Y if we were 
to intervene on X. Secondly, it is important to note that interventionism operates 
with a fairly permissive notion of possibility. For example, interventionism only 
requires that these interventions (either hypothetical or actual) be logically, 
conceptually and metaphysically possible, rather than being practically, 
nomically (i.e. that they must conform to the laws of nature of this world) or 
even physically possible (Woodward, 2003: 127-133). For Woodward, the reason 
why it is not necessary that interventions be within the realm of practical 
possibility is that it is simply not relevant to the coherence of the interventionist 
counterfactuals (and to our assessment of the truth of the counterfactuals) that 
anyone should actually be able to perform the interventions. For example, it is 
possible   to   consider   the   causal   claim   ‘the   impact   of   an   asteroid   caused   the  
extinction  of  the  dinosaurs’  in  interventionist  terms,  given that this claim coveys 
information about what would have happened to the dinosaurs had there been no 
asteroid strike as a result of some intervention, even though it is obviously not 
practically possible for anyone to carry out this intervention. For the same 
reason, it is unnecessary that interventions must be physically, or even nomically 
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possible. It is also worth noting that it is for this reason that interventionism is 
able to avoid the problems concerning anthropocentricism discussed in Section 
4.5 below, since the notion of an intervention is defined explicitly without 
reference to the action of any agent who actually does, or ever could perform an 
intervention. 
 
4.2.3 Causal Explanation  
 
The interventionist approach to causal explanation has been discussed 
briefly above, but it will be useful to now examine, in detail, how 
interventionism conceives of the relationship between causation and causal 
explanation, since this discussion will be especially relevant to the argument 
against the assumption of SP discussed below and to the interventionist account 
of mental causation outlined in the next chapter.   
In line with the manipulationist account of causation outlined thus far, the 
distinguishing feature of all causal explanations, according to interventionism, is 
that  they  are  explanations  “that  furnish  information  that  is  potentially  relevant  to  
manipulation and control: they tell us how, if we were able to change the value of 
one or more  variables,  we  could  change  the  value  of  other  variables.”  (Ibid:  6).  
Non-causal explanations, by contrast, provide no such information relevant to 
potential control and manipulation. Again, this manipulationist conception of 
causal explanation reflects the practical focus of causation and causal 
explanation, in the sense that causal explanations should provide us with 
information with which we can potentially acquire greater control over our 
environment.  
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The fact that all causal explanations provide information that is 
potentially useful for control and manipulation is a natural consequence of the 
fact that, on this account, causal explanations cite genuine causes. It is thus 
information about causal relationships, which necessarily exhibit patterns of 
counterfactual dependence between cause and effect, which provides this 
information about potential control and manipulation. As I mentioned above, all 
causal explanations thus share the feature of being able to answer a range of w-
questions, in the sense that they provide counterfactual information that allows us 
to consider what would happen to the effect given various changes to the cause. 
For   example,   the   explanation   ‘attendance   at   private   school   causes  
scholastic   achievement’,   counts   as   a   genuine   causal explanation, since it 
provides counterfactual information about what would happen to the effect 
(scholastic achievement) if we were to manipulate the cause (attendance at 
private school). (For example, it tells us that if we were to intervene on 
attendance, we would bring about a change to scholastic achievement.) As a 
result, this explanation provides us with the information that intervening on 
attendance is a way of controlling and manipulating scholastic achievement. By 
contrast,   consider  Woodward’s   example of the explanation of why raven a is 
black:  
All ravens are black.  
a is a raven  
a is black        
According to interventionism, this explanation fails to qualify as a 
genuine causal explanation since it fails to exhibit any pattern of counterfactual 
dependence between the explanans and explanandum (according to 
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interventionism, this is explained by the fact that this explanation simply does 
not cite the cause of raven a’s colour). For example, it does not tell us about the 
conditions under which raven a would be a different colour, or how we might go 
about changing the colour of raven a or any other bird for that matter.22  
Moreover, as I explained above, according to interventionism, causal 
explanations will be considered as better or worse to the extent that the 
generalizations that they refer to display either a relatively high or low degree of 
invariance and this is simply because highly invariant generalizations will, in 
general, be able to answer a wider range of w-questions. Moreover, by tracing 
the explanatory depth of a generalization to its ability to answer a wider range of 
w-questions, Woodward again emphasises the practical focus of interventionism: 
deeper or better causal explanations are simply those that provide us with more 
information that is potentially relevant to controlling and manipulating our 
environment.  
Although the relationship between causation and causal explanation is a 
very close one according to interventionism (given that causal explanations cite 
genuine causes), one important difference between causation and causal 
explanation is that whereas causation is thought to be a natural relation that exists 
(or  would  exist)  ‘out  there’  in  the  world,  independent of our epistemic awareness 
of it, causal explanation is essentially an epistemic activity that is carried out in 
order to acquire information about causal relationships. This difference is 
captured in the following passage:  
                                                 
22 This example also emphasises the point made above, since it is the fact that there is no 
logically or conceptually possible intervention associated with this explanation that guides our 
intuition that it is non-causal. The notion of physical or nomic possibility does not appear to have 
the same effect. (Consider again the example of the explanation of the extinction of the dinosaurs, 
for which there is no physically possible intervention, but which nonetheless strikes us as causal.)     
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“Causal   relationships   are   features   of   the   world:   they   are   ‘out   there’   in  
nature. By contrast, explanation is an activity carried out by humans and 
conceivably by some other animals, having to do with the discovery and 
provision of information, information about causal relationships.”   (Ibid:  
23)  
 
As we shall see, this epistemic constraint (i.e. the constraint that causal 
explanations should provide information that is epistemically available to us) 
plays a central role in my argument against the SP concept of causal explanation 
in Section 4.3 below.  
 I explained above that the claim ‘attendance   at   private   school   causes  
scholastic   achievement’,   qualifies as genuinely causal since there is some 
intervention on attendance at private school that changes scholastic achievement. 
Moreover, I explained that this explanation qualifies as a genuine causal 
explanation, in virtue of the fact that it conveys this counterfactual information 
about what would happen to scholastic achievement if we were to manipulate 
attendance at private school. However, it is not always this clear that the 
counterfactuals that are associated with some causal claims and explanations 
deliver consistent or intuitively correct causal judgments about those claims and 
explanations.   
 In   order   to   illustrate   this,   consider  Woodward’s   example   of   the   token-
level, or singular claim, ‘The  short  circuit  caused  the  fire’.  Now,  assuming that 
the short circuit does cause the fire and that there are no pre-emptive or 
overdetermining causes of the fire, according to interventionism, this singular 
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claim qualifies as causal since there is some intervention on the occurrence of the 
short circuit that changes the occurrence of the fire. Moreover, this explanation 
qualifies as genuinely causal in virtue of the fact that it conveys this 
counterfactual information about what would happen to the effect if we were to 
manipulate   the   cause.   For   example,   the   associated   counterfactual,   ‘if   the   short  
circuit had not occurred, the fire would not  have  occurred’,   (which  Woodward  
refers to as 5.8.4), tells us that intervening on the short circuit would be a way of 
intervening on the occurrence of the fire and hence tells us that the explanation is 
genuinely causal.  
 However, as Woodward points out in the following passage, there appear 
to be at least some counterfactual alternatives (i.e. some interventions on the non-
occurrence  of   the  short  circuit)  for  which  the  counterfactual  ‘if   the  short  circuit  
had not occurred, the fire would not have occurred’  is  not  true  and  according  to  
these counterfactual   alternatives,   it   looks   as   though   the   explanation   ‘the   short  
circuit  caused  the  fire’  does  not qualify as causal.   
 
“How  exactly  should  we  understand  a  phrase  like  “if  the  short  circuit  had  
not occurred”  in  (5.8.4)?  It  seems  that  there  are,  so  to  speak,  a  variety  of  
different  possible  ways  in  which  “the”  short  circuit  might  have  failed  to  
occur and that (5.8.4) may be true under some of these possibilities but 
not under others. Suppose that the actual short circuit s occurred at a 
specific time m and reached a certain temperature T. Consider a short 
circuit s* that occurs at a somewhat different time m* and reaches a 
different temperature T*. Will s* be the same short circuit as the actual 
short circuit s? If, as seems arguable for some values of m and T, the 
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answer to this question is no, then one of the ways the (actual) short 
circuit s might fail to occur is if the different short circuit s* occurs 
instead. But, if the antecedent of (5.8.4) is understood to include this sort 
of possibility—that is, if the nonoccurrence of s in (5.8.4) is understood 
to encompass the occurrence of s*—then it is far from obvious that the 
counterfactual (5.8.4) is  true.”  (Ibid:  211-2)  
 
 How then can we avoid the problem that it looks as though this singular 
causal claim qualifies as causal and explanatory according to some 
counterfactual alternatives, but as non-causal according to others? 
 Firstly, it is important to emphasise that it is simply not true according to 
interventionism that the singular causal claim ‘the   short  circuit  caused   the   fire’  
qualifies as causal and explanatory according to some counterfactual 
considerations, but as non-causal according to others. Remember that according 
to interventionism, this explanation will qualify as causal so long as there is at 
least some intervention on the value of the short circuit that changes the value of 
the occurrence of the fire and I explained that this remains true even if there are 
some counterfactual alternatives for which this is not true.  
 Rather, the issue that has been highlighted points to a potential lack of 
clarity and consistency in our causal judgements about causal claims and 
explanations, given that the same causal claim can nonetheless appear to qualify 
as causal according to some counterfactual considerations, but appear to qualify 
as non-causal according to others. How then can we resolve the problem that the 
interventionist criteria for causation and explanation seem to generate somewhat 
inconsistent and potentially incorrect causal judgements? In order to address this 
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problem, Woodward appeals to the notion of contrastive focus, which was 
introduced above and which I will now examine in more detail.  
Remember that according to interventionism, all causal claims have built 
into them a default contrastive focus, which tells us that it was the fact that the 
cause variable took this value, rather than that value that caused the effect 
variable to take  the  value  it  did.  Consequently,  a  ‘good’  causal  explanation  is  one  
that identifies exactly which changes to the cause variable are associated with 
changes to the effect variable. An explanation is deficient to the extent that it 
fails to do this (either because it omits vital information, or as is often the case, 
because it is overly specific). 
In   order   to   illustrate   this,   consider   Stephen   Yablo’s   (1992)   example:   a  
pigeon has been trained to peck on the presentation of any red object. On a 
particular occasion, the pigeon is presented with an object that happens to be a 
particular shade of scarlet and the pigeon proceeds to peck. Yablo asks to what 
we  should  attribute  as  the  cause  of  the  pigeon’s  behaviour:  is  it  the  redness  of  the  
object or the fact that it is scarlet? Yablo concludes that although the fact that the 
object is scarlet is sufficient for the behaviour (note that it also meets the 
interventionist requirements of causation, since there is some intervention on the 
property of scarlet, namely one that changes the colour from scarlet to any non-
red shade, that changes the effect), it fails to capture what is relevant about the 
object that causes the pigeon to peck, namely the fact that it is red. In fact, Yablo 
claims that citing the fact that the object is scarlet as an explanation of the 
behaviour is actually misleading since it suggests that the pigeon would fail to 
peck   in   any   case   in   which   the   object   is   not   scarlet.   In   Yablo’s   terms,   the  
explanation  citing  scarlet  fails  to  be  ‘proportionate’ to its effect, in the sense that 
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it fails to convey all and only such information about specific patterns of 
counterfactual dependence between cause and effect, (in this case, by both 
omitting relevant detail about such dependencies and including irrelevant detail). 
By contrast, the less specific explanation citing the property of red captures this 
information.23 
 Put  into  Woodward’s  terms,  the  explanation  citing  scarlet  fails to capture 
the correct contrastive focus, since it fails to capture exactly which changes to the 
cause variable are associated with changes to the effect (namely a change from 
‘red’  to  ‘not  red’)  and  in  fact  provides  potentially  misleading  information  about  
such patterns of counterfactual dependence. As a consequence, the explanation 
citing scarlet will be deficient in comparison to the one citing redness. Note also 
that by failing to capture the exact range of changes to the cause variable that are 
stably associated with changes to the effect (and in fact by providing potentially 
misleading information about such changes), the explanation citing the property 
of scarlet will provide information that is less useful for the purposes of control 
and manipulation. By contrast, given that it is specifically the contrast between 
whether the object is red/not red that is associated with whether the pigeon 
pecks/does not peck, the explanation citing the property of red will provide 
information with which we may stably and systematically control the effect. 
(These points are especially relevant to the interventionist account of mental 
causation outlined in the next chapter.)   
Before demonstrating how this notion can help us with the problem 
identified above, it will be useful to highlight the following feature of contrastive 
                                                 
23 Williamson  (1998)  argues  somewhat  similarly  that  ‘good’  explanations  have  an  appropriate  
generality  built  into  them  and  that  explanations  do  not  necessarily  get  ‘better’  by  being  more  
specific.  
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focus, since it will be relevant to our later discussion: whether some claim or 
explanation captures the correct contrastive focus can depend on the context of 
the situation and on the somewhat subjective consideration of our goal as 
enquirers. For example, the context dependence of contrastive focus can be seen 
in  Woodward’s  (2008a: 236) variant of the Yablo example in which the pigeon is 
trained to peck specifically at scarlet objects. In this case, it is now the contrast 
between whether the object is scarlet, rather than not scarlet that is associated 
with changes to whether the pigeon pecks, or fails to peck, rather than the 
contrast between whether the object is red or not red. Hence the explanation 
citing the property of scarlet now captures the correct contrastive focus and 
provides a preferable causal explanation of the behaviour.  
As an illustration of the way in which contrastive focus can depend on the 
goal  of   the  enquirer,  consider  Woodward’s   (Ibid: 227) example of the platform 
that will collapse if a weight greater than 1000kg is placed onto it. Suppose that a 
weight that happens to weigh 1600kg is placed onto the platform and the 
platform collapses. Now consider causal claim (1), which states that it is the fact 
that the weight is greater than 1000kg that caused the platform to collapse, 
compared with causal claim (2) which states that it is the fact that the weight is 
1600kg that caused the platform to collapse. Now, according to interventionism 
both claims qualify as causal, since there is an intervention on both whether the 
weight is 1000kg and whether it is 1600kg that changes the effect. However, 
since it is the contrast between whether the weight is greater than 1000kg, or less 
than 1000kg that specifically changes whether the platform collapses or fails to 
collapse, causal claim (1) captures the correct contrastive focus and will be 
considered as preferable in comparison to causal claim (2), which by being 
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overly specific, omits this information and provides potentially misleading 
information about the conditions under which the platform will collapse.  
Now imagine that we are interested not just in why the platform 
collapsed, but in why it collapsed at such and such a velocity. I suggest that 
given our new explanatory goal, it is now causal claim (2) that would capture the 
correct contrastive focus and which would be considered as preferable, in 
comparison to causal claim (1), since it is now changes to whether the weight is 
specifically 1600kg, or some other specific weight that would be associated with 
changes to the specific velocity of the collapsing platform. The relevance of 
these points will become clear later in this chapter and in the next.  
How does the notion of contrastive focus help us with the problem 
highlighted above? As Woodward explains, when dealing with complex causal 
claims, for which it is not immediately clear exactly which counterfactuals we 
should appeal to in order to assess the truth of the causal claim or explanation, 
we should appeal to the notion of contrastive focus to help us to determine this.24 
For example, since in the case of the short circuit, it is the contrast between the 
occurrence of the short circuit and a situation in which no short circuit occurs at 
all that explains the contrast between the situation in which the fire occurs and a 
situation in which no fire occurs, we should consider counterfactuals relating to 
this contrast as most relevant for assessing the truth of the causal claim. By 
appealing to those counterfactuals that are associated with the contrastive focus 
of the claim, it is possible to avoid the problem outlined above that it appears that 
                                                 
24 Woodward notes that this is especially useful when the values of the variables under 
consideration  are  not  simply  ‘present’  or  ‘not  present’,  but  instead take many different values. 
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the same causal claim comes out as true under some counterfactual 
considerations, but not others. 
 Once again, it is important to be clear that this is not to suggest that the 
notion of contrastive focus should be used to constrain the counterfactual truth 
conditions for interventionist causation.25 Remember that according to 
interventionism, the causal claim involving the short circuit will come out as true 
so long as there is some intervention on the actual value of the short circuit that 
changes the actual value of the occurrence of the fire, even if there are some 
counterfactual alternatives for which this is not true and even if the 
counterfactuals associated with the correct contrastive focus of the claim come 
out as false (the relevance of this last point will become especially clear in the 
next chapter). Rather, what has been suggested is that when it is not clear exactly 
which counterfactuals to appeal to when assessing the truth of some causal claim 
or explanation, or when different counterfactuals deliver different causal 
judgments, we can appeal to the notion of contrastive focus to help us to 
determine which counterfactuals are most relevant to consider. 
  
4.3 Interventionism versus the SP Concept of Causation: Problems 
 for the SP Concept 
 
In this section I draw attention to some problems that the SP concept of 
causation that was introduced in the previous chapter faces and contrast this 
account with the interventionist account of causation and causal explanation 
outlined thus far. By highlighting the problems that the SP concept faces and 
                                                 
25 If the counterfactual truth conditions for interventionist causation were constrained in this way, 
then contrastive focus or proportionality would, in effect, become a necessary condition for 
interventionist causation. I discuss a problem with this approach in Chapter 5 in which I examine 
two alternative interventionist accounts of mental causation that adopt this approach.  
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presenting interventionism as a coherent alternative theory of causation that 
avoids these problems, I aim to undermine the assumption that causation is 
identical to sufficient production and (if my argument in the previous chapter is 
correct) demonstrate that the non-reductive  physicalist  need  not  accept  Kim’s  a  
priori exclusion problem. 
In order to do this, I argue, in Section 4.3.1 that the SP concept of 
causation does not provide necessary conditions for causation. Then, in Section 
4.3.2, I argue that providing nomologically sufficient conditions for the 
occurrence of some effect is not sufficient for causal explanation and demonstrate 
that interventionism is able to avoid these problems. I claim that these arguments 
undermine the assumption that causation is identical to sufficient production and 
undermine the explanatory counterpart of the assumption of SP, which states that 
providing a causal explanation of some effect is simply a matter of identifying 
nomologically sufficient conditions for its occurrence. Lastly, in Section 4.4, I 
address the worry that despite the problems that the SP concept faces, 
interventionism fails to provide a viable alternative to this theory and hence fails 
to undermine the assumption of SP, since it faces serious problems of its own, 
which the SP concept seems to avoid. I demonstrate that not only can 
interventionism overcome these problems, but it is able to deal with many of 
these problems in a more satisfying way than the SP concept. I conclude that 
interventionism does, after all, provide a coherent alternative theory of causation, 
which undermines the assumption of SP and hence demonstrates that the non-
reductive  physicalist  need  not  accept  Kim’s  a  priori  exclusion  problem. 
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4.3.1 Is Sufficient Production Necessary for Causation? 
  
As I introduced it in the previous chapter, the SP concept of causation 
states that it is a necessary and sufficient condition for X to cause Y that X 
produces, generates or determines Y’s  occurrence  and  that  X  is  a  sufficient cause 
of   Y,   where   ‘cause’   is   understood   in   this   productive/generative sense. In this 
section, I argue that sufficient production does not appear to provide necessary 
conditions for causation, undermining the assumption that causation is identical 
to sufficient production. The section is divided into two parts. 
The first set of examples and arguments that I present argue that being 
sufficient, or more accurately, being nomologically sufficient is not necessary for 
causation. (Recall that in Chapter 3 I noted that we should understand the idea 
that causes are sufficient for their effects as entailing the view that causes are 
nomologically sufficient for their effects). More accurately, they demonstrate that 
it is not part of the meaning or concept of causation that underlying laws exist. I 
argue that this is sufficient for the purposes of my argument, since it nonetheless 
undermines the assumption that causation is identical to (nomological) sufficient 
production. 
The second set of examples and arguments that I present suggest that 
production, generation and determination are not necessary for causation. Since 
the arguments in this section cast doubt on the idea that sufficient production is 
necessary for causation and since I demonstrate that interventionism is simply 
able to avoid these problems, I conclude that they undermine the assumption that 
causation is identical to sufficient production.  
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To begin, it will be helpful to appeal to a series of arguments originally 
proposed by Woodward against the Deductive-Nomological, or DN model of 
explanation proposed by Carl Hempel (1969).26 As I will demonstrate, these 
arguments work equally well against the SP concept of causation, since the DN 
model also assumes that laws are necessary for causation.   
To begin, consider the following singular causal claim:  
 
“(2.4.1)  The impact of my knee on the desk caused the tipping over of the 
inkwell.”  (Woodward,  2010b)27  
 
Now, according to the SP concept of causation, in order for 2.4.1 to 
express a genuine causal claim, it must be true that some law is instantiated, 
which guarantees that the cause is sufficient for the occurrence of the effect, 
given certain initial conditions. However, as Woodward points out, 2.4.1 does 
not, at least explicitly, appear to instantiate any law, for example, one that would 
lawfully link the impact of knees on desks with the tipping over of inkwells. 
Nonetheless, 2.4.1 does intuitively appear to express a genuine causal claim. 
Thus, it appears, at least at first glance, that (nomological) sufficient production 
is not necessary for causation, since 2.4.1 appears to express a genuine causal 
claim, while failing to meet the nomological requirement of the SP concept of 
causation.  
 There are two responses noted by Woodward that Hempel makes to 
preserve the necessary status of laws on the DN model. I outline these responses 
                                                 
26 Although  Hempel’s  theory  is  specifically  concerned  with  the  nature  of  explanation,  rather  than  
causation, since Hempel himself accepts that at least some explanans cite causes, we can assume 
that a nomological sufficient conception of causation features in the DN model of explanation. 
27 Example originally due to Scriven (1962).   
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below and agree with Woodward that neither response deals adequately with this 
problem. I demonstrate that these arguments count equally well against the SP 
concept of causation.   
Hempel’s first response is to claim that 2.4.1 is after all backed by the 
instantiation  of  a  law,  but  that  the  law  is  ‘implicit’  in  2.4.1,  rather  than  explicit.  
As Woodward explains, this implicit law could take the following form:  
 
“(2.4.2)   Whenever   knees   impact tables on which an inkwell sits and 
further conditions K are met (where K specifies that the impact is 
sufficiently forceful, etc.), the inkwell will tip over. (Reference to K is 
necessary since the impact of knees on table with inkwells does not 
always result  in  tipping.)”  (Ibid)   
 
 Hempel’s   second   response   is   to   add   that   while   it   may   be   true   that   the  
entire complex content of 2.4.2 is not implicit in 2.4.1, we should understand 
2.4.2   as   an   ‘ideal’   explanation   of   the   effect,   in   contrast   with   2.4.1,   which  
provides  only  a  ‘partial  explanation’.   
According to Hempel then, on either response we can assume that some 
law   implicitly   ‘underlies’   and   grounds   the   causal   status   of   2.4.1,   whether   this  
underlying complex law is implied completely by 2.4.1, or whether it is only 
partly implied by 2.4.1. Is it true then that despite initial appearances, laws are 
necessary for causation, in accordance with the SP concept of causation? 
Woodward  offers   several   convincing  objections   to  both  of  Hempel’s   responses  
and consequently against the SP concept of causation, which I outline below.  
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In   response   to   Hempel’s   first   point,  Woodward   questions   exactly   what  
kind of law Hempel takes to implicitly underlie 2.4.1, since it is not clear which, 
if any, of the various kinds of laws are supposed to fulfil this role. Firstly, as 
Woodward explains, it could be something like 2.4.2, however, this assumes that 
condition K can be specified non-trivially.   Presumably,  Woodward’s   worry   is  
that we could just add conditions to 2.4.2 to ensure that the effect occurs given 
the   instantiation   of   this   ‘law’,   but   that   it   would   be   difficult   to   provide   such  
conditions non-trivially and non ad-hoc. 
This point brings out a related problem, which is the general problem of 
defining exactly what a law is. As Woodward points out, there is little consensus 
in the literature as to what a law actually is and although this problem does not 
prove that the DN or SP concept of causation do not provide necessary 
conditions for causation, it does suggest that these theses require clarification. 
This is because without a clear understanding of what a law is, it is not clear that 
the claim that causation requires the backing of laws is coherent 
Secondly, Woodward explains that the underlying law could be one 
specified at the level of classic physics, for example one that referred to the 
behaviour of liquids when not confined to a container. However, as Woodward 
points out, the problem with this approach is that it is highly unlikely that those 
laws could be known by an ordinary user of 2.4.1 and hence it is highly unlikely 
that our causal understanding of 2.4.1 is acquired in virtue of knowledge of those 
laws. Put slightly differently, although the fact that an ordinary user of 2.4.1 is 
unlikely to be aware of these laws does not imply that the laws of physics do not 
in fact underlie 2.4.1, it does make the idea that we understand or recognise 2.4.1 
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as causal in virtue of knowledge of these underlying laws look highly dubious. I 
return to this epistemological issue below.  
In  response  to  Hempel’s  second  point,  Woodward  questions  the  sense  in  
which   the   more   specific,   ‘lawful’   explanation   provided   by   2.4.2   should   be  
considered as explanatorily   ‘ideal’, in comparison to the seemingly 
straightforward explanatory claim offered by 2.4.1, given that it is at best only 
implicit,  or  as  Woodward  puts  it,  given  that  it  is  ‘epistemically  hidden’  in  2.4.1  
and therefore unlikely to be known by an ordinary subject.  
Now, I suggest that these points count against the assumption of SP and 
the explanatory counterpart of the assumption of SP, which, as I described it in 
Chapter 3, states that providing a causal explanation of some effect is simply a 
matter of identifying nomologically sufficient conditions for its occurrence. This 
is because once one recognises that the nomological aspect of causation and 
explanation will often be either implicit in the causal claims and explanations or 
epistemically unavailable to an ordinary subject, it undermines the idea that 
causation is identical with (nomological) sufficient production and undermines 
the idea that causal explanation is simply a matter of providing such 
(nomological) sufficient conditions. 
This point can be brought out further by appealing to the following 
example of P.F Strawson’s (1992), (originally due to Mill): a man falls down a 
flight  of   steps;;   the   fact   that   the  steps  were  slippery   and   the   fact   that   the  man’s  
mind was elsewhere is offered as a sufficient explanation of the event. However, 
as Strawson correctly observes, there are no general regularities or universal laws 
linking fallings, slipperyness of steps and absent-mindedness that could ground 
our causal understanding of this singular causal claim. Strawson does note that in 
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such cases of singular causation, there may in fact be some general, mechanistic 
law (presumably found at the level of physics), which underlies that singular 
causal claim, but he argues that such general and mechanistic laws would be 
quite abstract and removed from any causal understanding we might have of the 
singular   causal   claim.   Strawson   suggests   that  Mill’s   account   is   therefore   quite  
“wide   of   the   mark”   (Ibid:   127)   in   so   far   as   ordinary   causal   explanation   is  
concerned  and  concludes  that  this  points  to  a  “great  gap”  (Ibid)  between  ordinary  
causal explanation and strict law. 
To summarise, what  both  Strawson’s  and  Woodward’s  examples  suggest  
is that our causal understanding of causal claims and explanations is not acquired 
in virtue of knowledge of laws, given that any knowledge of those laws is likely 
to be either implicit in the causal claim or epistemically unavailable to an 
ordinary subject. This point is further supported by the fact that we seem to have 
an intuitive grasp of the causal status of singular causal claims, such as 2.4.1, in 
the absence of any knowledge of underlying laws.  
Now, one could reply that the problems that I have identified merely 
prove that knowledge of laws is not necessary for causal understanding, but that 
this is very different to proving that laws are not in fact necessary for causation 
and that the latter is required to undermine the assumption of SP.  This is an 
important point and does require further discussion, however, I suggest that this 
epistemological issue does have an important bearing on the plausibility of the 
SP concept of causation and consequently on the assumption of SP.   
This  is  because  what  Woodward’s  and  Strawson’s  examples  do suggest is 
that although it may be true that some law necessarily underlies all causal 
relationships, our understanding of those relationships and explanations as causal 
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is not acquired in virtue of knowledge of those laws. This epistemological point 
is sufficient to cast doubt on the idea that it is part of the very meaning or 
concept of causation that some underlying law exists (a view that Woodward 
calls  the  ‘meaning  thesis’)  and  this  is  sufficient to undermine the assumption that 
causation should be defined in terms of, or identified with (nomological) 
sufficient production.28  
In fact, as Woodward explains, although the idea that some law 
necessarily   underlies   all   causal   claims   (which  Woodward   calls   the   ‘underlying  
thesis’),  may  in  fact  be  true,  if  it  is  true,  it  is  simply  an  empirical  fact that those 
laws exist, rather than something that should form part of the meaning or concept 
of causation. As Woodward explains in the following passage, at the most basic 
level, the truth of the underlying thesis may simply commit us to the truth of 
physicalism29:   
 
                                                 
28 Again, one could reply here that although it may be true that it is not part of the meaning of 
causation that some underlying law exists, this does not undermine the idea that causation just is, 
in reality, a relationship of nomological sufficient production. By way of analogy, one could 
argue  for  example,  that  although  it  is  not  part  of  the  meaning  of  ‘water’  that  it  is  H2O, water just 
is, nonetheless, H2O. I cannot discuss this issue in detail here, but it seems that this objection 
would only be decisive if one favoured an empirical analysis of causation, which takes as its 
primary focus the discovery of what causation is in reality, as opposed to a conceptual analysis of 
causation, which seeks to understand the concept of causation as it is used in ordinary language. 
This is because empirical analyses of causation are not undermined by the fact that their resultant 
theories of causation do not accord with ordinary usage or form part of the meaning of causation, 
as it is understood in ordinary language. The theories produced via conceptual analysis will, by 
contrast, be constrained by ordinary usage and be undermined by the fact that the theory does not 
form part of the meaning of causation, as it is understood in ordinary language. Thus, so long as 
one finds the conceptual analysis approach more plausible than the empirical analysis approach, 
then this objection will not be very forceful. This is not to say that interventionism fits 
straightforwardly into the category of conceptual analysis. Note, for example, that a central 
feature of interventionism is that it makes normative claims about how causation should be 
understood, rather than merely analysing how the concept is used (Woodward, 2003: 7). 
Nonetheless, since interventionism does seek to describe both ordinary and scientific usage of the 
concept of causation and relates the concept to practical notions such as control and 
manipulation, it can be broadly considered as providing a conceptual analysis of causation.   
29 This accords with the a posteriori definition of causal closure outlined in Chapter 2. 
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“In  this  sense,  it  seems  unlikely  that  we  will  ever  find  cases  in  which  the  
underlying thesis is clearly false. What seems much more likely is that 
there are many causal claims for which it is unclear what the backing 
laws are or even what the  backing  relation  amounts  to…In  such  cases,  it  
may be harmless to say that an explanation in terms of underlying laws 
must  be   “there”   even   if  we  do  not  know  what   it   is,   but  we   should   also  
realize  that  we  do  not  have  much  purchase  on  what  “underlying”  means. 
In such cases, the underlying thesis may express little more than a 
commitment to physicalism and to the idea that physical phenomena are 
law-governed.”  (Woodward,  2003:  174) 
  
 In summary, although the examples and arguments presented in this 
section do not strictly prove that laws are not necessary for causation, they do 
suggest that laws are not a necessary part of the meaning or concept of causation 
and this is sufficient to undermine the assumption that causation is identical to 
(nomological) sufficient production.    
I suggest that this conclusion can be supported further once we recognise 
that interventionism avoids many of the problems identified above, whilst being 
able to successfully distinguish between genuinely causal and non-causal 
generalizations and relationships. The reason why interventionism is able to 
avoid these problems is because, as I explained in Section 4.2.1 above, 
interventionism replaces the notion of a law with the notion of an invariant 
generalization and, as will become clear, invariant generalizations simply avoid 
many of the problems that traditional laws face. 
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Firstly, unlike laws, remember that it is not necessary that invariant 
generalizations are exceptionless. For this reason, interventionism is able to 
avoid the problem, noted by Woodward in his first response to Hempel, that the 
underlying laws that are thought to be necessary for causation will either have to 
be strict and exceptionless (raising the problem that it is unlikely that they could 
contribute to causal understanding) or be qualified with ceteris paribus clauses 
(raising the problem that those generalizations appear somewhat ad hoc and may 
not even qualify as laws). 
Secondly, interventionism avoids the problem noted by Woodward in his 
second response to Hempel, which was that it is difficult to accept that our causal 
understanding of singular causal claims and explanations is acquired in virtue of 
conveying information about underlying laws, when those laws are likely to be 
either implicit or epistemically unavailable to an ordinary subject. 
Interventionism avoids this problem since remember that it states that our causal 
understanding is grounded in the fact that genuine causal claims and explanations 
convey information about the outcome of interventionist counterfactuals and this 
information is explicit in those causal claims and explanations.  
Lastly, interventionism is able to avoid the problem identified above with 
the  ‘meaning  thesis’,  which  explained  that  given  that  our  causal  understanding  of  
causal claims and explanations is not acquired in virtue of knowledge of laws, it 
undermines the idea that it is part of the very meaning or concept of causation 
that underlying laws exist. Firstly, interventionism is able to avoid this problem, 
since remember that the invariant generalizations associated with singular causal 
claims and explanations need not be strict and exceptionless and are therefore 
more likely to be known by an ordinary subject and contribute to causal 
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understanding. (For example, as in the case of the singular causal claim, ‘Smith’s  
smoking  caused  his  cancer’,  which  is  supported  by the invariant generalization, 
‘Smoking  causes  cancer’.) Secondly, it does not undermine interventionism that 
the associated invariant generalizations are often only implicit in the causal 
claims and explanations and are therefore unlikely (at least explicitly) to 
contribute to causal understanding. This is because, interventionism does not 
understand the meaning or concept of causation or causal explanation in terms of 
these invariant generalizations, but as I explained above, instead understands the 
meaning of causation and causal explanation in terms of the outcome of 
interventionist counterfactuals and this information is explicit in those causal 
claims and explanations.30 
In the next section I present some examples and arguments, which 
suggest that production, determination and generation are not necessary for 
causation. More specifically, these examples suggest that spatiotemporally 
continuous processes that produce, generate or determine the occurrence of their 
effects (which I explained in Chapter 3 are entailed by the SP concept of 
causation) are not necessary for causation. Once again, the arguments in this 
section will not strictly prove that production, generation and determination are 
not necessary for causation, but will nonetheless cast doubt on this idea and this 
is sufficient to undermine the assumption that causation is identical to sufficient 
production.     
                                                 
30 As a result, interventionism is also able to avoid the worries raised by Anscombe (1981), since 
although interventionism does claim that all singular causal claims imply the existence of some 
associated type-level generalization, it is not necessary that those generalizations be exceptionless 
(and  hence  standardly  ‘law-like’),  or  be  explicitly  known  by  an ordinary subject in order for that 
subject to be able to grasp the causal status of some particular instance of causation. 
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To begin, note that there are examples in physics, which seem to support 
the idea that spatiotemporally continuous productive processes, which involve 
the transfer of some conserved physical quantity, are not necessary for causation. 
As an illustration, consider Woodward’s (2003: 148) example of the inverse 
square law. Now, this law seems   to   allow   for   the   possibility   of   ‘action at a 
distance’,   in  which   two  physical  objects   stand   in  what  appears   to  be  a  genuine  
causal relationship, even though there is no spatiotemporally continuous process 
that connects the two objects. According to the SP concept, these relationships 
could not possibly count as causal in virtue of the fact that they fail to instantiate 
a spatiotemporally continuous productive process of some kind.  
From an interventionist perspective, by contrast, the relationships 
described by the inverse square law can count  as  genuinely  causal,  “as  long  as  it  
is true that manipulating the mass or position of the first (second) body will 
change   the   gravitational   force   exerted   by   the   second   (first)…”   (Ibid:   148)   and  
this can be true even if there is no spatiotemporally continuous process that 
connects the two bodies.   
The notion of action at a distance is not, of course, uncontroversial, but as 
Woodward notes, although it may be true (putting aside issues having to do with 
quantum indeterminacy) that given that conserved quantities that are conserved 
in some interaction are conserved locally, and hence given that it will be true that 
causal interactions that involve the transfer of some conserved quantity will 
involve a spatiotemporally continuous process, it is not true that all causal 
interactions involve the transfer of some conserved quantity and so it is not true 
that all causal interactions must involve spatiotemporally continuous processes. 
Rather, Woodward suggests that we think of this fact as an empirical, a posteriori 
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fact about physical causation, rather than as a necessary condition for 
causation.31 Most importantly for the argument in the next chapter, even when 
we are presented with examples of physical causation, in which it does seem 
necessary that some spatiotemporally continuous process is involved, 
interventionism denies that the causal and explanatory status of those 
relationships is acquired in virtue of the fact that they involve spatiotemporally 
continuous processes, but claims instead that it is acquired solely in virtue of the 
fact that they meet the interventionist requirements of causation.  
In any case, we do not have to look to physics to find intuitive examples 
of causation, which do not seem to involve spatiotemporally continuous 
processes. Take, for example, cases of so called causation by omissions, which 
do not involve any spatiotemporally continuous process, but which nonetheless 
appear   to   be   genuinely   causal.   Examples   include,   ‘the   lack   of   oxygen   in   the  
chamber   caused   X   to   die’,   ‘the   Titanic   hit   the   iceberg   because   there   were   no  
binoculars  on  the  lookout  deck’,  ‘the  inattentiveness  of  the  driver  caused  the  car  
crash’,   and   so   on.   Again, this is not to say that the issue of causation by 
omissions is uncontroversial (I address a problem concerning causation by 
omissions in Section 4.4.2 below), but from an interventionist perspective, each 
of these intuitive claims and explanations can count as genuinely causal, since 
there are interventions on each of the purported causes which are associated with 
changes to the effects. This does appear to be a virtue of interventionism that is 
crucially lacking on the SP concept of causation.  
                                                 
31 I made a similar point in Chapter 3, in which I explained that although causal closure does 
imply that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause (that presumably produces this 
effect via a spatiotemporally continuous process), this only generates the a priori exclusion 
problem if one assumes that this kind of sufficient production is identical to causation. 
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In summary, what these general examples suggest is that spatiotemporally 
continuous processes, which produce, generate or determine the occurrence of 
their effects, are not necessary for causation and that interventionism is simply 
able to avoid the problems highlighted for the SP concept. Once again, it is 
important to emphasise that just as with the first set of examples, although these 
examples do not strictly prove that spatiotemporally continuous productive 
processes are not necessary for causation, they do at least cast doubt on this idea 
and this is sufficient for the purposes of my argument, since it nonetheless 
undermines the assumption that causation is identical to sufficient production.     
 
4.3.2 Is Sufficient Production Sufficient for Causation?  
  
In this next section I present some examples which suggest that sufficient 
production is not sufficient for causation, or more accurately, that providing 
sufficient conditions for the occurrence of some effect is not sufficient for causal 
explanation. In order to illustrate this, I provide some examples of explanations, 
which seem to meet the requirements of the SP concept of causal explanation, 
but which either seem to lack certain features that we expect from successful 
causal explanation, or which seem to provide deficient causal explanations, in 
comparison to those explanations that meet the requirements of interventionism. 
Once again, although these examples will not strictly prove that providing 
sufficient conditions for the occurrence of some effect is not sufficient for causal 
explanation, they do cast doubt on this idea and this is sufficient for the purposes 
of my argument, since it nonetheless undermines the explanatory counterpart of 
the assumption of SP.  
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As a first illustration, recall Yablo’s   example   introduced above of the 
pigeon trained to peck specifically at red objects. In this example we saw that 
although the fact that the object is scarlet is sufficient to produce, or determine 
the pecking behaviour, it fails to capture what is causally relevant about the 
object that causes the pigeon to peck, namely the fact that it is red. By being 
overly specific, it both omits vital information (this being that the pigeon would 
fail to peck in any case in which the object is not red) and includes irrelevant and 
potentially misleading information (this being that the pigeon would fail to peck 
in any case in which the object is not scarlet). This example therefore suggests 
that providing sufficient conditions for the occurrence of some effect is not 
sufficient for causal explanation, since the explanation citing the property of 
scarlet clearly meets the SP conditions for causal explanation and yet appears to 
be explanatorily deficient in an important respect. 
This conclusion is supported further when we see that from an 
interventionist perspective, although both explanations do technically qualify as 
causal, the explanation citing the property of scarlet comes out as explanatorily 
deficient in comparison to the explanation citing redness (in line with our 
intuition), given that it captures the wrong contrastive focus and given that it is 
therefore less useful for the purposes of control and manipulation. Note that from 
the point of view of the SP concept of causation, this potentially useful 
distinction amongst causal explanations is simply lost.  
It is also worth pointing out that on the SP concept of causal explanation, 
this potential practical benefit of causal explanation is completely lost. This is 
because,  as  Yablo’s  example  illustrates,   it   is  simply  not   true  that  by  identifying  
sufficient conditions for the occurrence of some effect we thereby acquire greater 
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practical information about how we might go about manipulating or controlling 
the  effect.  In  fact,  what  Yablo’s  example  illustrates,  is  that  often,  by  identifying  
more precise sufficient conditions for the occurrence of some effect, we actually 
acquire information that is less useful for the purposes of control and 
manipulation. Although this does not prove that providing sufficient conditions 
for the occurrence of some effect is not sufficient for causal explanation, it does 
suggest that something (namely the potential practical benefit of causal 
explanation) is missing according to this assumption about causal explanation 
and this goes some way to undermine the explanatory counterpart of the 
assumption of SP.  
One final point that I suggest also undermines the explanatory counterpart 
of the assumption of SP can be seen by drawing attention to the fairly unintuitive 
consequences of this assumption. Remember that according to the explanatory 
counterpart of the assumption of SP, genuine causal explanations cite   ‘full   and  
sufficient  conditions’  for  the  occurrence  of  their effects. As a consequence, it is 
simply not possible for some effect to have more than one causal explanation 
without running into the problem of overdetermination. It was for this reason that 
Kim claimed that when presented with a case in which some explanation did not 
appear to be sufficient for its effect, we should either think of that explanation as 
a  ‘part-cause’  or  part-explanation of the effect that somehow adds together with 
other part-causes to provide a sufficient explanation of the effect, or we should 
think of the various explanations as somehow competing with one another.32 
Recall  Kim’s  example  of  the  highway  crash  introduced  in  Chapter  3:   
                                                 
32 Or we can assume that the explanations are related via some dependency relation, such as 
supervenience. As I explained in Chapter 3, this had serious consequences for the prospects of 
psychological explanation, since Kim argued from the fact that physical explanations are, by 
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“Thus  a  car  accident  is  explained  by  a  highway  designer  as  having  been  
caused by the incorrect camber of the highway curve, and by a police 
officer as caused by the inattentive driving of an inexperienced driver. 
But in a case like this we naturally think of the offered causes as partial 
causes; they together help make up a full and sufficient cause of the 
accident.”  (Kim,  1998a:  66)   
 
Now, according to Kim, in a case like this, we will have failed to explain 
the car crash until we have identified all of the sufficient conditions that together 
‘add  up’   to   provide  what  we  may   call   ‘the’   cause   of   the   crash,  which   is   alone  
sufficient for the occurrence of the effect. However, this does not seem to be in 
line with the way that we ordinarily think about causal explanation. For example, 
it   seems  perfectly  natural   to   appeal   to   the   inattentiveness  of   the  driver   as   ‘the’  
cause of the car crash, even though it is presumably not true that this fact alone 
was sufficient to produce the effect. Moreover, it seems equally unintuitive and 
unnatural to think that if the various causes  did  not  somehow  ‘add  up’  to  provide  
sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the effect, they would thereby compete 
with each other for explanatory status.   
Interventionism is able to avoid these fairly unintuitive consequences, 
since from an interventionist perspective, each of the explanations noted in the 
example can count as genuinely causal given that they convey information about 
the outcome of interventionist counterfactuals. From an interventionist 
                                                                                                                                    
definition, sufficient to explain their effects and from the fact that mental properties supervene on 
physical properties and hence cannot overdetermine their effects by providing sufficient 
explanations of their own, that they must inherit all of their explanatory power from their 
subvenient  physical  realizers  (c.f.  Kim’s  ‘Causal  Inheritance  Principle’  discussed  in  Chapter  3).     
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perspective, it simply does not make sense to think that causal explanations 
should   either   ‘add   up’   to   provide   a   sufficient   explanation   of   some   effect,   or  
compete for causal and explanatory status. Once again, although this does not of 
course prove that providing sufficient conditions for the occurrence of some 
effect is not sufficient for causal explanation,  it does at least suggest that there is 
something wrong with this idea and this is sufficient to undermine the 
explanatory counterpart of the assumption of SP. 
In this section, I have presented some examples and arguments which 
undermine the assumption that causation is identical to sufficient production and 
which undermine the explanatory counterpart of the assumption of SP, which 
assumes that causal explanation is simply a matter of providing such sufficient 
conditions for the occurrence of some effect. Given that in Chapter 3, I argued 
that Kim crucially depends on this assumption and its explanatory counterpart to 
generate the exclusion problem, this discussion should have therefore 
demonstrated that the non-reductive physicalist need not accept  Kim’s   a   priori  
exclusion problem.  
 
4.4 Interventionism versus the SP Concept of Causation: Problems 
 for Interventionism 
 
In response, however, one could argue that despite the problems that the 
SP concept faces, interventionism fails to provide a viable alternative to this 
theory and hence fails to undermine the assumption of SP, since it faces serious 
problems of its own, which the SP concept seems to avoid. 
In this final section, I argue that interventionism is able to avoid many of 
the standard problems that counterfactual theories of causation face, such as 
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problems that arise from cases of overdetermination, non-paradigmatic causation 
and causation by omissions, which are often thought of as cases that a production 
based concept of causation, such as the SP concept, can easily deal with. I argue 
that as well as being able to overcome these problems, interventionism is actually 
able to deal with many of these problems in a more satisfying way than the SP 
concept. I therefore conclude that interventionism does, after all, provide a 
coherent and viable alternative theory of causation, which does undermine the 
assumption of SP and hence does demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist 
need  not  accept  Kim’s  a  priori  exclusion  problem. (It will be equally important to 
demonstrate that interventionism is able to deal with these standard objections, if 
interventionism is to provide a coherent account of mental causation and 
satisfactory solution to the exclusion problem.)  
 
4.4.1 Overdetermination  
 
 I demonstrated above that interventionism can be applied to both type and 
token level causal claims. However, there are a significant class of token-level 
claims, for which the associated interventionist counterfactuals deliver highly un-
intuitive causal judgements. These are cases involving overdetermination. In fact, 
the problem of accommodating cases of overdetermination within counterfactual 
theories of causation, such as interventionism, is often considered to be one of 
the most significant problems that these theories face. Moreover, the fact that 
production based theories of causation, such as the SP concept, seem to be able 
to easily deal with these cases has led some to argue that we must retain the SP 
concept of causation, despite its apparent shortcomings. In fact, it has led some, 
such as Hall (2004), to argue for a two-concept theory of causation, incorporating 
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both counterfactual dependence and production. However, I demonstrate that 
unlike other counterfactual theories of causation, interventionism is able to deal 
with cases of overdetermination, such that it is not necessary to retain the SP 
concept of causation, or posit a two-concept theory of causation.   
 In order to see this, let us first recall the interventionist account of token, 
or  ‘actual’  causation  and  see  how  cases of overdetermination apparently generate 
a problem for this account. Remember that in order for it to be true that X is a 
token, or actual cause of Y, there must exist some intervention on X that changes 
the actual value  of  X  (e.g.  from  x  to  x’)  that  changes  the  actual value of Y (e.g. 
from   y   to   y’).   Woodward   provides   the   following,   more   precise   definition   of  
token or actual causation (AC):  
 
“(AC) (AC1) The actual value of X = x and the actual value of Y = y.  
(AC2) There is at least one route R from X to Y for which an intervention 
on X will change the value of Y, given that other direct causes Zi of Y that 
are not on this route have been fixed at their actual values. (It is assumed 
that all direct causes of Y that are not on any route from X to Y remain at 
their actual values under the intervention on X.) Then X = x is an actual 
cause of Y = y if and only if both conditions (AC1) and (AC2) are 
satisfied.”  (Woodward,  2003:  77)   
 
In order to see how overdetermination causes trouble for this definition of 
token causation, consider the following paradigmatic example of 
overdetermination cited by Woodward: two campers each throw a lighted 
cigarette into a forest (represented by the variables c1 and c2) and each cigarette 
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on its own is sufficient to bring about the occurrence of the forest fire 
(represented by variable e). As an illustration of how AC applies (or more 
accurately, misapplies) to this case, consider the following passage from 
Woodward:  
 
“…let  A=1 or 0 according to whether c1 occurs, B=1 or 0 according to 
whether c2 occurs, and C=1 or 0 according to whether e occurs…Fixing  A 
at its actual value = 1 in accord with (AC), we see that changing the value 
of B from its actual value (B = 1) does not change the value of C. So, 
according to AC, c2 (B = 1) is not an actual cause of e (C = 1). By parity 
of reasoning, c1 is also not a cause of e.”  (Ibid:  82)   
 
 In other words, given that in this case there is no intervention on the 
actual values of c1 or c2 that changes the value of e, while holding fixed c1 or c2 
at their actual values (in accordance with AC), it turns out, according to 
interventionism, that neither c1 nor c2 qualify as actual causes of the forest fire, 
despite the strong intuition that at least one of the events caused the fire. Given 
this strong intuition, it is argued that cases of overdetermination actually prove 
that counterfactual dependence is not necessary for causation, since these 
relationships strike us as genuinely causal even though it appears that there is no 
counterfactual dependence between cause and effect. Moreover, cases of 
overdetermination clearly do not present this problem for the SP concept, since 
that account provides a straightforward explanation of how c1 or c2 (or both) can 
qualify as causes of the fire: both c1 and c2 are each sufficient to produce the 
effect and hence qualify as overdetermining causes of the forest fire.   
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 How then can we resolve the fact that AC seems to deliver the 
problematic conclusion that counterfactual dependence is not actually necessary 
for causation and that we have to turn to a production based theory of causation, 
such as the SP concept to deal with these cases?  
 To resolve this issue, we can appeal to the following solution offered by 
Woodward, which draws on the idea of what Christopher Hitchcock has called 
the  ‘redundancy  range’  of  variables  within  a  system.  The  notion  of  a  redundancy  
range is explained in the following passage:   
 
“Consider   a   particular   directed   path  P from X to Y and those variables 
V1...Vn that are not on P. Consider next a set of values v1...vn, one for each 
of the variables Vi. The values v1...vn are in what Hitchcock calls the 
redundancy range for the variables Vi with respect to the path P if, given 
the actual value of X, there is no intervention that in setting the values of 
Vi to v1...vn, will change the (actual) value of Y. The actual values of the 
variables Vi are, of course, in the redundancy range with respect to P but 
nonactual values of the variables Vi will also be in the redundancy range 
if, given the actual value of X, we can set the variables Vi to those values 
without disturbing the actual value of Y.”  (Ibid:  83) 
 
As the passage above explains, certain values will be within the redundancy 
range of variables iff given the actual values of X and Y, setting the variable to 
those values does not change the value of Y.33 Woodward suggests that this 
                                                 
33 This allows one to avoid the problem that by modifying the values of other direct causes in this 
way, we could disrupt, or confound the causal relationship between X and Y. This is because, as 
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provides a potential solution to the problem of overdetermination, since he 
suggests, contrary to AC, that it is not always appropriate to hold fixed the other 
direct causes of Y that are not on the path from X to Y at their actual values, but 
that we may fix the other direct causes of Y to non-actual values if those values 
are within the redundancy range of values for those variables. Woodward 
suggests modifying AC to incorporate the notion of a redundancy range in the 
following way:   
 
“(AC*): (AC*1) The actual value of X = x and the actual value of Y = y. 
(AC*2) For each directed path P from X to Y, fix by interventions all 
direct causes Zi of Y that do not lie along P at some combination of values 
within their redundancy range. Then determine whether, for each path 
from X to Y and for each possible combination of values for the direct 
causes Zi of Y that are not on this route and that are in the redundancy 
range of Zi, whether there is an intervention on X that will change the 
value of Y.  (AC*2)  is  satisfied  if  the  answer  to  this  question  is  “yes”  for  at  
least one route and possible combination of values within the redundancy 
range of the Zi. X = x will be an actual cause of Y = y if and only if 
(AC*1)  and  (AC*2)  are  satisfied.”  (Ibid:  84)   
 
How then does this modification help in the case of symmetrical 
overdetermination above? Note that in the case of the forest fire, the value B = 0 
is  within   the   redundancy   range   for   the   variable  B   because   “…given   the   actual  
                                                                                                                                    
Woodward points out, by being within the redundancy range, those values do not, by definition, 
influence the relationship between X and Y. 
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value  of  A,  A  =  1,  the  value  of  C,  C  =  1  would  be  unchanged  if  B  =  0.”  (Ibid:  83)  
Then, fixing B to its non-actual value, B = 0, changing the value of A from its 
actual value, A= 1 to A= 0, does change the value of C; hence according to AC*, 
c1 qualifies as a cause of e (the same goes for c2).  
By introducing the notion of a redundancy range of values it is therefore 
possible for both c1 and c2 to qualify as causes of e, avoiding the problem that 
interventionism seems to deliver the counter-intuitive judgement that neither 
event caused e to occur and hence avoiding the problem that counterfactual 
dependence does not appear to be necessary for causation. By fixing the values 
of the variables within the redundancy range to non-actual values, the 
counterfactual dependencies (and hence the causal relationships) between the 
variables becomes apparent. Moreover, by modifying AC in this way, we are not 
forced to appeal to a production based concept of causation, such as the SP 
concept, in order to deal with these cases. 
 
4.4.2 Non-Paradigmatic Causation and Causation by Omissions (and 
insensitivity as a solution to these problems)  
 
In this section I discuss another set of cases, which apparently cause 
trouble for counterfactual theories of causation. These are cases of non-
paradigmatic causation and causation by omissions. As I will demonstrate, these 
cases are thought to be problematic for counterfactual theories, since they appear 
to show that it is possible to have counterfactual dependence without causation. 
In other words, they appear to illustrate that counterfactual dependence is not 
sufficient for causation. Moreover, it looks as though production based concepts 
of causation, such as the SP concept, are simply able to avoid this problem.  
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In this section I argue that by appealing to the interventionist concept of 
insensitivity34, not only can interventionism overcome the problems associated 
with these cases35, but it is actually able to deal with these problems in a more 
satisfying way than the SP concept. This supports the conclusion that 
interventionism does, after all, provide a coherent and viable alternative theory of 
causation, which does undermine the assumption of SP and hence does 
demonstrate that the non-reductive   physicalist   need   not   accept   Kim’s   a   priori  
exclusion problem. (I begin by outlining and examining the interventionist notion 
of insensitivity and will then demonstrate how this feature can be used to avoid 
the problems associated with these cases.)   
What exactly is insensitivity? In order to explain this concept, it is useful 
to compare it to the central interventionist notion of invariance. As the discussion 
above should have made clear, we can think of invariance as a necessary feature 
that a generalization or relationship must possess if it is to qualify as genuinely 
causal. I suggest that we can then think of insensitivity as a further condition, 
which considers whether that relationship (that is at least minimally invariant and 
hence causal) would continue to hold (or alternatively, whether the 
counterfactuals associated with that claim would continue to hold) over a range 
of changes and varying background conditions. If that relationship does continue 
to hold under these changes, then we may regard that causal relationship as 
insensitive. If it does not, then that causal relationship will be considered as 
sensitive. Woodward defines the notion of insensitivity as follows:  
 
                                                 
34 Woodward (2006) discusses the notion of insensitivity in detail.   
35 This  feature  also  allows  interventionism  to  avoid  the  problem  of  ‘double-prevention’,  noted  by  
Hall (2004), which cannot be discussed here. See Hall (2004) for further details.  
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“Broadly   speaking,   a   causal   claim   is   sensitive   if   it   holds   in   the   actual  
circumstances but would not continue to hold in circumstances that depart 
in various ways from the actual circumstances. A causal claim is 
insensitive to the extent to which it would continue to hold under various 
sorts of changes in the actual circumstances. The sensitivity of 
counterfactuals  is  understood  similarly.”  (Woodward,  2006:  2)   
  
         The idea of insensitivity can be elucidated further with the following 
example  of  Woodward’s:   
 
“Suzy   stands   in   front   of   a   fragile   glass   bottle   with   a   large   rock   in   her  
hand.  No  other  possible  causes  of   the  bottle’s  breaking  — no backup or 
preemptive throwers, no earthquakes and so on — are waiting in the 
wings. Suzy throws; the rock strikes the bottle squarely, and it shatters. 
The  impact  of  the  rock  caused  the  bottle  to  shatter.”  (Ibid:  1) 
 
Now, according  to  most  theories  of  causation,  it  was  Suzy’s  throwing of 
the rock that caused the bottle to shatter. Interventionism supports this 
conclusion,  since  there  is  an  intervention  on  Suzy’s  throw  that  changes  whether  
the bottle shatters (i.e. the relationship between the throwing of the rock and the 
bottle shattering is minimally invariant). This conclusion is supported by the 
truth of the following two counterfactuals:   
 
(1.1) If Suzy throws the rock, the bottle will shatter.  
(1.2) If Suzy does not throw the rock, the bottle will not shatter.  
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Now, as Woodward explains, in order to assess the insensitivity of the 
causal claim relating Suzy’s   throwing   of   the   rock   to   the   bottle   shattering   we  
should consider the insensitivity of the associated counterfactuals (1.1) and (1.2). 
As Woodward goes on to explain, in order to do this, we should consider 
whether, for example, counterfactual (1.1) “would   continue   to   hold   under  
changes that do not depart too much from the actual state of affairs or that do not 
seem too far-fetched or that are not judged to be unimportant or irrelevant for 
subject-matter-specific  reasons”  (Ibid:  11)  (I  explore  these  ideas  in  detail  below).  
This idea can be expressed in the form of the following counterfactual:  
 
(1.1.2) “If   the   rock   thrown   by   Suzy   were   to   strike   the   bottle   in  
circumstances Bi different from the actual circumstances, the 
bottle would  (still)  shatter.”  (Ibid:  5)   
 
Since it appears that (1.1.2) is true, (for example, if Suzy were to throw the rock 
at a slightly later time, or with a slightly different degree of force, the bottle 
would still shatter), we should consider counterfactual (1.1) to be fairly 
insensitive and consequently also consider the   causal   claim   relating   Suzy’s  
throwing of the rock to the bottle shattering as insensitive. If, on the other hand 
(1.1.2) turned out false (if, for example, this relationship failed to hold across a 
range of such changes), we should instead consider counterfactual (1.1) and the 
causal claim to be fairly sensitive.  
I noted above that a counterfactual, or causal claim will be judged to be 
insensitive if it holds over a range of changes to background conditions that do 
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not depart much from actuality or that seem important or relevant. Can we be 
more precise about the kinds of changes that are relevant for assessing 
insensitivity?  
As Woodward notes, certain changes will seem irrelevant for assessing 
the insensitivity of a counterfactual or causal claim. These include, for example, 
changes   to   the   colour   of   Suzy’s   blouse, or the sneezing of a man in Chicago. 
(One explanation of why these kinds of changes are not considered as relevant is 
that they fail to change the relevant features of the counterfactual, for example, 
the throwing of the rock and the smashing of the bottle.36) In other kinds of 
cases, (to be discussed below), certain changes will seem irrelevant because of 
the particular context of the counterfactual or causal claim.  
Within those changes that we do judge to be relevant for assessing 
insensitivity, according to Woodward, we can be more precise about the specific 
nature of the changes by appealing to a similarity metric, along the lines of David 
Lewis’   notion   of   the   closeness   of   possible   worlds.   Essentially,   the   possible  
worlds account would consider, as relevant for assessing the insensitivity of 
some counterfactual or causal claim, changes which are as close to actuality as 
possible. For example, when considering whether counterfactual (1.1.2) is true, it 
states that we should consider situations which do not depart much from the 
actual situation, such as a situation in which Suzy throws the rock at a slightly 
later time or with a different degree of force, rather than, for example, 
considering a situation in which Suzy throws the rock, which happens to be fitted 
with a navigation device which ensures that the rock reaches its target.  
                                                 
36 This  is  closely  related  to  the  idea  of  a  ‘testing  intervention’,  described  above. 
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Now, one important aspect of insensitivity that will be especially relevant 
to the discussion below is that insensitivity provides an explanation of our causal 
judgements and in particular, can explain how certain claims can qualify as 
causal according to the interventionist criteria for causation, while nonetheless 
striking us as non-causal. For example, take the case of Suzy: according to 
Woodward, it is the truth of counterfactuals (1.1) and (1.2), as well as the 
insensitivity of these counterfactuals that   informs   our   judgement   that   Suzy’s  
throw is causally relevant to the bottle shattering. By way of contrast, consider 
Woodward’s   variant of the Suzy case, which is extremely sensitive to slight 
changes to the actual situation: Suzy scratches her nose and the bottle shatters. 
As Woodward explains, although there may be counterfactual situations in which 
it   is   true   that   the   shattering   is   caused   by   the   scratching   of   Suzy’s nose, if for 
example, Billy had promised to shatter the bottle if Suzy scratches her nose, the 
reason  why  we  would  not  ordinarily  judge  that  Suzy’s  action  is  the  cause  of  the  
shattering is that it is extremely sensitive to slight changes to the actual 
circumstances. For example, Billy may renege on his promise or fail to be 
present. For Woodward, it is the relative sensitivity of the second claim that 
informs   our   judgement   that   although   Suzy’s   action   may   technically   cause   the  
shattering of the bottle (since there is some intervention on whether Suzy 
scratches her nose that changes whether the bottle shatters), that causal claim 
nonetheless strikes us as un-paradigmatically causal, since it is extremely 
sensitive to small changes to background conditions. 
Why does insensitivity affect our causal judgements in this way? Note 
that just as with the notion of invariance, by being stable or invariant over a wide 
range of changes (in this case, it is specifically stability under changes to 
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background conditions and circumstances, rather than just stability under 
interventions to the variables under consideration), causal claims and 
explanations that are insensitive will be able to answer a wider range of w-
questions, since they tell us what would happen to the effect under these wide 
range of changes. Moreover, those causal claims and explanations will be more 
potentially useful for the purposes of control and manipulation, since those 
relationships will continue to hold and hence continue to provide a means of 
control over these wide range of changes. As Woodward (Ibid: 7) explains, the 
idea of insensitivity thus captures the intuitive idea that causal claims and 
explanations   should   possess   a   certain   degree   of   ‘generalizability’   and   ‘context  
independence’.     
Before moving on to discuss how the notion of insensitivity helps 
interventionism to overcome problems concerning cases of non-paradigmatic 
causation and causation by omissions, it is important to address the question of 
whether the conditions for determining the relevance of changes to background 
conditions for the assessment of insensitivity are problematically subjective. It is 
important to address this question if the notion of insensitivity is to be used to 
avoid the problems noted above. Moreover, as we will see, the issues that I 
discuss concerning subjectivity are of crucial importance to subsequent 
discussions in this chapter and in the next.   
Now, a problem concerning subjectivity seems to arise since, as I 
explained above, the relevance of certain changes for assessing insensitivity can 
depend on context, pragmatics, the expectations of the subject and so on. For 
example, as Woodward notes, many generalizations in economics will be 
extremely sensitive to changes to the neurological processes of economic agents, 
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but it would seem strange to consider these changes as relevant for assessing the 
insensitivity of economic causal generalizations. Or, alternatively, it is possible 
for some changes to strike one individual as extremely close to actuality, but for 
the same changes to strike another individual as fairly far-fetched, given, for 
example, a difference in social expectations between the subjects. In other words, 
a potential problem arises since one could argue that by employing a similarity 
metric   along   the   lines   of   Lewis’   notion   of   closeness   of   possible   worlds,   this  
account is simply open to the same problems that Lewis faces, which concern the 
apparent vagueness of the notions of closeness and similarity (Fine 1975).  
 However, as Woodward explains in the following passage, the concept of 
insensitivity is not problematically subjective:  
 
“First,   as   emphasized   above,   one   of  my  primary   interests in the role of 
sensitivity is in using this notion to describe actual practices of causal 
judgment.   It   is  an  empirical  question   to  what  extent  people’s   judgments  
of sensitivity depend on the factors I have described; to the extent that 
they do, it is not an objection to the account that some of these features 
strike   us   as   “subjective.”   Second,   it   is   also   of   course   an   empirical  
question   to   what   extent   there   is   intersubjective   agreement   in   people’s  
judgments of sensitivity; it may be that we are largely able to agree on 
such judgments despite their highly contextual and highly multifaceted 
character. Finally, one obvious response to worries about subjectivity and 
context dependence is to relativize judgments of sensitivity to particular 
sets of changes in backgrounds. Even if you and I disagree about whether 
such and such a departure B* from actuality is large or far-fetched, it may 
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be  an  “objective”  matter  (or  at  least  a  matter  about  which  we  may  expect  
far more agreement) whether some counterfactual or causal claim would 
hold under B*. Thus, even if we disagree about whether the introduction 
of a solid steel barrier between Suzy and the bottle represents a large 
departure from the actual state of affairs, we can presumably agree that if 
such a barrier were introduced, it would no longer be true that if Suzy 
were  to  throw,  the  bottle  would  shatter.”  (Ibid:  15)   
 
There are several points captured in this passage that are relevant to our 
discussion. Firstly, what this passage suggests is that judgements of insensitivity 
may not actually differ to as great an extent as one might initially think, but to 
the extent that they do differ, this is not fatal to the notion of insensitivity, since 
this notion is essentially a practical one that concerns the nature of our causal 
judgements and as such we should expect a certain degree of subjectivity to enter 
into these judgements. Secondly, this passage suggests that to the extent that 
there are differences in judgements about which changes are more or less 
relevant for assessing insensitivity, we can assume that whether the 
counterfactuals actually hold under those changes is not a subjective matter. 
Although this point is not captured in the passage above, most importantly, I 
suggest that this kind of subjectivity does not introduce a problematic kind of 
subjectivity into interventionism, since as I explained above (and as I explain in 
further detail in Section 4.5 below), whether or not some relationship or 
generalization qualifies as causal depends solely on whether that relationship or 
generalization is invariant under interventions and I suggest below that we have 
good reason to think that this question is entirely objective.  
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With the notion of insensitivity outlined, I will now demonstrate how this 
notion helps interventionism to overcome two standard problems that less 
developed counterfactual theories of causation face. These are the problems that 
arise from cases of non-paradigmatic causation and causation by omissions.   
Firstly, consider the problem that it is possible, according to 
interventionism, for some relationship to qualify as genuinely causal in virtue of 
the fact that there is counterfactual dependence of the right kind, namely 
invariance under interventions, even though those relationships strike us as un-
paradigmatically causal (or even non-causal). One might reach this conclusion, 
for  example,  in  the  case  of  the  claim  relating  the  scratching  of  Suzy’s  nose  to  the  
bottle shattering. One could argue that these kinds of cases actually illustrate that 
counterfactual dependence is not sufficient for causation, since they appear to 
illustrate that it is possible for there to exist counterfactual dependence of the 
right kind without causation. 
The notion of insensitivity helps interventionism to avoid this problem, 
since it explains how it is possible for some relationship to qualify as genuinely 
causal, even though it may be judged as un-paradigmatically causal, or even non-
causal, given that it is fairly sensitive.37 When faced with examples of this kind 
there is therefore no reason to conclude that counterfactual dependence is not 
sufficient for causation, since our causal judgements that these cases are 
somewhat problematic and non-paradigmatic are explained by the relative 
sensitivity of those claims.38 
                                                 
37 Note that this also explains how certain background conditions (such as the presence of oxygen 
in the environment) can strictly qualify as causal according to interventionism, whilst striking us 
as somehow unparadigmatically, or problematically causal.   
38 There are of course those who will simply dig their heels in and argue that these cases are so 
un-paradigmatic that they should not qualify as causal at all. However, the point of this 
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A similar problem arises for interventionism as a result of cases of 
causation by omissions.39 Remember that according to interventionism, 
omissions can qualify as genuine causes, so long as there is counterfactual 
dependence of the right kind between the variables. Moreover, I argued above 
that the fact that interventionism can accommodate cases of negative causation, 
while the SP concept cannot, goes some way to undermine the assumption of SP. 
However, a problem seems to arise since it appears that counterfactual theories 
of causation, including interventionism, deliver the result that most, if not all 
negative events and states can qualify as genuine causes, which in many cases 
seems highly un-intuitive. In order to illustrate how the notion of insensitivity 
helps  to  overcome  this  problem,  consider  the  following  example  of  Woodward’s:       
 
“First,  consider 
(5.1) My writing of this very essay was caused by my not being hit by a 
large meteor 
and the associated counterfactuals, 
(5.2) If I were not struck by a large meteor, I would have written this very 
essay 
and 
(5.3) If I were struck by a large meteor, I would not have written this very 
essay.”  (Ibid:  24)   
                                                                                                                                    
discussion is not to convince those who are deeply sceptical about counterfactual theories of 
causation that they are wrong, but rather to illustrate that this problem can be dealt with within an 
interventionist framework, by appealing to the notion of insensitivity.  
39 The problems associated with causation by omissions (in particular for counterfactual accounts 
of  causation)  are  captured  concisely  by  Beebee  (2004).  Although  I  cannot  discuss  Beebee’s  
arguments here, I believe that the notion of insensitivity addresses the problems that Beebee 
highlights in her paper.   
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 Now, according to interventionism, there is a sense in which (5.1) is true, 
since it is true that intervening on whether Woodward is struck by a meteor is a 
way of intervening on the writing of the essay. However, as Woodward points 
out, it is also true that counterfactual (5.2) is highly sensitive40, in the sense that 
there are a range of relatively small variations to the situation, which would 
result in Woodward not writing the essay. For example, he may fail to have had 
the conversation with his colleague that gave him the idea for the essay, or he 
may simply have not had the time to write the essay. For Woodward, it is the 
sensitivity of counterfactual (5.2) that explains why, although (5.1) may 
technically qualify as causal according to interventionism, it nonetheless strikes 
us as an un-paradigmatic case of causation. Just as with the case above, we 
therefore need not conclude from such examples that counterfactual dependence 
is not sufficient for causation, since the notion of insensitivity explains how these 
kinds of cases can qualify as strictly causal, but appear un-paradigmatically 
causal or non-causal nonetheless. 
 Moreover, this problem does not undermine the argument that I made 
above, which was that it is a virtue of interventionism that it accommodates cases 
of negative causation, while the SP concept does not. This is because while the 
meteor case seems to strike us as un-paradigmatically causal, there are 
nonetheless cases of causation by omissions, which do strike us as genuinely 
causal. Consider the   following   examples   of   Woodward’s:   ‘The   absence   (of  
                                                 
40 According to Woodward, the insensitivity of a positive counterfactual (i.e. a counterfactual 
relating the occurrence of the supposed cause to the effect) carries more weight than the 
insensitivity of a negative counterfactual (i.e. a counterfactual relating the absence of the 
supposed cause to the effect). (Also note that in the meteor case above, the positive 
counterfactual actually concerns the non-occurrence of the meteor strike.)    
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access) to oxygen caused  N’s  death’,  and  ‘Many  German  civilians  were  caused  
to die from starvation (that is, from absence of food) by the British naval 
blockade  of  1919’.  Now, it does seem that we would be more willing to attribute 
causality to these negative claims than we would for (5.1) and for Woodward, 
this is simply because these claims are less sensitive than (5.1). My suggestion is 
that it is a virtue of interventionism that these intuitive claims can qualify as 
genuinely causal, while the same cannot be said for the SP concept.41  
 The benefit of introducing the notion of insensitivity into interventionism 
is clear: it remains possible to regard certain cases of causation by omissions as 
genuinely causal, while explaining the fact that there is something nonetheless 
un-paradigmatic about many cases of negative causation. By contrast, note that 
according to the SP concept, none of these claims (either intuitive or unintuitive) 
can count as causal. 
In summary, in this section I hope to have demonstrated that 
interventionism is able to avoid many of the standard objections that 
counterfactual theories of causation face, such as the problems that arise from 
cases of overdetermination, non-paradigmatic causation and causation by 
omissions. Given that interventionism is able to avoid these standard objections 
and given that I have demonstrated that in many cases, interventionism is able to 
                                                 
41 As Godfrey-Smith (2007: 13) points out, the issue of negative causation also arises in the 
context of responsibility. Consider Godfrey-Smith’s  example:  suppose that you walk past a child 
who has fallen into a pond, who then drowns. As Godfrey-Smith points out, although we might 
hold  you  responsible  for  the  child’s  death  even  though  you  didn’t  actually  cause  it  (we can 
imagine, for example, that someone sympathetic to the SP concept of causation might argue 
along these lines on the grounds that there is no spatiotemporally continuous physical process 
that  connects  your  ‘inaction’  with  the  child’s  death),  it  is  less  problematic  (and,  I  suggest,  more  
natural) to hold you responsible (morally and perhaps legally) if we treat your inaction as a cause. 
I suggest that these kinds of examples provide further support for the idea that some cases of 
negative causation do strike us as genuinely causal and that it is a virtue of interventionism that 
these intuitive claims can qualify as genuinely causal, while the same cannot be said for the SP 
concept.  
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deal with these problems in a more satisfying way than the SP concept, it is 
possible to conclude that interventionism does, after all, provide a viable 
alternative theory of causation to the SP concept, which does undermine the 
assumption of SP and hence does demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist 
need   not   accept   Kim’s   a   priori exclusion problem. Moreover, given that 
interventionism is able to deal with these standard objections, it is possible to 
conclude that interventionism can be used to provide a coherent account of 
mental causation and satisfactory solution to the exclusion problem.  
 
4.5 Remaining Problems  
 
There are, however, some remaining problems that I will discuss in this 
final section, concerning the potentially anthropocentric (Section 4.5.1), anti-
realist (Section 4.5.2) and circular (Section 4.5.3) nature of interventionism. 
Although these problems do not directly influence the arguments that I made 
above against the assumption of SP, it is also important to address these general 
problems if the interventionist account of mental causation that I outline in the 
next chapter is to be considered as providing a coherent theory of mental 
causation and satisfactory solution to Kim’s  exclusion problem.  
 
4.5.1 The Problem of Anthropocentricism  
 
The definition of interventionism outlined in this chapter appeals to the 
notions of control and manipulation and to the notion of an intervention to 
characterise causation. One could therefore argue that interventionism is 
problematically anthropocentric in the sense that whether X causes Y seems to 
Chapter 4, Interventionism    169  
 
depend on whether we, as humans, find certain relationships useful for the 
purposes of control and manipulation and on whether some agent actually 
performs an intervention.  
However, while interventionism does place a great deal of importance on 
the practical focus of causation and does appeal to human centred concepts, such 
as control and manipulation, interventionism is not problematically 
anthropocentric. In order to see this, remember firstly that according to 
interventionism, in order for X to cause Y, it is not necessary that some agent 
actually does perform, or ever could perform an intervention on X. For example, 
remember that the intervention on X need not actually be carried out, but may 
instead take the form of a hypothetical intervention that considers what would 
happen to Y if we were to intervene on X. Furthermore, for the reasons that I 
outlined above, interventionism only requires that these interventions be 
logically, conceptually and metaphysically possible, rather than being practically, 
nomically or even physically possible. Thus interventionism is not 
straightforwardly anthropocentric in the sense that whether X causes Y depends 
on the possibility that some agent actually does, or ever could perform an 
intervention on X.42 
Secondly, in order for X to cause Y, it is not necessary that the 
intervention on X has an actual practical  benefit,  or  ‘payoff’.  Once  again,  this  is  
                                                 
42 Unlike, for example, the theory of Menzies and Price (1993), which does make essential 
reference to the notion of human agency to define causation. Although Menzies and Price do 
address the issue of anthropocentricism, their solution involves developing fairly complex 
arguments that appeal to the notion of intrinsic similarity between cases in which some 
intervention is humanly possible and those cases in which it is not. (Roughly, the idea is that the 
latter kinds of cases can be considered as causal even though there is no humanly possible 
intervention associated with those cases, in virtue of the fact that they share intrinsic features with 
those cases in which some intervention is humanly possible.) By  contrast,  Woodward’s  
interventionism avoids the problem of anthropocentricism all together, since his notion of an 
intervention does not make essential reference to the notion of human agency.   
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because according to interventionism, X causes Y if there is some intervention 
on X that changes Y, even if that intervention is merely hypothetical, or is 
nomically, physically or practically impossible. I.e. even if the intervention is 
never, and could never be carried out and have an actual practical benefit. Rather, 
for Woodward, the potential practical benefit of interventionist causation actually 
explains why we, as humans, have an interest in causation and in discovering 
genuinely causal relationships over merely correlative ones. For example, as 
Woodward (2003: 28-33) explains, if the difference between genuinely causal 
relationships and merely correlative ones is that the former provide a potential 
means of control and manipulation over our environment, while the latter do not, 
then it is no wonder that we place such a great importance on understanding 
causation and on discovering genuinely causal relationships over merely 
correlative ones.43  
 
4.5.2 The Problem of Realism  
 
There is, however, a remaining concern regarding the potentially anti-
realist nature of interventionist causation. Before addressing the issue of realism 
and interventionism, let us first consider why the issue of realism is so important. 
Putting aside, for the moment, Kim’s   general   worries   with   the metaphysical 
credentials of counterfactual accounts of causation that I addressed briefly in 
Chapter 3 and will address below and again in Chapter 544, there is a strong 
intuition that our concept of causation and our concept of mental causation 
                                                 
43 This issue of how interventionism provides an explanation of our motivation for understanding 
causation is extremely interesting, but cannot be discussed further here. See Woodward, 2003, 
especially Chapters 2 and 3 for further details.   
44 These worries concerned the question of whether counterfactual dependence can sustain the 
kinds of causal relationships that are involved in human agency, or whether productive causation 
is required to account for these causal relationships.     
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should not be subjective and anti-realist in the sense that whether X causes Y 
depends on facts about us. For example, it should not depend on whether we find 
certain relationships useful for the purposes of control and manipulation, or on 
whether the counterfactuals associated with the claims strike us as insensitive. In 
short, there is a strong and reasonable intuition that we want realism about 
causation and realism about mental causation in the sense that whether X causes 
Y does not depend on facts about us, but rather, that causation exists objectively 
‘out  there’  in  reality  independently  of  us.45  
Moreover, regardless of whether one is sympathetic to the points that I 
made in response to Kim in Chapter 3 (and to the points that I go on to make in 
Chapter 5) about counterfactual dependence being sufficient to sustain the kinds 
of relationships that are involved in mental causation, if it turns out that 
interventionism is straightforwardly anti-realist, Kim would be justified in 
claiming that interventionism could not provide a satisfactory account of mental 
causation and solution to the exclusion problem.  
One worry is that the notions of contrastive focus and insensitivity, which 
are somewhat subjective, introduce a problematic kind of subjectivity into 
interventionism and generate an anti-realist conception of causation. However, I 
have argued at length that despite having somewhat subjective features, 
interventionism is not problematically subjective, or anti-realist. 
For example, I explained that although the notion of insensitivity is 
somewhat subjective, in the sense that our assessments of insensitivity can be 
                                                 
45 This is of course not to endorse an empirical analysis of causation, which takes as its primary 
focus the discovery of what causation is in reality, as opposed to a conceptual analysis of 
causation, which seeks to understand the concept of causation as it is used in ordinary language. 
As I explained above, (see footnote 28), interventionism can be broadly understood as providing 
a conceptual analysis of causation.  
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influenced by context, pragmatics, the expectations of the subject and so on, it 
does not follow that interventionism is thereby problematically subjective, or 
anti-realist. This is because, considerations of insensitivity do not determine 
whether X causes Y, but merely explain our causal judgements and as such, we 
should actually expect a certain degree of subjectivity to feature in these 
considerations. As I explained above, whether X causes Y depends solely on 
whether there is counterfactual dependence of the right kind between the 
variables, i.e. invariance under interventions and whether such counterfactual 
dependence exists is independent of whether we consider those counterfactuals to 
be insensitive. 
Similarly for the notion of contrastive focus, although I have suggested 
that this notion is somewhat subjective in the sense that whether some claim or 
explanation captures the correct contrastive focus can depend on the context of 
the situation and on our goal as enquirers, this does not introduce a problematic 
kind of subjectivity or anti-realism into interventionism. This is because the 
notion of contrastive focus is not introduced to distinguish between causal and 
non-causal claims and explanations, but rather is introduced to distinguish 
between better or worse causal claims and explanations and as such, it will 
inevitably feature a certain degree of subjectivity. Again, whether X causes Y, or 
whether X counts as a causal explanation of Y, depends solely on whether there 
is counterfactual dependence of the right kind between the variables and whether 
such counterfactual dependence exists is independent of whether we consider 
those counterfactuals to capture the correct contrastive focus. 
So, although interventionism has a subjectivist element in the sense that 
what we accept or judge to be causal or explanatory depends on somewhat 
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subjective notions such as sensitivity and contrastive focus, this does not 
introduce a problematic kind of subjectivity or anti-realism into the theory. This 
is because, as I hope to have made clear, whether X causes Y or whether X 
counts as a causal explanation of Y depends solely on whether there is 
counterfactual dependence of the right kind between the variables, (i.e. 
invariance under interventions) and whether such counterfactual dependence 
exists is completely independent of any subjective considerations.46 As 
Woodward  puts  it,  “the  patterns  of counterfactual dependence are, as it were, the 
“objective  core”   that   lies  behind  our  particular  causal   judgments,  and   it   is  such  
patterns  that  are  the  real  objects  of  scientific  and  practical  interest.”  (Ibid:  85)47  
In fact, as Woodward explains, it is actually built into the interventionist 
understanding of causation that causation is genuinely mind-independent. To use 
one  of  Woodward’s  examples,  suppose  that  an  agent  wishes  to  bring  about  some  
effect, Y, and wonders whether she can use X as a means of doing so. As 
Woodward explains, although it is up to the agent whether she discovers that this 
relationship is causal or non-causal, or actually uses X as a means of controlling 
Y, it is built into the very idea that the agent can discover whether this 
relationship is genuinely causal via interventions that whether X causes Y is not 
also  ‘up  to  her’.  As  Woodward  explains,     
 
                                                 
46 It is not clear that Woodward would agree that subjective considerations never influence 
whether some relationship qualifies as causal. For example, in his discussion (2003, especially 
pp. 87-89)  of  the  notion  of  ‘serious  possibility’  (which,  for  our  purposes,  is  relevantly  similar  to  
the notion of insensitivity), it is not clear whether Woodward actually thinks that serious 
possibility can be used to explain how it is possible for a relationship to meet the interventionist 
criteria for causation and yet fail to be causal, given that the associated counterfactuals are not 
serious possibilities. In any case, I believe that it is only if subjective considerations, such as 
serious possibility, never influence whether some relationship qualifies as causal that 
interventionism is able to avoid problems concerning realism that I discuss below and again in 
Chapter 5. 
47 Woodward actually makes this point in relation to cases of overdetermination. 
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“…it  is  a  presupposition  of  her  deliberation  that  if  it  is  possible  to  change  
Y by intervening on X, then there must be an independently existing, 
invariant relationship between X and Y that the agent makes use of when 
she changes X and, in doing so, changes Y—a relationship that would 
exist and have whatever characteristics it has even if the agent were 
unable to manipulate X or chose not to manipulate X or did not exist. In 
other words, it is built into the whole notion of a manipulation that the 
agent's activities, manipulative or otherwise, don't somehow create or 
influence or constitute whether there is a relationship between X and Y 
that allows us to manipulate Y by manipulating X.”  (Ibid:  119)   
 
Now, one point that will be especially relevant to our later discussion and 
which is a point that Woodward himself acknowledges, is that this interventionist 
notion of realism is “metaphysically   modest”   (Ibid:   121),   for   example,   in  
comparison to a conception of causation that posits the transfer of some 
conserved physical quantity as a necessary condition for causation (such as the 
SP concept). For example, according to interventionism, in order for X to cause 
Y (i.e. in order for the relationship between X and Y to be minimally invariant 
and causal), it is not necessary that X and Y are connected via any kind of 
spatiotemporally continuous physical process, or that X transfers some conserved 
physical quantity to Y. Moreover, it is also not true that relationships that display 
a relatively high degree of invariance thereby contribute something more 
‘metaphysically’   than   relationships   that   are   less   invariant.48 But rather, 
                                                 
48 Of course, in interventionist terms, relationships that are highly invariant can nonetheless be 
considered as more causally relevant than relationships that are less invariant, given the important 
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interventionist   realism   only   implies   “that   there   be   facts   of   the   matter,  
independent  of  facts  about  human  abilities  and  psychology”  (Ibid),  namely  facts  
about counterfactual dependencies.  
 Now, as I make clear in the next chapter, this “metaphysically  modest”  
(Ibid: 121) account of causation is actually the only account of mental causation 
and solution to the exclusion problem that we can give as serious physicalists, 
given that it is only by  being  “metaphysically  modest”  (Ibid)  that  this  account  is  
able to uphold all of the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism. 
Nevertheless, an important theme of the next chapter will be proving that this 
“metaphysically  modest”   (Ibid)  account  does  nonetheless provide a satisfactory 
solution to the exclusion problem. By demonstrating that interventionism is not 
straightforwardly anti-realist in the sense that whether X causes Y depends on 
facts about us and by demonstrating that it could never therefore provide a 
satisfactory account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem, 
the discussion in this chapter should have gone some way to prove this. 
 
4.5.3 The Problem of Circularity  
 
The final problem that I will discuss concerns the potential circularity of 
interventionism. This problem arises since the notion of an intervention, which is 
central to interventionism, is itself a causal notion. In order to see this, note that 
the criteria for a suitable intervention, (IV1-4), outlined above include the 
requirements that intervention I should cause X and that it should not cause Y 
directly. This raises the question of whether this account of causation is 
                                                                                                                                    
practical and explanatory benefits that are acquired in these cases. This point is especially 
important to the argument for mental causation outlined in the next chapter. 
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problematically, or viciously circular in the sense that it employs a causal notion 
to analyse causation and so cannot explain what causation is.   
Now, although the notion of an intervention is itself a causal notion and 
although this means that interventionism cannot be used to provide a reductive 
analysis of causation, (more on this below), interventionism is not viciously 
circular. We can see this by considering the following two points. Firstly, 
consider  Woodward’s   (Ibid: 104-105) point that the causal information that is 
required to establish whether intervention I is a suitable intervention on X, (for 
example, that it is a cause of X and that it does not cause Y directly and so on), is 
not the same causal information that is used to establish whether X causes Y. In 
other words, we have an understanding of what an intervention I on X would 
consist of and although this involves causal notions, it is also true that this is 
independent of (i.e. it does not presuppose) whether X causes Y. Indeed, the 
purpose of considering whether an intervention I on X changes Y is to establish 
whether X and Y are causally related. Woodward is right that it would only be if 
the (causal) notion of an intervention presupposed a causal relationship between 
X and Y that interventionism would be viciously circular and this is simply not 
true.  
Secondly, although the fact that interventionism appeals to causal notions 
to define causation means that it cannot provide a reductive analysis of causation, 
this would only be fatal to interventionism if it were true that only reductive 
analyses of causation could provide a genuine and non-viciously circular 
understanding of what causation is. However, this is simply not true. For 
example, what I hope the discussion in this chapter has demonstrated is that 
although interventionism is a non-reductive theory of causation it certainly does 
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provide an understanding of what causation is: it successfully distinguishes 
between causation and correlation, it explains the potential practical payoff of 
causation in terms of control and manipulation, it provides a plausible account of 
causal explanation, it provides an account of how omissions and overdetermining 
causes can all count as genuine causes, while explaining why our causal 
intuitions and judgements about these cases nonetheless vary. Moreover, as 
Woodward (Ibid: 149) points out, since interventionism is inconsistent with 
many other theories of causation, (including the SP concept), it undermines these 
alternative theories, all the while being a non-reductive theory.  
What the discussion in this last section should have demonstrated is that 
interventionism does not generate a problematically anthropocentric, anti-realist, 
or circular conception of causation and that it can therefore provide a coherent 
account of mental causation and satisfactory solution to the exclusion problem.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I began by outlining the central features of 
interventionism and in particular, examined those features of the theory that I 
appeal   to   in   the   next   chapter,   in   which   I   present   Woodward’s   interventionist  
account of mental causation. I then highlighted some of the problems that the SP 
concept faces and presented interventionism as a viable alternative theory of 
causation that avoids these problems, undermining the assumption of SP and 
thereby demonstrating that the non-reductive  physicalist  need  not  accept  Kim’s  a  
priori exclusion problem. I then addressed the worry that despite the problems 
that the SP concept faces, interventionism fails to provide a viable alternative to 
this theory and so fails to undermine the assumption of SP, since it faces serious 
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problems of its own. I argued that not only can interventionism avoid these 
problems, but it can actually deal with many of these problems in a more 
satisfying way than the SP concept. I concluded that interventionism does, after 
all, provide a viable alternative theory of causation to the SP concept and does 
undermine the assumption of SP, hence demonstrating that the non-reductive 
physicalist  need  not  accept  Kim’s  a  priori  exclusion  problem.  In  the  final  section,  
I addressed some general problems concerning the potentially anthropocentric, 
anti-realist and circular nature of interventionist causation. I demonstrated that 
interventionism avoids these problems and that it can therefore provide a 
coherent account of mental causation and satisfactory solution to the exclusion 
problem.  
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5. Interventionism and Mental 
Causation  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
  
My aim in this chapter is to present a positive account of mental 
causation and to demonstrate how this account avoids the exclusion problem, 
whilst upholding all of the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism, 
thereby providing a successful non-reductive physicalist solution to the exclusion 
problem. Before doing this, it will be useful to recap the argument thus far. In 
Chapter 2, I demonstrated that the exclusion problem appears to follow a priori 
from five apparently inconsistent theses of non-reductive physicalism. I argued 
that these theses are all in fact minimal commitments that cannot be rejected in 
order to overcome the exclusion problem and that they must therefore be upheld 
by any physicalist account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion 
problem. In Chapter 3, I argued that despite its apparent inevitability, the 
exclusion problem only follows a priori from these minimal commitments when 
they are combined with an assumption regarding causation, this being the 
assumption that causation is identical to sufficient production. In the previous 
chapter, I outlined and examined the interventionist theory of causation and 
highlighted some problems that the SP concept faces. By highlighting these 
problems and by demonstrating that interventionism provides a viable alternative 
theory of causation that avoids these problems, it undermined the assumption that 
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causation is identical to sufficient production and proved that the non-reductive 
physicalist  need  not  accept  Kim’s  a  priori   exclusion problem. In this chapter, I 
outline  Woodward’s  interventionist  account  of  mental  causation  and  demonstrate  
how this account avoids the exclusion problem, whilst upholding all of the 
minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism, thereby providing a viable 
and successful non-reductive physicalist account of mental causation and 
solution to the exclusion problem.   
The chapter is organised as follows: in Section 5.2, I outline the 
interventionist account of mental causation. I demonstrate that not only does 
interventionism provide an account of causation by which both mental and 
physical properties can qualify as causes of the same effects, but that when 
causation is understood in interventionist terms, mental properties can actually be 
considered to provide better causal explanations of their effects in comparison to 
those offered by their physical realizers. In order to demonstrate this, I appeal to 
the central features of interventionism that I outlined in the previous chapter, 
namely invariance (Section 5.2.1) and contrastive focus (Section 5.2.2). Most 
importantly, I demonstrate that when causation is understood in interventionist 
terms, the question of mental causation becomes an entirely a posteriori, not a 
priori question. In Section 5.3, I make explicit how this account of mental 
causation   avoids   Kim’s   a   priori   exclusion   problem and in Section 5.3.1, 
demonstrate that this account upholds all of the minimal commitments of non-
reductive physicalism and does therefore provide a viable non-reductive 
physicalist solution to the exclusion problem. Then, in Section 5.3.2, I 
demonstrate that this account also provides a satisfactory account of mental 
causation and solution to the exclusion problem. Finally, in Section 5.4, I 
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examine two alternative manipulationist accounts of causation, which I argue fail 
to provide satisfactory accounts of mental causation and solutions to the 
exclusion problem, given that they generate anti-realist conceptions of causation. 
I conclude that Woodward’s   interventionist account of mental causation 
therefore provides the only satisfactory non-reductive physicalist account of 
mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem. 
 
5.2 An Interventionist Account of Mental Causation  
   
 It appears, at least at first glance, that interventionism provides a 
straightforward account of the causal relevance of mental properties. We do, for 
example, routinely observe that intervening on our own or others’ mental (or 
psychological) states is a way of bringing about both physical and psychological 
effects. For example, I may tell you that there is no more milk in the fridge 
(intervening on your belief1), causing you to go to the supermarket. Or I may 
manipulate your belief that there are biscuits in the cupboard, so that you do not 
eat them.  
                                                 
1 This does depend on the acceptance of the commonsensical idea that it is possible to intervene 
on  others’  mental  states  through  verbal  communication,  etc.  Campbell (2007) questions whether 
these  ‘ordinary’,  or  folk-psychological (i.e. non-idealised) interventions should be required to be 
‘surgical’  in  the  specific  sense  captured  by  condition  IV-1  (which, remember, requires that 
intervention I should  ‘break  ties’  with  any  endogenous  causes  of  X,  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  
confounding) in order to be able to determine whether X causes Y. The reason that Campbell 
gives  is  that  this  would  implausibly  require  that  the  surgical  intervention  ‘suspend’  the  subject’s  
rationality,  e.g.  break  ties  with  the  subject’s  usual  reasons  for  possessing  mental  property  X,  
which are also causes of X. I will not discuss this issue in great detail, but it will be helpful to 
make the following points. Firstly, (if I have understood Campbell correctly), I do not agree that 
we should modify the criteria for a suitable intervention in the case of psychological causation in 
general, since these criteria still provide idealised conditions (in hypothetical or actual 
experimental situations) to determine whether X causes Y. However, I do think that it is plausible 
that we can (and do) routinely intervene on our own and  others’  psychological  states  and  agree  
with Campbell that it is unlikely (and somewhat implausible) that these interventions are strictly 
surgical, and moreover agree that we are justified in making causal inferences on the basis of 
these interventions, so long as we recognise that these interventions simply take the form of non-
ideal interventions for determining whether X causes Y. 
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 These kinds of examples of mental causation are commonplace in 
ordinary life, but the idea that mental states can be causes of both physical and 
psychological effects is also widely accepted in scientific practice, especially in 
psychology and other social sciences. For example, experiments across the 
sciences attempt to control for the so-called placebo effect, in which the mere 
belief that a subject will receive treatment can bring about a physical change to 
their   recovery.   Or   consider   Woodward’s   example from psychiatry that since 
positive thinking is associated with changes in depression, some claim that 
positive thinking can be considered as part of an effective treatment for 
depression. Since it appears that there are some interventions on these mental 
properties that change these physical and psychological effects, they can qualify 
as genuine causes according to interventionism. However, as we will see, there 
are examples of seemingly intuitive cases of mental causation, which fail to 
qualify as causal according to interventionism.2 I will now therefore examine the 
interventionist account of mental causation in detail.  
Woodward (2008a) cites recent research into the neural coding of 
intentions to reach for specific objects carried out by Richard Andersen and 
colleagues at Caltech.3 The research involved recording neural signals in the 
PRR (parietal reach region) of the brain in Macaque monkeys, which is thought 
to  encode  for  ‘intentions  to  reach  for  specific  targets’.  Woodward  notes  that  the  
researchers were able to relate variations   in   ‘aggregate   features’   of   the   neural  
signals to variations in intentions to reach for specific goals (as evidenced by the 
reaching behaviour of the monkeys) and that they were able to accurately 
                                                 
2 As I will shortly explain, this is because those mental properties fail to stand in the particular 
relationship to those effects that is required for mental causation (or more accurately, for all 
supervenient  causation),  namely  a  ‘realization  independent  dependency  relation’,  or  RIDR.   
3 This reference is listed as Musallam et al (2004) in the bibliography.  
Chapter 5, Interventionism and Mental Causation    183  
 
‘forecast’   specific   reaching   behaviour   from   these   neural   aggregates. What was 
also apparent was that although it was possible to relate an intention to a specific 
aggregate pattern of neurons, the same intention might be realized by a variety of 
neural patterns, so that each intention is multiply realized at the neural level.   
Consider a particular instance of this experiment:   
 
“Suppose   then   that   on   some   specific   occasion   t a monkey forms an 
intention I1 to reach for a particular goal—call this action R1. Suppose N11 
is the particular (token) pattern of firing in the relevant set of neurons that 
realizes or encodes the intention I1 on this particular occasion. Assume 
also that there are other token patterns of neural firing, N12, N13 that 
realize the same intention I1 on other occasions, so that I1 is multiply 
realized by N11, N12,  etc.”  (Ibid:  239) 
  
 Now, according to interventionism, mental property I1 qualifies as a cause 
of physical effect R1 if there is some intervention on I1 that changes R1, i.e. if the 
relationship between I1 and R1 is at least minimally invariant. For example, if in 
the experiment, an intervention sets the value of the intention from I1 to I2, and 
thereby makes it the case that the monkey exhibits reaching behaviour R2 rather 
than reaching behaviour, R1, I1 will qualify as a cause of R1. 
 Moreover, it will also be true (as guaranteed by causal closure, more on 
this below) that physical realizer N11 qualifies as a cause of R1, since there is 
some intervention on N11 that changes R1, i.e. the relationship between N11 and 
R1 is   minimally   invariant.   For   example,   if   we   imagine   altering   the   monkey’s  
Chapter 5, Interventionism and Mental Causation    184  
 
neural firing pattern from N11 to N15, this may result in different reaching 
behaviour, R5 being performed, rather than R1.4 
 So, by appealing to the theory of interventionism, it is possible to provide 
a fairly straightforward account of how both supervenient mental property, I1, 
and its physical realizer, N11, can qualify as causes of the same physical effect. In 
fact, although it is true that both I1 and N11 qualify as causes of R1, there is a 
sense in which the causal claim and explanation citing I1 can actually be 
considered as better than the causal claim and explanation citing N11. In what 
sense can the causal claim and explanation citing I1 be  considered  as  ‘better’  and  
what explains this difference? 
 
5.2.1 Invariance and Realization Independent Dependency Relations 
(RIDR) 
 
According to Woodward, whenever any supervenient property, such as a 
mental property, stands in a particular relation to some effect, namely a 
‘realization  independent  dependency  relation’,  or  RIDR  (to  be  discussed  below),  
it will usually be the case that that supervenient property will provide a 
preferable causal claim and explanation in comparison to its subvenient realizer. 
On the other hand, when supervenient properties fail to stand in this specific 
relationship with those effects, it will instead be the case that the subvenient 
property will provide the preferable causal claim and explanation (as I shortly 
                                                 
4 As I explain in Chapter 6, given supervenience, whenever a mental property qualifies as a cause 
of some effect, it is actually the same intervention that secures the causal status of the physical 
realizer of that mental property. Very roughly, this is because supervenience requires that any 
change at the mental level requires a change at the physical level. Consequently, any intervention 
that changes the mental property from one value to another (for example, from I1 to I2) will also 
change the value of the physical realizer of that property (for example, from N11 to N14) and 
hence also secures the causal status of that physical realizer. I explore this issue in more detail in 
Chapter 6 and address a potential problem that arises regarding the non-reductive  physicalist’s  
commitment to non-identity.   
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explain, in this kind of case, the supervenient property will actually fail to qualify 
as a cause of the effect).  
So, what exactly is RIDR? As Woodward explains,  
 
“…what  is  required  [for  RIDR]  is  the  existence  of  a  relationship  that  both  
involves a dependency between the upper level variables (different values 
of M1, produced by interventions map into different values of M2) and 
that is realization independent in the sense that it continues to stably hold 
for a range of different realizers of these values of M1 and M2. It is the 
presence of this sort of realization independent dependency relationship 
(hereafter RIDR) that ensures that interventions that change M1 are stably 
associated with changes in M2—hence that M1 causes M2.”  (Ibid:  241)   
 
In other words, whenever supervenient mental properties stand in this 
realization independent dependency relation to other properties, those 
relationships will display at least a minimal degree of invariance and will qualify 
as causal. I suggest that we can therefore think of RIDR as what makes it 
possible for supervenient mental properties to stand in invariant and hence causal 
relationships with other properties.   
Moreover, we can also see that when the relationships at the supervenient 
level display a high degree of realization independence, those relationships will 
display a higher degree of invariance than the relationships at the subvenient 
level. This is simply because, given that the supervenient properties are realized 
by a variety of physical properties, each of which lead to the same effect, there 
will simply be a wider range of interventions on those supervenient properties 
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that change the effect, than there are for those physical properties. For example, 
since I1 is realized by a variety of neural properties, each of which lead to the 
same reaching behaviour, R1, there will simply be a wider range of interventions 
on I1 (for example, interventions that change the intention from I1 to I2, I3, I4 and 
so on) that change R1, than there are for N11. (Remember that changing the value 
of the neural realizer from N11 to one of the other realizers of I1, for example, to 
N12, or N13 would fail to bring about any change to R1.)  
Going back to the discussion in Chapter 4, we can see that this high 
degree of invariance has two important benefits. Firstly, by being invariant over a 
wider range of interventions, the explanation citing I1 will be able to answer a 
wider range of w-questions, since it tells us what would happen to the effect 
under a wide range of interventions on I1. For example, it tells us what would 
happen to physical effect, R1,  if  we  were  to  change  the  subject’s  intention  from I1 
to I2, I3, I4, and so on. By contrast, given that the relationship between N11 and R1 
is invariant over a much more limited range of interventions, the explanation 
citing N11 will be able to answer a much more limited range of w-questions. For 
example, it will fail to tell us what would happen to the physical effect if we 
changed N11 to one of the alternative realizers of I1, such as N12, or N13.  
Secondly, given that the relationship between I1 and R1 holds over this 
wide range of interventions, it will be more exploitable for the purposes of 
control and manipulation, since this relationship will continue to hold and hence 
continue to provide a means of control, over this wide range of interventions. By 
contrast, the relationship between N11 and R1 will be less useful for the purposes 
of control and manipulation, since it will break down outside a narrow range of 
interventions.  
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We can illustrate the relevance of this level of control and manipulation 
in the case of mental causation by considering what the eventual goal of the 
research of Andersen et al is. As Woodward notes, the researchers hope to use 
this information to provide paralysed subjects with control over prosthetic limbs. 
Now, although it is true that in order to produce the movement in the prosthetic 
limb,  the  prosthesis  must  be  ‘wired  up’  to  the  subject’s  neural  system, it will be 
‘wired   up’   in   such   a   way   that   on   the   mere formation of an intention by the 
subject, for example, on the formation of intention I1, any one of the specific 
realizers of I1 could be instantiated and would bring about a change to the effect. 
(By contrast, imagine   that   the   prosthesis  was   ‘wired   up’   directly   to   one   single  
neural property, for example N11, in which case given that certain interventions 
on this specific neural property would not bring about a change to the effect, this 
level of control would simply be lost5.) In other words, it is by forming an 
intention that the subject will acquire the desired level of control over the 
prosthetic limb, the relevance of which for the paralysed subject goes without 
saying. 
I suggest that this demonstrates further that although interventionism 
provides an account of causation by which both mental properties and their 
physical realizers can qualify as causes of the same effects, there is a real and 
important sense in which the relationships and explanations at the mental level 
can be considered as better than those at the physical level and this can simply be 
explained in terms of the fact that those relationships are more stable, or invariant 
over a wider range of interventions. Moreover, it highlights the fact that from an 
                                                 
5 Note that from the perspective of the SP concept of causation, this practical benefit is 
completely lost. This is because by being sufficient to produce the behaviour, physical property 
N11would automatically be considered as preferable over mental property I1, even though it is the 
latter, not the former that is most useful for the purposes of control and manipulation.    
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interventionist   perspective,   there   is   nothing   ‘special’   or   privileged   about   the  
explanation citing N11 that follows from the fact that it is a physical explanation. 
(I explore these issues in further detail below.) 
As well as explaining how supervenient mental causation is possible, the 
notion of RIDR therefore also explains why supervenient mental properties will 
often provide better causal claims and explanations than their physical realizers: 
by standing in highly realization independent dependency relationships with their 
effects, those supervenient relationships will simply be more invariant over a 
wider range of interventions and hence will be able to answer a wider range of 
w-questions and will be more potentially useful for the purposes of control and 
manipulation.6   
Now, one could argue that I have merely demonstrated that mental 
properties often provide better explanations of their effects in comparison to their 
physical realizers and that they merely play an ‘instrumental’  role in explaining 
behaviour, but that this is very different from proving that mental properties are 
genuine causes of physical and psychological effects.  
In response, it is important to remember that according to 
interventionism, although explanation and causation are distinct notions in the 
sense that explanation is essentially an epistemic activity, concerned with the 
provision of causal information, whereas causation is an objective relation 
existing independently of any epistemic awareness of it, explanations nonetheless 
cite genuine causes. So, the worry that mental explanations are merely 
                                                 
6As I explain in further detail in Section 5.3.2 below, the notion of RIDR also explains how 
mental properties can qualify as causally distinct (i.e. as causes that cannot be identified or 
reduced) from the physical properties on which they supervene, allowing the non-reductive 
physicalist to avoid the threat of reduction. (Very roughly, this is because it allows mental and 
physical properties to exhibit distinct levels of invariance in relation to their effects.)  
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instrumental in explaining behaviour, rather than describing genuine causal 
relationships, simply does not arise. Secondly, remember that according to 
interventionism, all that is required for some property to qualify as a cause of 
some effect is that there is some intervention on that property that changes the 
effect and according to this definition, mental property I1 qualifies as a bona fide 
cause of physical effect R1.  
Before I provide some examples that will help to clarify the notion of 
RIDR, it is worth pointing out that it is not simply the fact that mental properties 
are multiply realized that ensures that they can qualify as causes, but it is the 
multiple realizability of mental properties and the specific notion of RIDR that 
makes this possible. As we will see, it is possible for a supervenient property to 
be multiply realized at the physical level, but for the relationship between that 
mental property and the effect to fail to be realization independent and hence fail 
to exhibit any degree of invariance and hence qualify as causal.  
As  an  illustration,  consider  the  following  example  of  Woodward’s  (Ibid:  
242): an ordinary roulette wheel is spun by a croupier C, who has a varied set of 
hand movements Bi that he can use to spin the wheel. Although it may be true 
that C is able to distinguish Bi in a fairly fine grained way, so that C has maximal 
control over Bi, each Bi will be multiply realized at the micro level given all of 
the different variations of the starting positions and momenta of the wheel. 
Suppose then that on some particular occasion, C employs movement Bk to spin 
the wheel and the ball falls into a red slot. Now, according to interventionism, 
although Bk is multiply realized, Bk does not cause the ball to fall into the red 
slot, since there is no intervention on Bk that changes whether the ball falls into 
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the red slot.7 This is because whether or not the ball lands in the red slot depends 
on the specific realization of Bk, which varies on every occasion that C employs 
Bk. Since the relationship between Bk and the ball falling into the red slot is not 
realization independent the relationship fails to be even minimally invariant 
under interventions to Bk and hence fails to qualify as causal, even though Bk is 
multiply realized.   
In order to elucidate the notion of RIDR and the argument for 
supervenient mental causation further, it will be helpful to appeal to some 
examples. Firstly, let us consider the case of mental property I1: as I explained 
above, the relationship between I1 and R1 is highly realization independent in the 
sense that it would continue to hold for all of the different physical realizations of 
I1. I illustrate this in Figure 5.1 below.   
 
Figure 5.1: RIDR/Intention I1 
Solid arrows represent genuine causal relationships. Broken lines represent 
supervenient relationships.  
 
                                                 
7 Remember that although it may be true that there is one single intervention on Bk that changes 
whether the ball falls into the red slot, this does not guarantee that Bk qualifies as a cause of the 
effect, since remember that according to interventionism, for X to cause Y, even if it is only 
discovered by one single intervention, that intervention must in theory be repeatable, to rule out 
the possibility that the intervention on X is only associated with the change in Y by chance. 
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We can see that by standing in this realization independent dependency 
relationship to R1, interventions on I1 will be stably associated with changes to 
R1; hence I1 will qualify as a cause of R1. Moreover, by being highly realization 
independent and hence by displaying a higher degree of invariance than the 
relationship between N11 and R1, the causal claim and explanation citing I1 will 
be better than the one citing N11. As I explained above, this is simply because by 
being stable or invariant over a wider range of changes, the explanation citing I1 
will answer a wider range of w-questions and will be more useful for the 
purposes of control and manipulation, which I hope to have shown in the case of 
mental causation, is especially important.   
On the other hand, let us consider those supervenient relationships that 
fail to be even minimally realization independent and hence fail to be minimally 
invariant and causal. According to Woodward, these kinds of non-RIDR cases 
are   usually   cases   of   ‘causal   heterogeneity’,   in   which   a   supervenient   property,  
such as a single mental property is multiply realized by a variety of physical 
properties and in which case each different realization of that mental property 
leads to a different effect.   
As  an  illustration,  consider  the  following  example  of  Woodward’s  (Ibid:  
260-261):  to  the  extent  that  the  general  concept  ‘fear’  is  realized by a number of 
more   specific   ‘fear   systems’   that   are   causally   heterogeneous   in   the   sense   that  
each of the different physical realizations is associated with a different effect, it 
is  likely  that  any  generalization  linking  the  general  concept  ‘fear’  to  a particular 
behavioural effect will be completely unstable and hence will fail to qualify as 
minimally invariant and causal. Put slightly differently, given that any 
intervention on the property   ‘fear’ will instantiate any one of the specific 
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realizers of ‘fear’,  each  of  which  lead  to  a  different  effect,  there  is  no  intervention  
on the general property   ‘fear’   that would lead to a change to the effect under 
consideration.8 Instead, it is only by intervening on one of the specific physical 
realizers  of   ‘fear’ that we will find any invariant and hence causal relationship 
between cause and effect. I illustrate this in Figure 5.2 below. In line with the 
interventionist account of causation and explanation outlined thus far, these non-
RIDR and hence non-invariant and non-causal cases would not qualify as even 
minimally explanatory or potentially useful for the purposes of control and 
manipulation.  
 
Figure 5.2: Non-RIDR/Fear 
Solid arrows represent genuine causal relationships. Broken lines represent 
supervenient relationships. Fear systems F1, F2 and F3 represent the different 
realizers   of   the   supervenient   concept   ‘fear’.   B1, B2 and B3 represent different 
behavioural effects.    
 
                                                 
8 As I mentioned in footnote 7 in relation to the roulette wheel example, although it may be true 
that  there  is  one  single  intervention  on  ‘fear’  that  changes,  for  example, behavioural effect B1, 
this  does  not  guarantee  that  ‘fear’  qualifies  as  a  cause  of  B1, since given the lack of realization 
independence  of  the  relationship  between  ‘fear’  and  B1 (which can in turn be explained by the 
causally heterogeneous nature of the realizers  of  ‘fear’)  there  is  no  intervention  on  ‘fear’  that  
would change B1 that would be repeatable in the sense required to rule out the possibility that the 
intervention  on  ‘fear’  is  associated  with  the  change  in  B1 by chance. 
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Further still, I suggest that in other kinds of cases, in which the 
relationships at the supervenient level possess a fairly low degree of realization 
independence and hence possess a lower degree of invariance than the 
relationships at the physical level, we may prefer the causal claims and 
explanations offered by the subvenient realizers of those supervenient properties. 
As an illustration, let us again consider the psychological concept of positive 
thinking: it is possible for the relationship between positive thinking and 
depression to be somewhat realization independent, in the sense that there are a 
number of realizations of positive thinking that lead to a change in depression. 
As a result, there will be some intervention on positive thinking that changes 
depression, hence this relationship will possess a minimal degree of invariance 
and will qualify as causal. However, it may also be true that there are some 
realizations of positive thinking that are not associated with changes to 
depression, but which may instead be associated with changes to the immune 
system, or scholastic achievement, for example, and the relationship between 
positive thinking and depression will break down under any intervention on 
positive thinking that instantiates one of these realizers. I illustrate this in Figure 
5.3 below. As a consequence, the relationship between positive thinking and 
depression will not be as invariant as the relationships at the physical level 
between the specific realizers of positive thinking and the various effects. As a 
result, the explanations offered at the supervenient level will not answer as wide 
a range of w-questions, or provide information that is as useful for the purposes 
of control and manipulation as the explanations offered at the physical level.  
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Figure 5.3: Minimal-RIDR/Positive thinking  
Solid arrows represent genuine causal relationships. Broken lines represent 
supervenient relationships. P1, P2 and P3 represent the group of physical realizers 
of positive thinking that cause changes in depression. P4, P5 and P6 represent the 
group of physical realizers of positive thinking that cause changes in the immune 
system. P7, P8 and P9 represent the group of physical realizers of positive 
thinking that cause changes in scholastic achievement.  
 
We can elucidate these ideas further by referring back to the idea of 
‘degrees  of  invariance’  that  I  introduced in the previous chapter. Remember that 
according to interventionism, there is both a threshold of invariance that a 
relationship or generalization must pass if it is to qualify as causal and varying 
degrees of invariance that a relationship or generalization can possess. In a recent 
paper, Woodward (2008b) importantly asks where psychological relationships 
and   generalizations   are   likely   to   lie   on   the   scale   of   invariance.   Woodward’s  
suggestion is that they will typically lie around the middle of the scale, in the 
sense that they fail to be as highly invariant as the claims and generalizations of 
physics, for example, but that many will pass the threshold for invariance and 
will qualify as genuinely causal.   
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How does the notion of RIDR fit into this scale? I suggest that we can 
think of the scale of RIDR as ‘mapping  onto’  the  scale  of  invariance  (I illustrate 
this in Figure 5.4 below). In general, we can think of psychological causal claims 
and generalizations that are highly realization independent as lying at the upper 
end of the mid-range of the scale, (for example, as in the case of intention I1), 
whereas I suggest that we can think of mental properties that do not display a 
great deal of realization independence as lying at the latter end of the mid-range, 
(for  example,  as  in  the  case  of  the  psychological  variable  ‘positive  thinking’).  In  
other kinds of cases, in which the mental properties are not even minimally 
realization independent and hence are not minimally invariant or causal, (for 
example,   as   in   the   case   of   the   general   concept   ‘fear’),   we can see that those 
relationships will fail to pass the threshold of invariance and will fail to qualify 
as genuine causes.    
              
Figure 5.4: The Scale of Invariance and RIDR9 
 
                                                 
9 It is interesting to note that it is not just mental properties that can stand in realization 
independent relationships with their effects and hence exhibit distinct levels of invariance in 
comparison to their more specific physical realizers, but as the figure above illustrates, 
macrophysical properties, such as those invoked in the gas laws can also display a degree of 
realization independence and hence a distinct level of invariance in comparison to their specific 
microphysical realizers. Woodward (2008a: 233) provides a detailed example.   
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What I hope to have shown in this discussion is that when the 
relationships at the supervenient level are highly realization independent and 
hence display a higher degree of invariance than the relationships at the physical 
level, supervenient mental properties will often provide better causal claims and 
explanations than their physical realizers, given that those supervenient 
relationships will be able to answer a wider range of w-questions and will be 
more potentially useful for the purposes of control and manipulation (the 
implications of this level of control in the case of mental causation were made 
clear above). In other cases, in which the relationships at the supervenient level 
are less realization independent and hence less invariant than the relationships at 
the physical level, we may prefer the causal claims and explanations offered by 
the subvenient realizers of those supervenient properties, since those 
explanations will now answer a wider range of w-questions and will provide 
information that is more potentially useful for the purposes of control and 
manipulation. Further still, there are cases in which the supervenient 
relationships in question are non-RIDR and non-invariant and hence non-causal, 
leaving only the physical realizers of those supervenient properties to qualify as 
causes of the effects.  
Most importantly for the purposes of my argument, according to this 
account, whether and to what extent a supervenient relationship is RIDR and 
invariant and hence whether a supervenient mental property qualifies as a cause 
of some effect, and further still, whether it qualifies as a preferable cause of that 
effect over its physical realizer, become entirely a posteriori questions, 
dependent on the specific details of the case at hand, rather than something that 
can be settled a priori, as Kim suggests. Woodward is correct when he suggests 
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that this a posteriori question is the only relevant question left regarding the 
causal status of mental properties: 
  
“Whether and to what extent such stability is present is an empirical 
question that depends both on the upper level relationship and the nature 
of their realizers and the generalizations governing them. I want to 
conclude this essay by suggesting that to the extent there are issues about 
the reality and extent of mental causation, these have to do with such 
empirical consideration, rather than with the very general arguments for 
the causal  inertness  of  the  mental…”  (Woodward,  2008a:  259-260) 
 
5.2.2 Contrastive Focus 
 
I demonstrated above that the notions of RIDR and invariance explain 
how it is possible for mental properties to qualify as causes of their effects and 
explain how it is possible, in some cases, for mental properties to provide better 
causal claims and explanations than their physical realizers. There is another 
feature of interventionism that I introduced in the previous chapter, which also 
distinguishes between better or worse causal claims and explanations and which 
is therefore relevant to our current discussion. This is the notion of contrastive 
focus.  
In this next section I demonstrate how the notion of contrastive focus 
explains how causal explanations that cite mental properties can often be 
considered as preferable in comparison to causal explanations that cite the 
physical realizers of those mental properties. In order to illustrate this, let us 
recall Yablo’s example of the trained pigeon introduced in the previous chapter.  
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In this example we saw that although the fact that the object is scarlet 
qualifies as a cause of the pecking behaviour (since there is some intervention on 
the property of scarlet that changes the behaviour), the more specific explanation 
citing the property of scarlet is deficient in comparison to the explanation citing 
the property of red. This is because by being overly specific, it fails to capture 
exactly  which  changes  to  the  cause  variable  (namely  a  change  from  ‘red’  to  ‘not  
red’)   are   associated  with   changes   to   the  effect   variable   (namely   a   change   from  
‘pigeon  pecks’  to  ‘pigeon  does  not  peck’).  Moreover,  the  explanation  citing  the  
property of scarlet is potentially misleading, since it suggests that the pigeon 
would  fail  to  peck  in  any  case  in  which  the  object  is  not  scarlet.  In  Yablo’s  terms,  
the property of scarlet  fails  to  be  ‘proportionate’  to  its  effect,  in  the  sense  that  the 
causal explanation citing the property of scarlet fails to convey all and only such 
information about specific patterns of counterfactual dependence between cause 
and effect, (in this case, by both omitting relevant detail about such dependencies 
and by including irrelevant detail).  
Moreover, remember that by failing to capture the exact range of changes 
to the cause variable that are associated with changes to the effect (and in fact by 
providing potentially misleading information about such changes), the 
explanation citing the property of scarlet will provide information that is less 
useful for the purposes of control and manipulation. By contrast, given that it is 
specifically the contrast  between  whether   the  object   is   ‘red’  or   ‘not   red’   that   is  
associated  with   changes   to  whether   the   pigeon   ‘pecks’   or   ‘does   not   peck’,   the  
explanation citing the property of red will provide information with which we 
can stably and systematically control the effect.   
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As Woodward points out in the following passage, the same seems to be 
true for the example of the research of Andersen et al:   
 
“Just  as  with  [Yablo’s  example],  the  causal  claim/causal  explanation  that  
appeals to N11 to explain R1 seems overly specific. It fails to convey a 
relevant pattern of dependence: that there are some alternatives to N11 
(namely, N12 and N13) that would have led to the same reaching behavior 
R1 and other alternatives (those that realize some different intention I2, 
associated with reaching for a different goal) that would not have led to 
R1. Put slightly differently, Andersen's concern in this example is in 
finding the cause of variations in reach toward different goal objects—
why the monkey exhibits reaching behavior R1 rather than different 
reaching behavior R2. According to the interventionist account, to do this, 
he needs to identify states or conditions, variations in which, when 
produced by interventions, would be correlated with changes from R1 to 
R2. Ex hypothesi, merely citing N11 does not accomplish this, since it tells 
us nothing about the conditions under which alternatives to R1 would be 
realized. By way of contrast, appealing to the fact that the monkey's 
intention is I1 rather than some alternative intention I2 does accomplish 
this, assuming (as we have been all along) that there is a stable 
relationship between the occurrence of I1 (however realized) and R1 and 
that under I2 some alternative to R1 (reaching toward a different goal) 
would have occurred.”  (Ibid:  239)   
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 In other words, by being overly specific and hence by failing to capture 
the exact range of changes to the cause variable that lead to stable changes to the 
behavioural effect, namely changes to I1, (and in fact, by providing potentially 
misleading information about such changes), the explanation citing N11 fails to 
capture the correct contrastive focus and consequently provides a deficient 
explanation of the effect in comparison to the one citing I1. Moreover, by failing 
to capture the exact range of changes to the cause variable that are stably and 
systematically associated with changes to the effect (and by providing potentially 
misleading information about such changes), the explanation citing N11 will also 
provide information that is less useful for the purposes of control and 
manipulation, in comparison to the explanation citing I1. (For the paralysed 
subject who would presumably wish to acquire this kind of stable and systematic 
control over the prosthetic limb, the relevance of this information goes without 
saying.) 
 One final aspect of contrastive focus that will be useful to highlight at this 
stage (which I briefly drew attention to in Chapter 4) is that the correct 
contrastive focus of some explanation or causal claim can vary depending on the 
context of the situation.10 I illustrated this with Woodward’s  (2008a:  236)  variant  
of the Yablo example in which the pigeon is trained to peck specifically on the 
presentation of scarlet objects. In this example, we saw that the explanation 
citing scarlet now captures the correct contrastive focus and will now be 
considered as preferable in comparison to the explanation citing the property of 
red. This is because it is now the contrast between whether the object is scarlet, 
                                                 
10 I also explained that the correct contrastive focus of some explanation or causal claim can vary 
depending on the goal of the enquirer.  
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rather than not scarlet that is specifically associated with changes to whether the 
pigeon pecks, or fails to peck, rather than the contrast between whether the object 
is red or not red. Moreover, it is now this explanation that provides information 
that is most useful for the purposes of control and manipulation. 
As Woodward points out, what this suggests is that there is nothing 
privileged about the explanation citing I1 that follows from the fact that it is a 
mental explanation. By the same token, I suggest that there is nothing privileged 
about the explanation citing N11 that follows from the fact that it is a physical 
explanation,  as  I  have  argued  Kim’s  argument  suggests.  Rather, depending on the 
details of the case, the correct contrastive focus might be captured by an 
explanation that cites some mental property, or by an explanation that cites the 
physical realizer of that mental property. Most importantly for my argument, 
what this again emphasises is that according to interventionism, the question of 
whether  mental  properties  provide  ‘better’  causal  explanations  of  their  effects   in 
comparison to their physical realizers is not a matter that can be settled a priori, 
as  Kim’s  argument   suggests,  but   is   instead  an  a  posteriori  question,  which will 
depend on the specific details of the case.  
In summary, I have demonstrated that interventionism provides a 
straightforward account of how both mental properties and their physical 
realizers can qualify as causes of the same effects; if interventions on mental or 
physical properties are associated with changes to the effects under 
consideration, they will qualify as bona fide causes according to interventionism. 
Moreover, I have demonstrated that whenever mental properties stand in highly 
realization independent relationships to their effects and hence display a 
relatively high degree of invariance and capture the correct contrastive focus, 
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they can actually be considered to provide better causal explanations than those 
offered by their physical realizers.  
Most importantly, what this discussion should have shown is that whether 
and to what extent a mental level relationship or explanation is RIDR, invariant, 
or provides the correct contrastive focus and hence whether some mental 
property qualifies as a cause of some effect and qualifies as a preferable cause in 
comparison to its physical realizer, are all a posteriori questions that are to be 
determined depending on the details of the case at hand. What this means is that 
there is nothing on the interventionist account of causation that a priori excludes 
mental properties from qualifying as genuine causes, but rather, the question of 
mental causation and the question of whether it is at the mental or physical level 
that we will find preferable causal claims and explanations become entirely a 
posteriori questions.   
 
5.3 A Solution to the Exclusion Problem  
  
Thus far I have demonstrated that interventionism provides a fairly 
straightforward account of how both mental properties and their physical 
realizers can qualify as causes of the same effects and that according to this 
account, the question of mental causation becomes an entirely a posteriori, not a 
priori one. Although I argued in Chapter 3 that Kim’s  exclusion problem only 
follows a priori for the non-reductive physicalist when combined with the 
assumption of SP, which I went on to undermine and although interventionism 
demonstrates that the question of mental causation is an entirely a posteriori, not 
a priori one, it is worth making clear exactly how this interventionist account of 
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mental  causation  avoids  Kim’s  a  priori  exclusion  problem.  In  order  to  do  this,  I  
will refer back to the arguments that I made in Chapter 3. 
The first way that I argued that the assumption of SP motivates the 
exclusion problem was in the sense that if one assumes that causation is identical 
to sufficient production it suggests that by being sufficient to produce its effect, 
that property simply exhausts all there is to cause and explain regarding that 
effect  and   implies   that   there  would   literally  be   ‘nothing   left’   for  any  additional  
property to causally contribute. Given the minimal commitments of non-
reductive physicalism, it seemed that the exclusion problem was inevitable: 
supervenience guarantees that any supposed mental cause of a physical effect 
necessarily supervenes on a physical cause, which causal closure states is 
sufficient for that effect. Then, given that this cannot be a case of 
overdetermination, whereby both the mental and the physical property could 
qualify as metaphysically distinct, sufficient causes of the effect, it seems that 
there  really  would  be  ‘nothing  left’  for  the  mental  property to causally contribute. 
On the assumption that causation is identical to sufficient production, physical 
causation, by its very definition would capture all there is to cause and explain 
regarding the occurrence of an effect and would seem to make mental causation 
‘dispensable’.   
However, we can see that when causation is understood in interventionist 
terms,   the  idea  that  physical  causes  leave  ‘nothing  left’  for  mental  properties   to  
contribute,  thereby  rendering  them  ‘dispensable’  simply  does  not  make  sense.  As 
an illustration, consider again the example of the research of Andersen et al: 
according to interventionism, mental property I1 qualifies as a bona fide cause of 
physical effect R1, since there is an intervention on I1 that changes R1. I1’s  causal  
Chapter 5, Interventionism and Mental Causation    204  
 
status is not somehow undermined,   or  made   ‘dispensable’   by   the   fact   that   I1’s  
physical realizer, N11, also qualifies as a cause of R1, since so long as 
interventions on I1 are associated with changes to R1, I1 qualifies as a cause of 
R1, regardless of whether R1 has any additional causes. In fact, as the discussion 
above illustrated, according to interventionism, far from being rendered 
dispensable, mental properties can often be considered as providing preferable 
causal claims and explanations in comparison to those offered by their physical 
realizers. It is of course true that causal closure guarantees that physical causes, 
such as N11, are sufficient to produce the occurrence of their effects, but, as I 
argued in Chapter 3, without the assumption that sufficient production is 
identical to causation, there is no reason to conclude that physical causation 
somehow renders mental causation as dispensable. Rather, I suggested that we 
think of the fact that physical causes are, by definition, sufficient to produce their 
effects merely as an empirical fact about physical causation.  
The second way that I argued that the assumption of SP motivates the 
exclusion problem was in the following sense: given that cases of mental 
causation cannot be cases of overdetermination, whereby mental properties could 
cause their effects via metaphysically distinct, sufficient productive chains or 
processes and given the assumption that this kind of sufficient production is 
identical to causation, it implied that mental properties must derive their causal 
status from the only productive (and hence only causal) processes and chains, 
these being the physical processes and chains. This led Kim to conclude that 
mental properties are reducible to the physical properties on which they 
supervene, since the causal powers of those mental properties are apparently 
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acquired in virtue of and are identical and hence reducible to the causal powers 
of those physical properties.11   
However, once again, we can see that in interventionist terms, the idea 
that mental properties must derive their causal status from the physical properties 
on which they supervene does not make sense. Consider again the research of 
Andersen et al: according to interventionism, mental property I1 qualifies as a 
distinct and irreducible cause of R1, in addition to R1’s  physical  cause,  N11, since 
there is some intervention on I1 that changes R1 and since the relationship 
between I1 and R1 displays a distinct level of invariance in comparison to the 
relationship between N11 and R1 (I discuss this issue of causal distinctness below 
and again in Chapter 6). As I argued in Chapter 3, one would only reach the 
conclusion that I1 must derive its causal status from N11 if one assumed that 
causation is identical to sufficient production, since it is true that I1 could have no 
‘new  causal  powers’,  independent  of  N11 in this specific sense.  
In summary, what I hope to have made clear is that interventionism not 
only provides an account of causation by which both mental properties and their 
physical realizers can qualify as causes of the same effects, but that when 
causation is understood in interventionist terms, rather than in terms of sufficient 
production,  Kim’s  exclusion  argument  simply  does  not  go  through.   
 
5.3.1 A Physicalist Solution?  
 
In Chapter 2 I argued that any successful non-reductive physicalist 
account of mental causation must uphold all of the minimal commitments of non-
reductive physicalism, namely mental causation, non-identity, supervenience, 
                                                 
11 See  Kim’s  (2003b:  208)  ‘Causal  Inheritance  Principle’.   
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causal closure and non-overdetermination, if that account is to provide a viable 
non-reductive physicalist solution to the exclusion problem. In fact, in Chapter 3 
I suggested that the real challenge that faces the non-reductive physicalist 
regarding mental causation is providing an account of mental causation that 
explains how mental properties can have genuinely distinct causal roles (thus 
avoiding the threat of reduction), whilst being ontologically identical with and 
metaphysically inseparable from their subvenient physical realizers, which are 
sufficient to produce their effects.  
In this section I address each of the commitments of non-reductive 
physicalism, in order to demonstrate that the interventionist account of mental 
causation outlined in this chapter does uphold all of these commitments and does 
therefore provide a viable non-reductive physicalist solution to the exclusion 
problem.  
Let us begin with the thesis of mental causation, which is usually 
understood as the thesis that distinctly mental properties, such as intentions, 
beliefs and desires, have physical effects. Now, it seems clear that the 
interventionist account of mental causation does uphold this thesis. For example, 
in the case of the research of Andersen et al, it is the fact that the monkey 
instantiates mental property I1 on this occasion that causes physical effect R1 to 
be instantiated. As I explained in Section 5.2.1, this kind of mental causation is 
possible because the relationship between I1 and R1 is realization independent 
and hence invariant. I also explained that according to interventionism, whenever 
any mental property stands in this particular relationship to some effect, that 
property will not only qualify as a cause of the effect in question, but may 
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actually qualify as a preferable cause of that effect, in comparison to its physical 
realizer.  
What about the non-reductive physicalist's commitment to the thesis of 
non-identity? (Note that the points that I discuss in this section will be especially 
relevant to my argument in the next chapter.) 
Now, as I briefly mentioned above, according to interventionism, 
supervenient mental properties (that qualify as causes of effects), although not 
ontologically or metaphysically distinct from the physical properties on which 
they supervene, can nonetheless qualify as causally distinct from those physical 
properties (i.e. as causes that cannot be identified with or reduced to those 
physical properties). That this is possible is implied in the discussion in Chapter 
4, but since this issue is especially important to the argument in this section and 
to the argument in Chapter 6, it is worth making this issue of causal distinctness 
explicit.  
According to the interventionist criteria for causation, in order for some 
property X to qualify as causally distinct from some property Z in relation to 
effect Y, X must exhibit a distinct level of invariance and hence distinct 
manipulability and causal relations in relation Y, compared with Z. (Recall the 
interventionist maxim introduced in Chapter 4, “No  causal  difference  without a 
difference in manipulability relations, and no difference in manipulability 
relations without a causal difference.”  (Woodward,  2003:  61))  
Going back to the discussion on RIDR, we can see that it is actually the 
realization independence of the supervenient relationships that mental properties 
stand in with their effects that makes this possible for mental properties. This is 
simply because it is the realization independence of those supervenient 
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relationships that makes it possible for mental properties to exhibit distinct levels 
of invariance and hence distinct manipulability and causal relations in relation to 
their effects in comparison to their physical realizers. As I explained above, 
depending on the nature of the dependency relationship, those properties may 
exhibit either more or less invariance than their physical realizers. However, it is 
important to be clear that in either case I take it that this varying degree of 
invariance is sufficient to distinguish the causal roles of those properties. 
Moreover, as the example of mental causation illustrates, nothing on this account 
of causal distinctness requires that the properties under consideration are 
metaphysically distinct.   
Now, one implication of this account of causal distinctness, the relevance 
of which will become clear in the next chapter, is that it does matter, according to 
interventionism,   how  we   ‘pick   out’   the   variables   that   are   under   consideration. 
This is because, to the extent that two properties enter into exactly the same 
invariant relationship with some effect and hence enter into exactly the same 
manipulability relations, it is appropriate, in interventionist terms, to consider 
them as the same cause.12  
As   an   illustration,   consider   the   following   example   of   Woodward’s  
(2008a: 239), which again refers to the research of Andersen et al: consider 
property A1, which appeals to physically characterized facts about the aggregate 
pattern of the firing rates, which correspond to intention I1. As Woodward 
explains,  “…insofar  as  this  aggregate profile A1 corresponds to the different ways 
N11, N12, N13 of realizing I1, and A1 leads to R1 and A1 contrasts with whatever 
aggregate profile of neural activity A2 corresponds to the different intention I2, it 
                                                 
12 I made this point briefly in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.2.1.  
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will be equally appropriate to cite A1 as causing or figuring in the causal 
explanation for the monkey's exhibiting R1.”  (Ibid)  In  other  words,  according  to  
interventionism, A1 also qualifies as a cause of R1. However, as Woodward goes 
on  to  explain,  “insofar  as  A1 and I1 enter into exactly the same manipulability or 
dependency relationships with respect to R1, it is natural (from an interventionist 
point of view) to think of them as involving the same rather than competing 
causal claims with respect to R1.”  (Ibid:  239-240) So, although A1 also qualifies 
as a cause of R1, since there is some intervention on A1 that changes R1, they are 
the same interventions that bring about the same changes to R1 that are involved 
in the causal relationship between I1 and R1 and so it is appropriate to consider A1 
and I1 as the same cause.13 I return to this issue in the next chapter.  
What about the thesis of supervenience? The account of mental causation 
that I have presented certainly seems consistent with the fact that mental 
properties supervene on physical properties with metaphysical necessity. In fact, 
as I have explained, the interventionist account of mental causation (which 
appeals to the notion of RIDR to explain mental causation) applies more 
generally to all supervenient causation and therefore explains how any 
supervenient property can qualify as a cause of some effect, in addition to its 
subvenient realizer.14 
                                                 
13 Papineau (2013) argues that mental properties can qualify as causes of physical effects and can 
‘outcompete’  their  specific  physical  realizers  for  causal  status  (based  on  a  proportionality  
requirement for causation), but only when those mental properties are type-identical (and hence 
reducible) to some physical property (for example, physical aggregate A1). An in depth 
discussion  of  Papineau’s  argument  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  chapter, but it is important to 
recognise that for the purposes of defending non-reductive  physicalism  against  Kim’s  exclusion  
problem, what matters is that we demonstrate that mental properties are not identical to their 
specific physical realizers. This is because it is these specific physical properties that feature in 
the exclusion argument and which Kim therefore takes to pre-empt and exclude mental 
properties.   
14 There are, however, some remaining issues regarding the thesis of supervenience, raised by 
Michael Baumgartner (2009, 2010), which will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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In Chapter 3 I outlined an argument that proved that overdetermination is 
not possible in the case of mental causation, given a supervenience relation 
between mental and physical properties. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the 
interventionist account of mental causation is consistent with the thesis of non-
overdetermination, since it provides an account of mental causation by which 
mental properties qualify as genuine causes of their effects, without being 
metaphysically distinct, sufficient productive causes of those effects, which 
would be required for genuine overdetermination to occur.    
What about the thesis of causal closure, which states that every physical 
effect has a sufficient physical cause? I have already illustrated one way in which 
the interventionist account of mental causation does not violate causal closure, 
since I demonstrated that it provides an account of mental causation by which 
mental properties qualify as genuine causes of their effects, without exerting any 
additional force or energy into the physical domain to cause their effects. But, is 
it still true that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause when 
causation is understood in interventionist terms? 
In order to see why the answer   to   this   question   is   ‘yes’,   note that as I 
described it in Chapter 2, the thesis of causal closure entails that every physical 
effect is sufficiently determined by some prior physical state. I suggested that 
this follows from the acceptance of the conservation laws of physics, in addition 
to relatively recent discoveries in science. Now, this level of physical 
determinism essentially guarantees that every physical effect has an 
interventionist physical cause, given that it guarantees that intervening on a prior 
physical state will always be a way of intervening on a physical effect. (If every 
physical effect is sufficiently determined by some prior physical state, it will 
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always be possible to bring about a change to that physical effect by intervening 
on that prior physical state.) Put slightly differently, my claim is that the physical 
determinism that is implied by causal closure ensures that the relationships at the 
physical level display at least a minimal degree of invariance and hence ensures 
that  every  physical  effect  has  a  physical  cause,  even  when  ‘cause’  is  understood  
in interventionist terms.15 What I hope to have made clear by now is that 
according to interventionism, it is merely an empirical fact about the physical 
world that those physical causes are sufficient to produce their effects, rather 
than something that constitutes their causal status and I have argued that it is only 
when one makes this latter assumption that the exclusion problem becomes 
inevitable for the non-reductive physicalist. 
In this section I have argued that not only does interventionism provide a 
coherent account of mental causation that avoids the exclusion problem, but it 
also provides a viable non-reductive physicalist account of mental causation and 
solution to the exclusion problem, since it upholds all of the minimal 
commitments of non-reductive physicalism.  
                                                 
15 Remember  that  this  is  not  true  for  the  case  of  mental  properties,  as  the  example  of  ‘fear’  above  
illustrated. Although this is not an issue that Woodward discusses, the fact that physical causation 
is guaranteed under interventionism seems to give physical causation a kind of primacy over 
other kinds of causation. Now, this is not to undermine the fact that physical properties will often 
fail to provide preferable causal claims and explanations of their effects in comparison to mental 
properties;;  I  have  demonstrated  that  according  to  interventionism,  there  is  nothing  ‘privileged’  
about physical causation in this sense. Nevertheless, it is an interesting feature of interventionism 
that fits well with our physicalist intuitions, that physical causation is guaranteed under 
interventionism (which, remember, is explained by the empirical facts about our world, rather 
than following from some a priori notion of the physical), while the same cannot be said for 
mental causation.    
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5.3.2 A Satisfactory Solution?  
 
One final question that I will now address, which I have alluded to in 
previous chapters, is whether this interventionist account of mental causation 
provides a satisfactory account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion 
problem. This question arises, since, as I briefly discussed in Chapter 3, Kim 
(2010a) argues that attempts to overcome the exclusion problem that appeal to 
counterfactual theories of causation (of which interventionism is an example) fail 
to provide satisfactory accounts of the causal relevance of mental properties and 
hence fail to provide satisfactory solutions to the exclusion problem. According 
to   Kim,   this   is   because   ‘mere’   counterfactual   dependence   cannot   sustain   the  
kinds of causal relationships that are involved in human agency, i.e. in the idea 
that human agents can perform physical actions, such as the movements of limbs 
and bring about physical effects, such as picking up the morning paper. 
According to Kim, what is required to sustain these kinds of causal relationships 
is the metaphysically richer notion of causation as production/generation. In fact, 
Kim goes as far as to claim   that  “without  productive  causation,  which   respects  
the   locality/contiguity   condition,   such  causal  processes  are  not  possible.”   (Ibid:  
236) 
Now, as I explained in Chapter 4, it is true that interventionism operates 
with   a   “metaphysically   modest”   (Woodward, 2003: 121) conception of 
causation, in comparison, for example, to the SP concept. For example, in order 
for X to cause Y, it is not necessary that X and Y are connected via any 
spatiotemporal process, or that X and Y exchange any conserved quantity, such 
as energy or momentum. Instead, it is only necessary that X and Y are connected 
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via counterfactual dependence (of the interventionist kind) and as I explained in 
Chapter  4,   this  only  commits  one   to   the   idea  “that   there  be   facts  of   the  matter,  
independent  of  facts  about  human  abilities  and  psychology”  (Ibid),  namely  facts  
about counterfactual dependencies.  
What this means is that when we give an account of the causal relevance 
of a mental property in interventionist terms, it is not necessary that that mental 
property instantiates any kind of productive process in order to bring about its 
effect, or contributes any kind of energy or momentum to the production of that 
effect.  Is  Kim  right  to  argue  that  this  “metaphysically  modest”  (Ibid)  conception  
of causation does not provide a satisfactory account of the causal relationships 
that are involved   in   human   agency?   In   order   to   see   why   the   “metaphysically  
modest”   (Ibid)   interventionist   account   of   mental   causation   does provide a 
satisfactory account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem, 
firstly consider the argument that I made in Chapter 3.  
As I explained in Chapter 3, the non-reductive physicalist who endorses 
an interventionist account of mental causation would not be committed to 
denying that the physical effects of mental causes are also caused by the 
subvenient physical realizers of those mental properties, which are sufficient to 
produce, or determine those effects (presumably via a continuous productive 
process of some kind), but in fact, given the non-reductive   physicalist’s 
commitment to causal closure and supervenience, she would be minimally 
committed to this idea. Thus, it is simply not true that when mental causation is 
understood in interventionist terms, there would be no physical effects produced 
as a result of human agency, since so long as the non-reductive physicalist is 
committed to causal closure and supervenience, the physical effects of mental 
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causes will continue to be produced, or determined by the subvenient physical 
realizers of those mental causes. The interventionist simply denies that this kind 
of sufficient production is identical to causation and instead claims that the 
causal relevance of both mental properties and their physical realizers can be 
understood in interventionist terms (i.e. in terms of the fact that there is an 
intervention on both the mental and the physical property that changes the effect 
in question).16 
Moreover, I argued that as non-reductive physicalists we should not 
actually be surprised to discover that mental properties can only produce their 
effects, or be considered as sufficient causes of those effects, in virtue of the fact 
that they supervene on physical properties, since it was because of our 
commitment to causal closure (which implies that mental properties cannot exert 
any force or energy into the physical domain to produce or determine physical 
effects) and our commitment to the idea that the widespread overdetermination 
of physical effects by two metaphysically distinct sufficient causes would be 
implausible, that we accepted that the mental must supervene on the physical and 
hence that we should be physicalists in the first place.  
What I hope this discussion therefore also demonstrates is that it is only 
by being “metaphysically  modest”  (Ibid)  that  interventionism is able to provide a 
                                                 
16 In this sense, interventionism differs from the account of mental causation offered by Frank 
Jackson and Philip Pettit (1990a, 1990b). Jackson and Pettit make a distinction between so called 
‘causal  relevance’  and  ‘causal  efficacy’  (where  the  latter  is  thought  to  involve  
production/generation and the former is thought to involve something like counterfactual 
dependence) and argue that the causal role of mental properties can be understood in terms of 
relevance, rather than in terms of causal efficacy. However, by making a distinction between 
causal relevance and causal efficacy and by acknowledging that mental properties can only be 
considered to have causal relevance, rather than efficacy, this leaves them open to critique from 
Kim,  who  claims  that  ‘full  blown  causal  efficacy’  is  required  to  vindicate  mental  causation.  By  
contrast, interventionists can avoid the charge from Kim that efficacy is required to vindicate 
mental causation, since the interventionist simply denies that there is a distinct concept of 
causation as efficacy and instead claims that the causal role of both mental and physical 
properties can be understood solely in interventionist terms. 
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viable non-reductive physicalist account of mental causation and solution to the 
exclusion problem, since it is only in this way that interventionism is able to 
uphold all of the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism. For 
example, I have demonstrated that it provides an account of mental causation by 
which supervenient mental properties can count as genuine causes of physical 
effects, in addition to their physical realizers. It respects the theses of causal 
closure and non-overdetermination by guaranteeing that mental properties cannot 
contribute to or interact with the sufficient physical causes of physical effects, or 
qualify as metaphysically distinct sufficient productive causes of those effects. 
Moreover, I demonstrated that this account also upholds causal closure in the 
sense that it remains true that every physical effect has a sufficient physical 
cause, even when causation is understood in interventionist terms. Lastly, I 
demonstrated that this account nonetheless upholds the theses of non-identity and 
mental causation, since it assigns genuinely distinct causal roles to mental 
properties, such as intentions, beliefs and desires.  
Consequently, I suggest that if the non-reductive physicalist is looking for 
a metaphysically richer account of mental causation, involving the transfer of 
some conserved physical quantity, or spatiotemporally continuous physical 
process, for example, they will inevitably fail (since this would directly violate 
causal closure and non-overdetermination). However, what I hope the discussion 
in this thesis has shown is that although this account of mental causation may not 
be satisfactory for some (and although it is not the kind of causation that is 
usually discussed in the causal exclusion debate), it does nonetheless provide a 
satisfactory account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem 
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and is in fact the only viable account of mental causation and solution to the 
exclusion problem that we can give as serious physicalists. 
  Secondly, there are important practical reasons for thinking that this 
conception of mental causation is satisfactory. In order to see this, consider the 
following passage from Woodward:  
 
“Consider  again  a  paralysed  subject  who  is  able  to  move  a  prosthetic  limb  
(or a cursor on a screen) merely by thinking or by forming the right 
intention. Would most lay people and scientists think that this sort of 
“instrumental   efficacy”   is   insufficient   for true mental causation, with 
something metaphysically richer being required in addition? I suspect not. 
Certainly if we ask why we should care about whether there is mental 
causation, this looks very much like an issue about instrumental 
effectiveness: the concern is that we are deluded in our common sense 
belief that our intentions, desires, beliefs play a role in controlling our 
mental life and behavior, that we can change our behavior by changing 
these, that we can manipulate the mental states and behavior of others by 
changing other mental states of theirs and so on. This concern is 
adequately addressed by showing that mental states are causes in the 
sense captured by the interventionist account. We are thus left with the 
possibility that the only people who think that vindicating the claim that 
mental states are causes requires showing that they are causes in a richer, 
more  metaphysical  sense  are  certain  philosophers  of  mind.”  (Woodward,  
2008a: 248-9)  
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What this passage emphasises is that in interventionist terms, the mere 
formation of an intention by a paralysed subject would qualify as a full blown 
cause of the movement in the prosthetic limb (even though it is true that the 
production of this movement is due entirely to the fact that some physical 
property, namely the physical realizer of the intention on this occasion, is 
instantiated). Woodward is right to ask why we should insist on a metaphysically 
richer notion of mental causation, when this conception adequately captures the 
intuitive causal roles that we attribute to our mental states and captures the 
important practical implications of mental causation. (Remember that in Chapter 
4 I argued that these important practical implications are in fact lost on the SP 
concept of causation.) When faced with such examples, I suggest that the onus is 
on Kim to explain why we should insist on a metaphysically richer notion of 
mental causation than interventionism offers.   
 
5.4 Alternative Manipulationist Accounts of Mental Causation and 
 the Problem of Realism 
 
 In this thesis I have argued that those features of interventionism that are 
somewhat subjective, for example, judgements of insensitivity and contrastive 
focus, do not introduce a problematic kind of subjectivity into interventionism 
and generate an anti-realist conception of causation because according to 
interventionism, whether X causes Y depends solely on whether there is 
counterfactual dependence of the right kind between the variables, (i.e. 
invariance under interventions) and I have argued that we have good reason to 
believe that this is an entirely objective matter. 
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 Before moving on to discuss two alternative manipulationist accounts of 
causation, which I argue do generate anti-realist conceptions of causation, it is 
worth reminding ourselves why the issue of realism is so important. As I 
explained in the previous chapter, there is a strong and reasonable intuition that 
our concept of causation and our concept of mental causation should not be 
subjective and anti-realist in the sense that whether X causes Y depends on facts 
about us. For example, it should not depend on whether we find certain 
relationships useful for the purposes of control and manipulation, or depend on 
whether a certain claim captures the correct contrastive focus. Rather, we expect 
our concept of causation and our concept of mental causation to be realist in the 
sense that whether X causes Y does not depend on facts about us, but rather, that 
causation  exists  objectively  ‘out  there’  in  reality, independently of us. 
Moreover,  despite  my  argument  above  that  the  “metaphysically  modest”  
(Woodward, 2003: 121) account of mental causation that interventionism 
provides is satisfactory and despite my claim that it is in fact the only kind of 
account that we can give as serious non-reductive physicalists, if it turns out that 
interventionism is straightforwardly anti-realist, Kim would be justified in 
claiming that interventionism could not provide a satisfactory account of mental 
causation and solution to the exclusion problem. In other words, although I have 
argued that while the interventionist account of mental causation is 
“metaphysically  modest”  (Ibid)  it  does  nonetheless  provide  a  satisfactory  account  
of mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem, the same could not be 
said  if  that  “metaphysically  modest”  (Ibid)  account  turned  out  to  be  anti-realist.  
While Woodward’s   interventionist   account   of causation and mental 
causation is not anti-realist (for the reasons that I have outlined thus far), I argue 
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that the same cannot be said for other accounts of mental causation that are also 
interventionist in spirit. In this section, I examine two alternative manipulationist 
accounts of mental causation, put forward by Christian List and Peter Menzies 
(2009) and John Campbell (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010). I argue that despite the 
individual merits and potential benefits of these theories, they each introduce a 
problematic kind of subjectivity into their theories and generate anti-realist 
conceptions of mental causation and so fail to provide satisfactory solutions to 
the exclusion problem. I demonstrate that the reason why these alternative 
accounts generate anti-realist conceptions of mental causation is because they 
each incorporate the notion of contrastive focus, or proportionality17, which are 
somewhat subjective notions, into the necessary conditions for causation, while 
the   same   is   not   true   for   Woodward’s   account.   More   specifically,   while  
Woodward appeals to the notion of proportionality to distinguish between better 
or worse causal claims and explanations, both List and Menzies and Campbell 
take proportionality to be a necessary condition for causation that distinguishes 
between causal and non-causal relationships, which inevitably generates an anti-
realist concept of mental causation. I conclude   that  Woodward’s   interventionist  
account of mental causation therefore provides the only satisfactory non-
reductive physicalist account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion 
problem.  
                                                 
17 For  the  most  part,  I  use  the  term  ‘proportionality’  in  this section, rather than the term 
‘contrastive  focus’,  since  this  is  the  term  that  List  and  Menzies  use  in  their  paper  and  it  is  
therefore more useful for the purposes of this argument. Although proportionality is the specific 
term that Yablo (1992) introduces,  it  is  relevantly  similar  to  Woodward’s  notion  of  contrastive  
focus and so it will be harmless to use these terms interchangeably in this section.     
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5.4.1 List and Menzies and the Problem of Realism   
 
 In a recent paper, List and Menzies (2009) argue that by adopting a 
‘difference   making’,   or   ‘DM’   approach to causation (which they claim is 
common to a number of theories of causation, including Woodward’s  
interventionism),   Kim’s   a   priori exclusion problem turns out to be false.18 
Moreover, they argue that when the exclusion problem is reformulated in DM 
terms, it becomes a contingent, rather than a priori matter whether or not mental 
properties can have physical effects. An in depth discussion  of  List  and  Menzies’  
detailed argument is beyond the scope of this chapter, so I limit myself to 
discussing those features of their argument that are most relevant to my 
argument.19 (I direct the reader to the footnotes for more specific details of List 
and  Menzies’  argument.)   
 What exactly does the DM conception of causation entail? List and 
Menzies offer the following account of the truth conditions for DM causation 
(List and Menzies appeal to a standard possible worlds analysis of 
counterfactuals)20: 
 
“The  presence  of  F  makes  a  difference  to  the  presence  of  G  in  the  actual  
 
 
                                                 
18 A similar argument is put forward by Raatikainen (2010) and by Menzies (2008).  
19 Shapiro (2011) also  argues  that  List  and  Menzies’  argument  fails  to  provide  a  solution  to  Kim’s  
exclusion problem, but argues instead that their argument fails specifically because of their use of 
the  notion  of  ‘realization-insensitivity’. 
20 This account is explained in detail in List and Menzies (2009: 6-8).  
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 With the counterfactual truth conditions for DM causation outlined, List 
and  Menzies   argue   that  Kim’s   a   priori   exclusion   problem   (which   they   refer   to  
specifically as the principle that “If   a   property   F   is   causally   sufficient   for   a  
property  G,   then  no  distinct  property  F*   that   supervenes  on  F  causes  G”   (Ibid:  
3)), turns out to be false. This is because they claim to prove that in DM terms, it 
is possible for some property F to be sufficient for some effect, G, and for a 
distinct property F*, that supervenes on F to cause G. In order to illustrate this, 
they appeal to  Yablo’s  example  of  the  trained  pigeon  and   to the example of the 
research of Andersen et al. already mentioned above. 
 As a first illustration, note that in the Yablo example, the property of red 
qualifies as a DM cause of the pecking behaviour, given the truth of the two 
counterfactuals, ‘target  is  red    pigeon  pecks’  and  ‘target  is  not  red    pigeon 
does   not   peck’, even though it supervenes on the property of scarlet, which is 
sufficient for the behaviour. By contrast, note that the property of scarlet does not 
qualify as a DM cause of the behaviour, given that one of the counterfactuals, 
namely,  ‘target  is  not  scarlet    pigeon  does  not  peck’  is  not  true. According to 
List and Menzies, this can be explained in terms of a similarity relation between 
possible worlds, since presumably the closest world in which scarlet is not 
present is a world in which another shade of red is instantiated, in which case the 
pigeon still pecks.    
 Similarly for the example of Andersen et al, mental property I1 qualifies 
as a DM cause of physical effect R121, given the truth of the two counterfactuals 
‘monkey  has  intention  I1   monkey performs R1’  and  ‘monkey  does  not  have  
                                                 
21 List and Menzies actually refer to this property as A1, but for the sake of consistency, I refer to 
it as R1.  
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intention I1   monkey does not perform R1’, even though it supervenes on 
neural property N11, which is sufficient for R1. By contrast, neural property N11 
does not qualify as a DM cause of R1, given that the negative counterfactual, 
‘monkey  does  not  have  neural  property  N11   monkey does not perform R1’  is  
not true. Again, this is based on the assumption that the closest world in which 
N11 does not occur is one in which an alternative realizer of I1 is instantiated, in 
which case R1 still occurs. Thus, List and Menzies conclude that when causation 
is   understood   in  DM   terms,  Kim’s   a   priori   exclusion   principle   turns   out   to   be  
false.22  
 In  the  next  stage  of  their  argument,  List  and  Menzies  reformulate  Kim’s  
exclusion principle in DM terms, such that under certain conditions, no effect can 
have more than one DM cause. They also crucially extend this revised exclusion 
principle  to  incorporate  both  an  ‘upwards’  and  a  ‘downwards’  formulation:   
  
“Revised exclusion principle (upwards formulation): If a property F 
causes a property G, then no distinct property F* that supervenes on F 
causes G. 
 
Revised exclusion principle (downwards formulation): If a property F 
causes a property G, then no distinct property F* that subvenes or realizes 
F  causes  G.”  (Ibid:  11)   
 
                                                 
22 List and Menzies (Ibid: 10) acknowledge that Kim would not find this argument against his 
exclusion principle convincing, since he is concerned with vindicating mental causation as 
‘production’,  rather  than  in  terms  of  counterfactual  dependence.  Although  it  cannot  be  discussed  
here, List and Menzies (Ibid) do put forward a convincing  argument  against  Kim’s  objections  and  
defend their DM approach to mental causation.  
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 According to List and Menzies, which version of this revised exclusion 
principle applies, if any, is an entirely a posteriori, not a priori matter, since it 
depends solely on the details of the case at hand. This is because whether or not 
the exclusion principle applies (and whether it applies in its upwards or 
downwards formulation) depends on whether the two properties under 
consideration meet the requirements of DM causation (i.e. whether each of the 
properties meets the two counterfactual truth conditions outlined above). When 
each of the properties under consideration meet these requirements and hence 
qualify as DM causes of some effect, which List and Menzies label as cases 
meeting   the   ‘compatibility   requirement’, the exclusion principle, on either 
formulation, will be false.23  
 According to List and Menzies, there are, however, a number of cases for 
which the exclusion principle will hold. These are cases in which one of the 
properties meets the requirements of DM causation, but in which case the other 
property fails to meet these requirements, resulting in either upwards, or 
downwards exclusion.24  
                                                 
23 More precisely, they claim that this is possible when the following conditions are all met 
(where B represents some behavioural effect, M represents some mental property and N 
represents  the  physical  realizer  of  M):  “(i)  B  is  present  in  all  closest  M-worlds; (ii) B is absent in 
all closest ~M- worlds; and (iii) B is absent in all closest ~N-worlds that are M-worlds.”  (Ibid:  
12) As List and Menzies go on to explain in detail, this is possible when the relationships 
between supervenient properties and their effects are realization sensitive, in that small changes 
to how the supervenient property is realized leads to the absence of the effect. (Note that this 
guarantees  that  the  negative  counterfactual  ‘~F    ~G’  is  met  and  that  the  subvenient  property  
therefore also qualifies as a cause of G.) 
24 List and Menzies provide the following, more precise criteria for upwards and downwards 
exclusion. (Once again, B represents some behavioural effect, M represents some mental property 
and  N  represents  the  physical  realizer  of  M):  “Necessary and sufficient conditions for upwards 
exclusion: An instance of upwards exclusion occurs if and only if N is a difference-making cause 
of B and either (i) B is absent in some closest M-worlds that are ~N-worlds or (ii) B is present in 
some closest ~M-worlds outside the smallest ~N-permitting sphere.”  (Ibid:  13-14) and 
“Necessary and sufficient conditions for downwards exclusion: An instance of downwards 
exclusion occurs if and only if M is a difference-making cause of B and B is present in some 
closest ~N-worlds that are M-worlds.”  (Ibid:  15)   
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 Upwards exclusion occurs when a subvenient property meets both of the 
counterfactual truth conditions for DM causation and hence qualifies as a DM 
cause of the effect, while the property that supervenes on it does not meet one of 
the counterfactual truth conditions and hence fails to qualify as a DM cause of 
the effect. For example, this occurs in the variant of the Yablo example in which 
Yablo’s  pigeon  is  trained  to  peck  specifically  at  scarlet  objects.  This  is  because  in  
this case, the property of scarlet now meets both of the counterfactual truth 
conditions and hence qualifies as a DM cause of the effect, while the property of 
red  fails  to  meet  one  of  the  counterfactual  truth  conditions,  namely,  ‘target  is  red  
  pigeon  pecks’  and  hence  fails  to  qualify  as  a  DM  cause,  supposedly  resulting  
in a case of upwards exclusion.  
 By contrast, downwards exclusion occurs when a supervenient property 
meets both of the counterfactual truth conditions for DM causation and hence 
qualifies as a DM cause of the effect, while the subvenient property that realizes 
it does not meet one of the counterfactual truth conditions and hence fails to 
qualify as a DM cause of the effect. For example, this occurs in the case of the 
research of Andersen et al, since supervenient mental property I1 meets both of 
the counterfactual truth conditions, while physical property N11 fails to meet the 
negative  counterfactual,  ‘monkey  does  not  have  neural  property  N11   monkey 
does not perform R1’,   and   hence   fails   to   qualify   as   a  DM   cause   of   the   effect,  
supposedly resulting in a case of downwards exclusion.  
 Now, it is worth noting that according to List and Menzies, downwards 
exclusion is possible when the relationship between a supervenient property and 
its effect is realization insensitive, i.e. it holds under small changes to the 
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realization of the supervenient property.25 Very roughly, this is because this 
insensitivity essentially guarantees that the supervenient property meets both of 
the counterfactual truth conditions, while the physical realizer of that 
supervenient property fails to meet the negative counterfactual truth condition. 
(This is because the insensitivity of the supervenient relationship ensures that the 
effect will still occur even if the physical realizer is changed to any one of the 
alternative realizers of the supervenient property.) In fact, because of multiple 
realization and insensitivity, it looks as though physical properties will often fail 
to meet the negative counterfactual truth condition for DM causation and hence 
fail to qualify as DM causes of the physical effects of the properties that 
supervene on them.26 
 List and Menzies conclude that by understanding causation in DM terms 
it is not only possible to prove that Kim’s exclusion principle is false, but it is 
also possible to reformulate the exclusion principle in DM terms, such that 
exclusion becomes an entirely a posteriori matter that can actually support cases 
of mental causation, rather than providing a priori grounds for the causal 
exclusion of the mental. 
                                                 
25 Although  this  notion  of  insensitivity  appears  to  be  similar  to  Woodward’s  notion  of  realization  
independence, this is not technically true. List and Menzies actually liken their notion of 
insensitivity  to  Woodward’s  notion  of  sensitive/insensitive  causation.  However,  as  I  have  
explained, for Woodward, it is the fact that supervenient relationships are specifically realization 
independent not insensitive that guarantees that they qualify as causal, as this guarantees that 
there is at least a minimal degree of invariance at that level. For Woodward, the notion of 
insensitivity simply explains our causal judgements and helps to distinguish between better or 
worse causal claims and explanations, rather than distinguishing between causal and non-causal 
relationships.  
26 This formulation  of  interventionism  (and  Campbell’s)  therefore leads to the somewhat 
unintuitive conclusion that most, if not all, subvenient physical properties will fail to qualify as 
causes of the effects of the properties that supervene on them.   
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 So, what  exactly  is  wrong  with  List  and  Menzies’  argument  and  why  does  
it fail to provide a satisfactory account of mental causation and solution to the 
exclusion problem?  
 It is possible to diagnose the problem by looking more closely at the DM 
conditions for causation, since these conditions essentially rule out the possibility 
that a cause could fail to be proportionate to its effect.27 For example, condition 
(i) rules out the possibility that causes could be too general for their effects, 
while condition (ii) rules out the possibility that causes could be too specific for 
their effects. This can be illustrated more clearly by appealing to the following 
example of List and Menzies’:  
 
“Suppose, for example, there is a drug that causes patients to recover 
from an illness. The effect variable is a binary variable whose values are 
recovery or non-recovery. But the cause variable is a many-valued 
variable that can take the values 0mg, 50mg, 100mg, 150mg, and 200mg. 
Suppose that any regular dose at or above 150mg cures a patient, but any 
lower dose does not. Suppose a patient has taken a regular dose of 150mg 
and has recovered from the illness. What made the difference to the 
patient’s  recovery?  According  to  the  truth  conditions  above,  the  answer  is  
“Giving  the  patient  a  dose  of  at  least  150mg”.  It  satisfies  both  conditions  
(i) and (ii): all relevantly similar patients who take a regular dose at or 
above 150mg  recover  and  all   those  who   take   a   lower  dose  don’t.  Other  
answers are either too specific, or not specific enough. For example, the 
cause   cannot   be   “Giving the patient a dose above 50mg”   because   that  
                                                 
27 This is something that List and Menzies (Ibid: 6) acknowledge.  
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does not meet condition (i): some relevantly similar patients who are 
given a dose above 50mg, say 100mg, do not recover. Similarly, it cannot 
be   “Giving   the   patient   a   dose  of   exactly   150mg”  because   that   does   not  
meet condition (ii): some relevantly similar patients who are not given a 
dose of exactly 150mg, say they are given 200mg, nonetheless recover. In 
this way, condition (i) rules out causes that are not specific enough to 
account for the change in the effect variable, while condition (ii) rules out 
causes that are too specific to account for it.”  (Ibid:  6)   
 
  Similarly, we can see that by being overly specific (i.e. by failing to be 
proportionate to the effect), physical property N11 fails to meet condition (ii), (the 
negative counterfactual truth condition) and hence fails to qualify as a 
proportionate DM cause of the effect. (As I explained above, this is based on the 
assumption that the closest world in which N11 does not occur is one in which an 
alternative realizer of I1 is instantiated, in which case R1 still occurs.) As I 
mentioned above, because of multiple realization and insensitivity, it looks as 
though physical properties will often fail to meet this negative counterfactual 
truth condition and hence will fail to qualify as DM causes of the physical effects 
of the properties that supervene on them. By contrast, by being proportionate to 
its effect, mental property I1 meets both of these specific counterfactual truth 
conditions and hence qualifies as a proportionate DM cause of the effect.  
 Now, I argue that this version of interventionism,   unlike  Woodward’s, 
does generate an anti-realist conception of mental causation. This is because 
whether X causes Y clearly depends on whether X is proportionate in relation to 
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Y28 and given that the notion of proportionality is a subjective notion, for the 
reasons that I will outline below, this inevitably generates an anti-realist 
conception of mental causation.    
 Firstly, recall that in Chapter 4 I demonstrated that whether or not some 
property qualifies as a proportionate cause of some effect can vary depending on 
the context of the situation and most importantly for our present purposes, on the 
somewhat subjective consideration of our goal as enquirers. I illustrated this 
point  in  Chapter  4  with  Woodward’s  example  of  the  platform,  but  I suggest that 
this can also be illustrated by considering a   variant   of   List   and  Menzies’   drug  
trial example.  
 For example, suppose that in the actual circumstances the patient is given 
a dose of exactly 150mg and recovers from the illness in five days. Just as in the 
original example, suppose that Doctor A wants to know why the patient recovers, 
rather than does not recover. In this case, given the explanatory goal of Doctor A, 
List and Menzies are correct to state that the  dose’s  being  exactly  150mg  does  
not qualify as a proportionate DM cause of the recovery, given that it is overly 
specific,  while   the  dose’s  being  at   least 150mg does qualify as a proportionate 
DM cause of the  patient’s  recovery. However, now consider doctor B who is also 
on the patient’s medical team and who instead wants to know why the patient 
recovered specifically in five days, rather than in some other specific time frame 
(for example, in two days, three days, four days, seven days, etc.) In this case, 
given the explanatory goal of Doctor B,  the  dose’s  being  exactly  150g does now 
qualify as a proportionate DM cause of the effect, while  the  dose’s  being  at  least  
150mg no longer qualifies as a proportionate DM cause of the effect, given that it 
                                                 
28 Woodward (2011a) also makes this point (see footnote 1).  
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is changes to whether the dose is specifically 150mg or some other specific dose 
that is associated with changes to the specific length of recovery.  
 So, we can see that whether or not some property qualifies as a 
proportionate cause of some effect can depend on the goal of the enquirer and 
given that, according to List and Menzies, whether X causes Y depends on 
whether X is proportionate in relation to Y, the DM conditions for causation 
inevitably become subjective and anti-realist. 
 Secondly, by appealing to a similarity metric in terms of the closeness of 
possible worlds, I suggest that List  and  Menzies’  theory  is  also open to the same 
problems of subjectivity that I mentioned in Chapter 4 in relation to Woodward’s  
notion of insensitivity. For example, I explained in Chapter 4 that judgements of 
closeness can depend on the context of the situation, on social custom, the 
expectations of the subject and so on. Given the potential subjectivity of 
considerations of closeness and given that these considerations are central to List 
and  Menzies’  account of causation, their account inevitably becomes subjective 
and anti-realist.  
 As an illustration, remember that when considering whether the 
counterfactual ‘target is not scarlet   pigeon  does  not  peck’   is   true, List and 
Menzies assumed that the closest world in which scarlet is not present is a world 
in which another shade of red is instantiated, in which case the pigeon still pecks 
and in which case the property of scarlet fails to qualify as a proportionate DM 
cause of the effect. However, why should we think that the closest possible world 
is one in which another shade of red is instantiated? This seems to depend on the 
idea that some kind of back-up mechanism would be in place, which would 
guarantee that another shade of red would be instantiated if scarlet were not 
Chapter 5, Interventionism and Mental Causation    230  
 
instantiated. However, this is not stipulated in the original example and in any 
case, seems a fairly far-fetched possibility.29 Although one could argue that the 
closest possible world in which scarlet is not instantiated is one in which some 
alternative shade of red is instantiated, this question is at least open to subjective 
debate and this inevitably opens List  and  Menzies’  theory  up  to   the problem of 
subjectivity and anti-realism.  
 So, we can see that according to List and Menzies, whether X causes Y 
depends on whether X is proportionate in relation to Y and given that I have 
suggested that the notion of proportionality is a somewhat subjective notion, in 
the sense that it depends on the subjective considerations of our goal as enquirers 
and on the somewhat subjective considerations of closeness of possible worlds, 
their account inevitably becomes subjective and anti-realist. Given the strong and 
reasonable intuition that our account of mental causation should not be anti-
realist and given that I have suggested that   any   satisfactory   response   to  Kim’s  
exclusion problem will have to avoid being anti-realist, I conclude that this 
account fails to provide a satisfactory account of mental causation and solution to 
the exclusion problem.    
 By contrast, although Woodward’s theory incorporates the notion of 
proportionality, it does not likewise generate an anti-realist conception of 
causation. Remember that according to Woodward’s  account, X causes Y so long 
as there is at least some intervention on X that changes Y, even if there is no 
intervention on X that is associated with a proportionate change in Y. For 
example, since there is some intervention on physical property N11, namely an 
                                                 
29 This is essentially the same point that Shapiro (2011) and Woodward (2011a, see footnote 1) 
make.  
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intervention that changes N11 to N15, that changes physical effect R1, N11 
qualifies as a bona fide cause of R1, even though there is no intervention on N11 
that is associated with a proportionate change in R1. 
 Remember that for Woodward, the fact that N11 does not appear to be 
proportionate to its effect merely provides us with reasons to consider mental 
property I1 as providing a better causal claim and explanation of the effect in 
comparison to N11, rather than providing grounds for the downwards exclusion of 
that physical property. In other words, while Woodward appeals to the notion of 
proportionality to distinguish between better or worse causal claims and 
explanations,  on  List  and  Menzies’  account, proportionality is built into the very 
definition of DM causation and hence becomes a feature that distinguishes 
between causal and non-causal relationships, inevitably introducing a 
problematic kind of subjectivity and anti-realism into their theory, whilst this 
possibility  is  ruled  out  on  Woodward’s  account.30  
 Moreover, remember that unlike   List   and   Menzies’   account,   the 
counterfactual truth conditions for Woodward’s   version of interventionism do 
not appeal to a similarity metric based on the closeness of possible worlds, but 
instead appeals to the technical notion of an intervention, which makes no 
reference to the notion of closeness of possible worlds. As I explained in Chapter 
4, considerations of closeness do enter into Woodward’s  theory  via  the  notion of 
insensitivity, but since these judgements do not determine whether X causes Y, I 
argued that this degree of subjectivity is not problematic and does not generate 
                                                 
30 Yet another way of describing this difference is in terms of the idea that those features that 
Woodward identifies as useful from the point of view of causal selection (i.e. as useful for 
identifying which causes strike us as most salient amongst various causes), List and Menzies take 
to determine whether X causes Y. This difference is brought out clearly in Menzies (2011) and in 
Woodward (2011a). 
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an anti-realist conception of causation, while the same cannot be said for List and 
Menzies’  account.   
 
5.4.2 Campbell and the Problem of Realism 
 
John Campbell (2008a) appeals directly to the theory of interventionism 
and  specifically  to  the  notion  of  a  ‘control  variable’,  (which  is  explained  below),  
in order to illustrate that it is possible to have physical effects without physical 
causes, thereby directly refuting the thesis of causal closure.31 Campbell claims 
that this provides a solution to Kim’s exclusion problem, since it proves that 
physical effects can have psychological causes without there necessarily existing 
competing physical causes of the same effects. I argue that despite the attractive 
consequences of this theory for the non-reductive physicalist, Campbell’s  theory 
also generates an anti-realist conception of mental causation and so fails to 
provide a satisfactory account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion 
problem. Once again, it is not possible to examine in detail the complex and 
insightful arguments that Campbell presents in his papers, so I focus only on 
those features that are most relevant to my argument. 
                                                 
31It  is  not  clear  that  Campbell  actually  does  ‘refute’  the  thesis  of  causal  closure,  but  rather,  he  
appears to refute a particular formulation of the thesis that appeals to causal notions, i.e. he 
refutes  the  thesis  that  ‘every  physical effect has a sufficient physical cause’. Remember that as I 
described it in Chapter 2, causal closure entails that every physical effect is sufficiently 
determined by purely physical prior occurrences. As I explained, although it is possible to define 
causal closure in this specific way (and although it is possible to generate the physicalist 
conclusion of the Causal Argument on either formulation), it would be harmless (and useful for 
the purposes of my argument) to define causal closure as the thesis that  ‘every  physical  effect  has  
a  sufficient  physical  cause’,  since  this  turns  out  to  be  true  when  causation  is  understood  in  terms  
of Woodward’s  version of interventionism. In other words, I take it that Campbell does not refute 
the thesis of causal closure per se (since he certainly does not seem to deny that all physical 
effects are sufficiently determined by purely physical prior occurrences), but rather refutes the 
particular formulation of the thesis that appeals to causal notions, since he argues precisely that 
sufficient determination is not identical to causation and argues that when causation is understood 
in terms of his specific version of interventionism, it is not guaranteed that every physical effect 
has a physical cause.  Menzies (2008), Raatikainen (2010) and Hitchcock (2012) put forward 
somewhat similar arguments against the thesis of causal closure; however, the points that I have 
made in response to Campbell here apply equally well to those arguments.  
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Campbell’s  specific  formulation of interventionism centres on the notion 
of   a   ‘control   variable’,   which   he   introduces   in   order   to   elucidate   the  
interventionist relationship between causes and their effects. As Campbell writes,  
 
“The  idea  is  that  when  we  are  trying  to  find  ‘the  right  level’  at  which  to  
characterize the causal functioning of a complex system, what we are 
looking   for   is   what   you   might   think   of   as   the   ‘control   panel’   for   the  
system,  with   respect   to   the   outcomes  we   are   interested   in.”   (Campbell,  
2010: 1)  
 
    To illustrate  the  notion  of  a  control  variable,  consider  Campbell’s  (Ibid)  
example of the relation between the dials on a radio and the output: since it is 
possible to control the output of the radio in a stable and systematic way by 
intervening on the position of the dials, changing the dials qualifies as a control 
variable for the output and consequently qualifies as a cause of the effect. 
Conversely, since it is not possible to stably and systematically control the output 
of the radio by intervening on the level of the circuitry of the radio, the physical 
state of the circuitry (on which it is assumed that the varying positions of the dial 
supervenes) does not qualify as a control variable for the output and 
consequently fails to qualify as a cause of the effect. Put slightly differently, 
since  there  is  a  “systematic  function”  (Ibid:  6)  between  the  various  positions  of  
the dials and the output, turning the dials qualifies as a control variable and cause 
of   the  output,  while  given   that   there   is  no  “systematic  function”  (Ibid)  between  
the various physical states of the circuitry and the output, the physical state of the 
circuitry fails to qualify as a control variable and cause of the output. Note that 
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Campbell does acknowledge (Ibid) that there would be some change to the output 
under an intervention on the physical state of the circuitry, for example, under 
one intervention the radio may be completely destroyed. However, since this 
function is not systematic, (i.e. since the changes to the physical state of the 
circuitry are not systematically associated with changes to the output), this 
physical variable fails to qualify as a control variable and hence cause of the 
effect. 
 What becomes clear is that according to Campbell, in order for X to cause 
Y it is not only necessary that some intervention on X changes Y (since it is true, 
for example, that there is some intervention on the state of the circuitry of the 
radio that changes the output), but those interventions on X must be associated 
with  “large,  specific  and systematic”  (Campbell,  2008a:  433)  changes  in  Y,  such  
that X acts as a control variable for Y. Given this understanding of causation, it 
becomes possible for physical effects to have mental causes (if those mental 
variables can be considered as control variables for those effects), without also 
having   physical   causes,   (if   there   aren’t   any   physical   variables   that   meet   the  
specific criteria set out by the notion of a control variable). 
 In order to illustrate this, Campbell (Ibid: 437-439) appeals to the 
following example: suppose there exists a Martian physicist who has complete 
physical knowledge of human beings, including complete knowledge of the 
physical laws governing the basic particles that constitute us. Despite this 
complete physical knowledge, the Martian physicist is unaware that human 
beings are sentient creatures. On one occasion the Martian physicist and student 
are considering the cause of the congregation of humans at a colloquium, every 
Friday at 11am. The Martian physicist might respond that this outcome is a 
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complete accident, since there is no physical process which can be identified as a 
control variable for the outcome, i.e. no physical process, interventions on which 
are associated with “large, specific and systematic”   (Ibid: 433) effects on the 
outcome.  The  Martian  physicist  might  consider   constructing  a   ‘gerrymandered’  
physical  control  variable  for  this  outcome,  consisting  of  the  ‘total  microphysical  
state’   of   each   individual,   along   with   the   total   microphysical   state   of   their  
environment, but as Campbell points out, as well as being highly complex and 
quite removed from the qualitative outcome space we are interested in 
explaining, interventions on this gerrymandered variable would also fail to have 
a systematic effect on the outcome, which is required by his definition of a 
control variable. Thus it appears that this physical outcome (congregation) has no 
physical cause, directly refuting the thesis of causal closure.  
 Furthermore, Campbell points out that although this effect does not have 
a physical cause, it does have a psychological control variable and cause, this 
being the place and time at which everyone agreed to meet. For Campbell, this 
example illustrates that psychological causation is possible without physical 
causation, apparently providing a solution to the exclusion problem, since it 
illustrates that psychological properties and their physical realizers do not 
necessarily stand in competition with one another.32  
 So  what  exactly  is  wrong  with  Campbell’s  argument  and  why  does it fail 
to provide a satisfactory solution to the exclusion problem? As I explained 
above,  according  to  Campbell’s  account,  in  order  for  X  to  cause  Y,  it  is  not  only  
                                                 
32 For Campbell, the question of whether there are physical control variables (and hence physical 
causation) becomes an entirely empirical matter to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
However, since he claims to have proven that the thesis of casual closure is false, he argues that 
the discovery of such physical causes does not affect the causal status of psychological 
properties. 
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necessary that there is some intervention on X that changes Y, but those 
interventions must  have  “large,  specific  and  systematic”  (Ibid) effects on Y, such 
that X acts as a control variable for Y. This is what makes it possible for a 
physical effect to have a psychological cause, without also having a physical 
cause.   
 Why does Campbell impose the constraint that causes should act as 
control variables for their effects? In order to see why, note that the requirement 
that causes act as control variables for their effects just is the requirement that 
changes to the cause variable should be proportionate to changes to the effect 
variable. On a plausible reading, the notion of a control variable simply captures 
the idea that different values of the cause variable should be systematically, 
stably and proportionately associated with different values of the effect variable.  
 For example, take the case of the colloquium: since it is the specific time 
and place of the congregation that we are interested in explaining (e.g. why the 
congregation occurred at 11am, rather than, say, 12pm), in order for some 
physical variable, such as the total neurophysiological state of each individual, to 
qualify as a cause of this effect, it is necessary that interventions on the value of 
this physical variable are associated with specific, systematic and proportionate 
changes to the value of the effect variable (e.g. to the time of the congregation). 
Since there fails to exist some such physical property, interventions on which are 
associated with specific, systematic and proportionate changes to the effect, 
Campbell concludes that this physical effect has no physical cause.33  
                                                 
33 This reasoning can lead to the equally unintuitive conclusion that it is possible for some 
physical effect to have no cause  whatsoever.  See  Campbell’s  (2008a)  example of the billiard 
table. 
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 Now, just  as  with  List  and  Menzies’  account,  I suggest that this version of 
interventionism also generates an anti-realist conception of mental causation, 
since whether X causes Y also depends on whether X is proportionate in relation 
to Y and as we have seen, whether X qualifies as a proportionate cause of Y can 
vary depending on the somewhat subjective consideration of our goal as 
enquirers.  
 I suggest that this can be illustrated by considering a variant of 
Campbell’s colloquium example. For example, suppose that we are no longer 
interested in explaining why the colloquium occurs at 11am, rather than 12pm, 
but are instead interested more generally in why the colloquium occurs at all. 
Given this new explanatory goal, the total neurophysiological state of each 
individual will qualify as a proportionate cause of the effect, since interventions 
on this variable will now be stably, systematically and proportionately associated 
with changes to whether the colloquium occurs, or fails to occur.  
 Once again, we can see that whether some property qualifies as a 
proportionate cause of some effect is somewhat subjective and given that 
according to Campbell, whether X causes Y depends on whether X is 
proportionate in relation to Y, this theory inevitably becomes subjective and anti-
realist. Given the strong and reasonable intuition that our account of mental 
causation should not be anti-realist and given that I have argued that any 
satisfactory response  to  Kim’s  exclusion  problem  will  have  to  avoid  being anti-
realist, I conclude that this account also fails to provide a satisfactory account of 
mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem   
 By contrast, this problem simply does not arise for  Woodward’s  account.  
This is because on Woodward’s  account, there is guaranteed to be some physical 
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property (for example, one relating to the total neurophysiological state of each 
individual) that qualifies as a cause of this physical effect, given that there will 
be some intervention on this physical property that is associated with some 
change to the effect (for example, the congregation may not occur at all under an 
intervention on this physical variable). In other words, the relationship between 
this physical property and the effect is guaranteed to be at least minimally 
invariant and hence causal.34 This remains true even though this intervention will 
not be associated   with   “large, specific and systematic”   (Ibid) changes to the 
effect variable (e.g. to the specific time of the congregation), i.e. it remains true 
even though the changes to this physical variable are not proportionate to the 
changes to the effect variable.  
 Remember that for Woodward, the fact that this physical cause would not 
be proportionate to its effect merely explains why this physical cause may be 
considered as less preferable in comparison to the psychological cause of this 
effect. In other words, just as in the case of List and Menzies, while Woodward 
appeals to the notion of proportionality to distinguish between better or worse 
causal claims and explanations, for Campbell, proportionality becomes a 
necessary condition for causation, (as evidenced by his notion of a control 
variable), that distinguishes between causal and non-causal relationships, 
                                                 
34 Campbell  (2008c)  actually  refers  to  Woodward’s  notion  of  invariance  when  providing  his  
account of mental causation, but it is evident that Campbell confuses this notion with his specific 
notion of a control variable. For example, Campbell suggests (Ibid: 188) that if there exists some 
physical effect, for which there is no physical property, interventions on which are associated 
with “large, specific and systematic”  (Campbell, 2008a: 433) changes to the effect, then there 
will fail to exist an even minimally invariant and hence causal relationship at the physical level. 
However, remember that for Woodward, so long as there is some intervention on some physical 
property that changes the effect, that relationship will qualify as minimally invariant and causal, 
even if there is no physical property, interventions  on  which  are  associated  with  “large, specific 
and systematic”  (Ibid) changes to the effect, i.e. even if there is no physical property that is a 
proportionate cause of that physical effect. 
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thereby generating an anti-realist conception of causation, whilst this possibility 
is  ruled  out  on  Woodward’s  account.   
 What about the worry that in formulating such minimal requirements for 
causation,  Woodward’s   theory   provides  problematically weak requirements for 
mental causation? For example, one could argue that merely knowing that there 
is some intervention on a property that changes the effect does not tell us very 
much about that relationship, nor does it guarantee that that property will provide 
a satisfactory explanation of the effect, or provide an effective means of control 
over   the   effect.   Whereas,   since   on   both   List   and   Menzies’   and   Campbell’s  
accounts, these features are built into the very definition of what it is for X to 
cause   Y,   it   is   guaranteed   that   causes   will   also   provide   ‘good’   explanations   of  
their effects and potentially provide an effective means of control over those 
effects.   
 Now, it is important to make clear exactly why Woodward’s  account  does 
not generate problematically weak conditions for mental causation. This is 
because   Woodward’s   version of interventionism does successfully distinguish 
between genuinely causal and non-causal relationships (in terms of the idea of a 
minimal degree of invariance), whilst also appealing to the notion of 
proportionality to distinguish between better or worse causal claims and 
explanations.   The   difference   between   Woodward’s   theory   and   each   of   the  
theories discussed in this section is simply that Woodward does not take this 
further consideration to be a necessary condition for causation.  
 Nevertheless,  what  I  hope  to  have  shown  is  that  in  so  far  as  Woodward’s  
account does generate relatively minimal requirements for causation, this is not a 
problem for this account, since it is precisely because Woodward only appeals to 
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the notion of invariance (which is an entirely objective notion, unlike the notion 
of proportionality) to distinguish between causal and non-causal relationships 
that his theory is able to avoid the problem of realism, while the same is not true 
for   List   and   Menzies’   and   Campbell’s   accounts.   I   hope   to   have   shown   that  
Woodward’s  account  of  mental  causation  therefore  provides  the  only satisfactory 
account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem.35 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
  
 In this chapter I presented Woodward’s interventionist account of mental 
causation and demonstrated how this account avoids the exclusion problem, 
whilst upholding all of the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism, 
thereby providing a successful non-reductive physicalist solution to the exclusion 
problem.  
 I began by demonstrating that interventionism not only provides an 
account of causation by which both mental and physical properties can qualify as 
causes of the same effect, but that when causation is understood in interventionist 
terms, mental properties can actually be considered as preferable causes of their 
effects, in comparison to their subvenient physical realizers (when, for example, 
those mental properties are highly RIDR and relatively invariant and provide the 
correct contrastive focus). Most importantly, I demonstrated that when causation 
is understood in interventionist terms, the question of mental causation becomes 
an entirely a posteriori, not a priori question.  
                                                 
35 It is important to be clear that this argument has not been intended as an outright rejection of all 
of the ideas presented by List and Menzies and Campbell in their papers, since each of these 
theories upholds a broadly interventionist approach to causation and provides many insights into 
the exclusion problem. 
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 I also made explicit how this account of mental causation avoids Kim’s  a  
priori exclusion problem and argued, contra Kim, that although this account is 
“metaphysically  modest”  (Woodward,  2003:  121), it does provide a satisfactory 
account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem. I also 
suggested that it is precisely because this account is   “metaphysically  modest”  
(Ibid) that it is able to uphold all of the minimal commitments of non-reductive 
physicalism and hence provide a viable non-reductive physicalist solution to the 
exclusion problem. Finally, I compared this account to two alternative 
manipulationist accounts of mental causation and argued that since they each 
generate anti-realist conceptions of mental causation, they fail to provide 
satisfactory accounts of mental causation and solutions to the exclusion problem. 
I   concluded   that   Woodward’s   interventionist   account   of   mental   causation  
therefore provides the only satisfactory non-reductive physicalist account of 
mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem.  
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6. Interventionist Causal 
Exclusion and the 
Underdetermination Argument 
 
   
6.1 Introduction  
   
In a series of recent papers, Michael Baumgartner (2009, 2010) argues 
that far from securing the causal status of mental properties and providing a non-
reductive physicalist solution to the exclusion problem, interventionism actually 
generates a new kind of exclusion problem, which apparently rests on weaker 
premises than the original Kimian formulation of the exclusion problem. 
Moreover, Baumgartner (2010) argues that the proposed interventionist solution 
to  this  novel  interventionist  exclusion  problem  leads  to  an  ‘underdetermination’ 
of mental causation, making this supposed solution not fit for the purposes of the 
non-reductive physicalist.   
In the first half of this chapter I outline and examine the debate between 
Baumgartner (2009) and Woodward (2011a). I demonstrate that although 
Woodward’s   solution   involves modifying the definition of interventionism 
proposed in his (2003), (which I appealed to in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis), it 
does offer  a  genuine  solution  to  Baumgartner’s  a  priori  interventionist  exclusion  
argument. With this interventionist solution outlined, I will then, in the second 
half   of   this   chapter,   present   my   argument   against   Baumgartner’s   (2010)  
underdetermination argument. I demonstrate that by clarifying the metaphysical 
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implications of interventionist mental causation and by clarifying the conditions 
under which we can acquire empirical evidence for mental causation, the non-
reductive physicalist who hopes to use interventionism as a solution to the 
exclusion  problem  can  avoid  Baumgartner’s  underdetermination argument. I will 
therefore conclude that the interventionist is able to defend her position against 
both of  Baumgartner’s  objections  and  uphold   the   interventionist   solution   to   the  
exclusion problem outlined in the previous chapter. In fact, I will demonstrate 
that this discussion actually provides further support for the “metaphysically 
modest”  (Woodward,  2003:  121) account of mental causation that I outlined in 
Chapter 5.  
The chapter is organised as follows: in Section 6.2, I outline and examine 
Baumgartner’s  (2009)  interventionist  exclusion  argument  and   in Section 6.2.1, I 
outline and examine Woodward’s   (2011a) interventionist response to this 
argument. In Section 6.2.1.1, I outline Woodward’s proposed modification of 
interventionism and in Section 6.2.1.2, I address some worries regarding this 
modification. In Section 6.3, I outline Baumgartner’s   underdetermination 
argument and argue that by clarifying the metaphysical implications of 
interventionist mental causation and by clarifying the conditions under which we 
can acquire empirical evidence for mental causation, the interventionist can avoid 
the underdetermination argument. Section 6.4 follows with some concluding 
remarks.  
  
6.2 The Interventionist Exclusion Argument  
 
Baumgartner (2009) argues  that   the  ‘interventionist  exclusion  argument’  
follows a priori from the very definition of interventionism proposed by 
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Woodward in his (2003). It will be useful to remind ourselves of these 
definitions:  
 
“(M)  A  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for X to be a (type-level) direct 
cause of Y with respect to a variable set V is that there be a possible 
intervention on X that will change Y or the probability distribution of Y 
when one holds fixed at some value all other variables Zi in V. A 
necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level) contributing 
cause of Y with respect to variable set V is that (i) there be a directed path 
from X to Y such that each link in this path is a direct causal relationship 
…  and  that  (ii)  there  be  some  intervention on X that will change Y when 
all  other  variables  in  V  that  are  not  on  this  path  are  fixed  at  some  value.”  
(Woodward 2003: 59, cited in Baumgartner, 2009: 163-164) 
 
“(IV) I is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y iff 
1. I causes X;  
2. I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X. That is, certain 
values of I are such that when I attains those values, X ceases to depend 
on the values of other variables that cause X and instead depends only on 
the value taken by I;  
3. Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. That is, I does not 
directly cause Y and is not a cause of any causes of Y that are distinct 
from X except, of course, for those causes of Y, if any, that are built into 
the I – X – Y connection itself; that is, except for (a) any causes of Y that 
are effects of X (i.e., variables that are causally between X and Y) and (b) 
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any causes of Y that are between I and X and have no effect on Y 
independently of X. 
4. I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that causes Y and that 
is on a directed path that does not go through X.” (Woodward, 2003: 98, 
cited in Baumgartner, 2009: 164) 
  
Now, according to Woodward (2003), (and according to the account of 
interventionism examined in this thesis so far), (M) and (IV) provide necessary 
and sufficient conditions for X to cause Y: (M) spells out what it is for X to cause 
Y  by  appealing   to   the  notion  of  a   ‘possible’   intervention,  while   (IV)  spells  out  
the criteria that an intervention must meet if it is to be considered as suitable for 
assessing the causal role of X in relation to Y. How then does this formulation of 
interventionism generate the a priori interventionist exclusion problem?   
According to Baumgartner, this problem arises for the interventionist 
because (M) and (IV) entail two necessary conditions for causation, which as we 
shall see, cause trouble when applied to cases of mental causation. Baumgartner 
labels these necessary conditions (MAN) and (FIX):   
  
“(MAN)  There  possibly  exists  an  intervention  I = zi on X with respect to 
Y. 
 
(FIX) The possible intervention I = zi is such that, while it is performed 
on X, all variables in the pertaining variable set V that are not located on a 
causal path from X to Y are held fixed, i.e. the variables in V that are not 
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located on a causal path from X to Y can be held fixed while I = zi is 
performed on X.” (Ibid: 167)   
 
 Now, (MAN) states, quite simply, that in order for X to cause Y there 
must possibly exist an intervention I on X with respect to Y. As I explained in 
Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.2), this notion of possibility should be understood in a 
fairly permissive sense, in that it is only necessary, according to Woodward, that 
interventions be constrained under logical, conceptual and metaphysical 
possibility, rather than, say, practical, physical or nomological possibility. With 
the notion of possibility understood in this fairly permissive sense, Baumgartner 
is right to claim that (MAN) is entailed by (M) and (IV) and is a necessary 
condition for interventionist causation.   
Next, note that (FIX) essentially appeals to criterion IV-4 above, which 
states that intervention I must be independent of any variable Z which causes Y, 
that is on a directed path that does not go through X. It does therefore look as 
though (FIX) is also entailed by (M) and (IV) and is also a necessary condition 
for interventionist causation. We may  therefore  agree  with  Baumgartner  that  “If  
either (MAN) or (FIX) cannot be satisfied by two variables X and Y and the 
variable set V, X and Y are not causally connected relative to V according to 
(M).”  (Ibid) 
With these two necessary conditions for causation in mind, Baumgartner 
formulates his interventionist exclusion argument, which apparently a priori rules 
out the possibility of mental causation. In order to introduce this argument, let us 
consider the supposedly paradigmatic example of mental causation that I 
introduced earlier in this thesis: my desire for a cup of tea causes me to form the 
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intention to walk to the kitchen and switch on the kettle. Let M and M* represent 
these two mental phenomena and let P and P* represent the two physical 
phenomena that realize them. According to the non-reductive physicalist, M and 
M* supervene on P and P* without being identical to them, M causes M* and P*, 
and P causes P*.1 I illustrate this in Figure 6.1 below.       
             
Figure 6.1: Supervenient Mental Causation   
Solid arrows represent supposed causal relationships, while the broken lines 
depict supervenient relationships.  
 
In relation to this set of variables (set V), Baumgartner formulates the 
interventionist exclusion argument as follows:  
 
“(1)  M is causally relevant to P* with respect to the variable set V = {M, 
M*, P, P*} iff there possibly exists an intervention I1 = z1 on M with 
respect to P* such that all other variables in V that are not located on a 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting that Baumgartner claims that his interventionist exclusion argument only 
excludes the causal relevance of M in relation to P*, but leaves it open as to whether M can cause 
M*. According to Baumgartner, this is because causation could never be transmitted through the 
P to M* route (given a supervenience relation between M* and P*) and without the idea that P is 
also  a  cause  of  M*,  Baumgartner’s  exclusion  argument  would  not  go  through.  However, I agree 
with Woodward (2011a: 22) that causation can sometimes be transmitted through the P to M* 
route (if, for example, some intervention on the value of P changes the value of M*) and if that is 
correct,   Baumgartner’s   exclusion   argument   would also rule out the possibility of causation 
between M and M*.  
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causal path from M to P* are held fixed and the value or the probability 
distribution of P* changes. 
(2) M supervenes on MSB(M) = {P = y1, P = y2,  …   ,  P = yn} without 
being identical to P.  
(3) P is causally relevant to P*. 
[therefore] ¬(M is causally relevant to P* with respect to the variable set 
V = {M, M*, P, P*}).”  (Ibid:  169) 
 
Let us examine this argument more closely. Although Woodward 
demonstrates   that   the   crucial   misstep   in   Baumgartner’s   argument   lies   in   his  
formulation of premise (1), according to (1), in order for M to cause P* there 
must possibly exist an intervention I on M such that all other variables in set V 
that are not located on a causal path that goes through M are held fixed and in 
which case P* changes. In other words, in order for M to cause P*, (MAN) and 
(FIX) must be satisfied in relation to all of the variables in set V.  
According to premise (3), which is guaranteed by causal closure, P is 
causally relevant to P*.  
Next, consider premise (2), which appeals to the theses of supervenience 
and non-identity. Now, Baumgartner correctly observes that any legitimate 
reading of supervenience has to maintain two things. Firstly, that supervenience 
is a non-causal relation and secondly, that any change at the supervenient level 
requires a change at the subvenient level (with disagreements concerning the 
modal force with which this is thought to hold). From these two minimal 
requirements, Baumgartner claims that the following holds:  
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“(2a)  M ≠  P ^ ¬(M causes P) ^ ¬(P causes M);  
(2b) Every change in the values of M is necessarily accompanied by a 
change in the values of P. 
(2a) and (3) imply:   
(4) P is on a causal path to P* that does not include M.”  (Ibid:  170)   
 
Given the conjunction of these theses, the interventionist exclusion 
problem seems inevitable:  assuming  that  P  is  an  ‘off-path’  variable  that  does  not  
go through M that causes P*, (MAN) and (FIX) require that P be held fixed 
while M is manipulated, however, this is clearly ruled out by the most minimal 
reading of supervenience. In other words, it turns out that because of 
supervenience, (MAN) cannot be satisfied in relation to set V, since 
supervenience guarantees that there fails to exist a possible intervention on M 
that meets even the most liberal reading of possibility. As Baumgartner explains,  
 
“From   the   conjunction   of   (1a)   and   (4)   it   follows   that,   if  M is causally 
relevant to P*, there possibly exists a variable that causes changes in M 
while being statistically independent of changes in P. The latter, however, 
is excluded by (2b), which determines that the values of every variable 
that induces changes in M will necessarily be correlated with the values 
of P. Hence, there cannot possibly exist an intervention variable for M 
with respect to P*. A straightforward application of modus tollens to (1a) 
then leads to the conclusion of the interventionist exclusion argument: 
¬(M is causally relevant to P* with respect to the variable set V = {M, 
M*, P, P*}) or M is causally irrelevant to P*, for short. Put differently, M 
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and P* violate the first necessary condition for M to cause P* according 
to  reading  (III)  of  (M),  viz.  (MAN).”  (Ibid:  170-171)  
  
We can see that (FIX) is also clearly violated for the same reason,   
   
“(4)  states   that  P is located on a causal path to P* that does not include 
M, which in virtue of (FIX) requires that P be fixed while M is 
manipulated. (2b), however, excludes just that fixability, i.e. (2b) 
excludes that P can possibly be held fixed while M is manipulated. 
Therefore, M, P,  and  V  also  violate  (FIX).”  (Ibid:  171) 
 
Given that I accepted that (MAN) and (FIX) are necessary conditions for 
causation according to (M) and (IV), it does look as though supervenient 
causation (for example between M and M*, or between M and P*) is a priori 
ruled out by the very definition of causation outlined in (M) and (IV), since 
(MAN) and (FIX) cannot be satisfied when the variables under consideration 
stand in a supervenience relation. Moreover, Baumgartner claims that since this 
argument requires only a minimal reading of supervenience, it applies to all 
cases of supervenient causation, including all mental causation. For 
Baumgartner, this generates a novel, a priori interventionist exclusion problem. 
Before moving on to discuss the solution to this problem, it is worth 
noting that according to Baumgartner, this exclusion argument rests on even 
weaker premises than the traditional Kimian formulation of the exclusion 
problem, apparently making it all the more decisive against the non-reductive 
physicalist who hopes to use interventionism to solve the exclusion problem. 
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Baumgartner notes that his exclusion argument differs from the traditional 
Kimian formulation in two crucial ways. Firstly, it does not involve a premise 
ruling out overdetermination and secondly, it does not presuppose that physical 
property P is sufficient for P*. As Baumgartner explains,  
 
“The  mere  causal  relevance  of  P for P* suffices that P would need to be 
fixable while M is manipulated in order for the latter to be a cause of P* 
in the sense of (M). As we have seen above, such a fixing of P is 
impossible. In consequence, even though there may well exist countless 
systematically overdetermined effects and even though micro causes may 
not fully determine their micro effects, the currently most popular version 
of interventionism does not allow for any downward causal influence of 
supervening  macro  properties.”  (Ibid) 
   
If   correct,   the   conclusion   of   Baumgartner’s   interventionist exclusion 
argument would indeed have disastrous consequences for the interventionist 
solution to the exclusion problem that I outlined in the previous chapter. What 
then is the solution for the interventionist?  
 
6.2.1 The Interventionist Solution to the Interventionist Exclusion 
Problem  
 
In a recent paper, Woodward (2011a) defends the interventionist response 
to   the   traditional   exclusion   problem   and   responds   directly   to   Baumgartner’s  
interventionist exclusion argument. Woodward argues that Baumgartner’s  
mistake is to assume that cases of causation involving what Woodward calls 
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‘non-causal  dependency  relations’,  such  as  logical,  conceptual  and  supervenient 
dependencies, should be treated in exactly the same way as cases of causation 
involving no non-causal dependencies. More specifically, Woodward argues that 
Baumgartner’s   argument   relies   on   a   mistaken   assumption   about   what   it   is  
appropriate to control for, or hold fixed, when assessing causal systems that 
include supervenient dependencies and argues, contra Baumgartner, that it is not 
appropriate to control for the subvenient bases of supervenient properties when 
assessing the causal status of the latter. In other words, Woodward argues that 
(M) and (IV) (and (MAN) and (FIX)) cannot simply be applied to cases of 
causation involving supervenient dependencies.2 Instead, Woodward proposes a 
modified version of (M) and (IV) that can be applied to causal systems that 
include supervenient dependencies and demonstrates that this formulation of 
interventionism does not lead to Baumgartner’s   interventionist   exclusion  
argument.  
Of course, the success of this solution will depend on how plausible one 
finds   Woodward’s   argument   that   causal   systems   that   include   non-causal 
dependencies should be treated differently to causal systems that do not include 
any non-causal dependencies and that we should not require that subvenient 
bases be held fixed when assessing the causal relevance of supervenient 
properties. Luckily for the interventionist, Woodward does put forward a 
convincing   argument   in   support   of   this.   I   outline   and   examine   Woodward’s  
argument in the remainder of this section.    
                                                 
2 
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To begin, Woodward points out that the formulation of interventionism 
that he provides in his (2003), which appeals to (M) and (IV), is intended to 
apply to causal systems that include variables that all stand (or can potentially 
stand) in causal relationships with one another. In other words, it is presumed 
that the causal systems do not include any variables that stand in non-causal 
dependency relationships.3 As Woodward explains, 
  
“…it  is  generally  assumed  that  the  variables  occurring  in  a  graph  may  be  
causally related or not or correlated or not, but that such variables are not 
connected by relationships of non-causal dependency (such as logical,  
conceptual, or mathematical relationships  or supervenience relationships) 
of a sort that are inconsistent with their standing in causal 
relationships…In   other   words,   it   is   assumed   that we are dealing with 
variables [that] are   “distinct”   in   a  way   that   allows   them   to   be   potential  
candidates  for  relata  in  causal  relationships.”  (Woodward,  2011a:  6) 
   
Woodward   formulates   the   principle   of   ‘independent   fixability’   (or   IF),  
which essentially captures this requirement: 
 
“(IF):  a set of variables V satisfies independent fixability of values if and 
only if for each value it is possible for a variable to take individually, it is 
possible  (that  is,  “possible”  in  terms  of  their  assumed  definitional, logical, 
mathematical,  or  mereological  relations  or  “metaphysically  possible”)  to  
                                                 
3 In fact, Woodward adds that it is standard practice in causal theory to assume that the causal 
graphs and systems that are examined do not involve any non-causal dependencies. 
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set the variable to that value via an intervention, concurrently with each 
of the other variables in V also being set to any of its individually 
possible values by independent  interventions.”  (Ibid:  11-12)4 
 
Now, on the assumption that the system under consideration includes no 
non-causal dependency relations (i.e. assuming that the system meets the 
preconditions spelled out in (IF)), in order to determine whether X causes Y, (M) 
and (IV) do state that there must exist some possible intervention on X that 
changes Y, where the notion of an intervention is defined in terms of the criteria 
outlined in (IV). In other words, when dealing with causal systems that include 
no non-causal dependencies, Baumgartner is correct that (MAN) and (FIX) do 
require that all of the variables in that set that also cause the effect, and which are 
not on a causal path that goes through the purported cause variable, must be held 
fixed while the cause variable is manipulated.  
As an illustration, consider the following example5: suppose that we want 
to find out whether smoking, S, causes lung cancer, C. According to (IV), 
(which, remember, assumes that all of the variables in the system are 
independent of one another, with no non-causal dependency relations holding 
between them) this requires (amongst other things) that I should intervene on S 
independently of any other variable Z that also causes C, that does not go 
through S. For example, imagine that Z is a variable representing either the 
                                                 
4 As Woodward (2011a: 13) points out, some writers, such as Brad Weslake (2011) have argued 
that we should in fact restrict the application of interventionism to causal systems that meet (IF). 
However, I agree with Woodward that although dealing with systems that do not meet (IF), for 
definitional, or metaphysical reasons, for example, does complicate matters, we can acquire 
genuine and novel causal knowledge from examining such systems and it is therefore justifiable 
to modify interventionism along the lines suggested by Woodward to deal with such systems. 
5 This is a variant of an example that Woodward (2011a: 7-8) uses to illustrate this point.  
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presence  or  absence  of  asbestos  in  the  subject’s  environment.  Assuming  that  Z  is  
also a cause of C, the intervention on S must be independent of Z in order to rule 
out the possibility that Z could confound the relationship between S and C. If 
there does not exist such a possible intervention on S, then the causal relationship 
between S and C will be ruled out on a priori grounds.  
 Now, as   Woodward   explains,   the   ‘crucial   misstep’   in   Baumgartner’s  
argument is to assume that a causal system that includes both causal and non-
causal dependency relations, such as the one depicted in Figure 6.1 above, 
(which  Woodward  calls  a  ‘mixed  structure’),  can  be  treated  in  the  same  way  as  a  
causal system that includes no non-causal dependencies, such as the one 
described in the example above. More specifically, he explains that 
Baumgartner’s  mistake  is   to  assume that (M) and (IV) can be applied to causal 
systems that include non-causal dependencies and hence that we should hold 
fixed the subvenient bases of supervenient properties when considering the 
causal status of the latter, i.e. that (MAN) and (FIX) must be satisfied in relation 
to these causal systems. 
 So, why should we think that these two kinds of causal system should be 
treated differently and that it is not, in fact, appropriate to control for the 
subvenient bases of supervenient properties when assessing the causal status of 
the latter? Woodward provides the following arguments in support.    
Firstly, Woodward argues that when one assumes that both of these kinds 
of causal system can be treated in exactly the same way and hence assumes that 
one must control for the subvenient bases of supervenient properties, it leads to 
mistaken causal inferences, suggesting that there is in fact an important 
disanalogy between the two cases.  
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In support of this argument, Woodward begins by appealing to an 
example which does not involve supervenience, but which involves another kind 
of non-causal  dependency,  this  being  ‘definitional  dependency’.  Woodward  then  
argues that the same argument applies to cases involving supervenient 
dependencies. 
Consider  Woodward’s  example:   
 
“Suppose…that  heart  disease   (D) is causally influenced by high density 
cholesterol (HDC), which lowers the probability of disease and low 
density cholesterol (LDC) which raises the probability of disease. 
Suppose that we also have a variable representing total cholesterol (TC) 
which is defined as the arithmetic sum of HDC and LDC (i.e., 
TC=HDC+LDC). Assume for the sake of argument that we think of TC 
as also (causally) influencing D, although its overall impact on any given 
occasion of course will depend on the precise mix of HDC and LDC that 
taken together realize TC.”  (Ibid: 20)  
  
This can be illustrated as follows:   
                                      
Figure 6.2: Cholesterol  
Illustration copied from Woodward (2011a). The arrows from HD and LD to TC 
represent the definitional dependency of TC on HD and LD and the arrows from 
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HD, TC and LD to D represent the causal dependence of D on these variables. 
As Woodward notes, Figure 6.2 does not therefore make a distinction between 
causal and definitional relationships. 
 
As Woodward explains, assuming, as Figure 6.2 does, that all of the 
variables in the system stand in causal, or potentially causal relationships with 
one another, in order to determine, for example, whether LD causes D, (M) and 
(IV) require that we consider the outcome of an intervention on LD that holds 
both HD and TC fixed, since both of these variables cause D and are on a causal 
path that does not go through LD. However, given the definitional relationship 
between HD, LD and TC, such interventions would be impossible. Arguing 
along   Baumgartner’s   lines,   it   would   seem that LD is a priori ruled out as a 
potential cause of D, given that the definitional relationships between the 
variables make IV-interventions impossible relative to that set.  
However, as Woodward points out, this conclusion seems plainly 
mistaken and highly counterintuitive. Woodward argues that what this example 
actually suggests is that by introducing non-causal dependencies, such as 
definitional dependencies into a causal system, that causal system becomes 
somewhat complex and suggests that we need to be careful about how we treat 
such cases. More specifically, he argues that it suggests that we should be 
cautious in applying (M) and (IV) to these causal systems. For Woodward, the 
fact that the standard reading of (M) and (IV) delivers the judgement that a 
causal relationship between LD and D can actually be ruled out on a priori 
grounds, when this is clearly an issue to be settled on empirical grounds, strongly 
supports this point.  
Chapter 6, Interventionist Causal Exclusion and the Underdetermination Argument 258  
 
Now, Woodward does seem right to conclude that causal systems that 
include variables that stand in definitional relationships should be treated 
differently to those causal systems that do not include any such variables and that 
it is not therefore appropriate to hold fixed all of the variables in that set at 
independent values (which will be impossible for definitional reasons), since this 
leads to mistaken causal inferences regarding that system.  
Can the same be said for causal systems that include supervenient 
dependencies? Woodward argues that the same argument can be applied to the 
supervenient case. As an illustration, consider again set V: given that two of the 
variables in that set, namely P and P*, are the subvenient bases of the other two 
variables in the set, namely M and M*, it will be impossible to intervene on M 
and M* while holding P and P* fixed. Once  again,  arguing  along  Baumgartner’s  
lines, it would seem that M is a priori ruled out as a potential cause of P*, given 
that the supervenient relationships between the variables make IV-interventions 
impossible relative to that set.  
Woodward concludes that the fact that a causal relationship between M 
and P* is ruled out on a priori grounds suggests, just as in the case involving 
definitional dependencies, that causal systems that include supervenient 
dependencies should be treated differently to those causal systems that do not 
include such dependencies and that it is not therefore appropriate to control for 
the subvenient bases of supervenient properties.6    
                                                 
6 Baumgartner (2013) argues that there is an important disanalogy between the cholesterol case 
and a case of mental causation, because in the latter case, the non-reductive physicalist claims 
that a mental property, such as intention I1, has distinct causal powers from its subvenient base, 
whereas in the cholesterol case,  it  would  be  appropriate  to  consider  TC’s  causal  powers  to  be  
identical and hence reducible to the causal powers of HD and LD. Consequently, Baumgartner 
argues that it is still appropriate to hold fixed the subvenient bases of mental properties, while the 
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Although I do not think that this example decisively proves this point, I 
agree with Woodward that given that a causal relationship between M and P* is 
ruled out on a priori grounds, it at least suggests that causal systems that include 
supervenient dependencies should be treated differently to those causal systems 
that do not include such dependencies and that it is not therefore appropriate to 
control for the subvenient bases of supervenient properties. 
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, Woodward argues that the 
original motivation that we had for controlling for variables in causal systems 
that include no non-causal dependencies, does not transfer to cases that include 
variables that do stand in non-causal dependencies and that it is not therefore 
appropriate to control for the subvenient bases of supervenient properties when 
assessing the causal status of the latter.  
As an illustration, consider again the example of smoking introduced 
above: when considering the causal relevance of smoking, S, in relation to lung 
cancer, C, the motivation for controlling for variable Z, (which represents the 
presence/absence  of  asbestos   in   the  subject’s   environment),  was   to   rule out the 
possibility that the correlation between S and C was not due to the effect of 
intervention I on S, but was due to the effect of variable Z, which is also a cause 
of Y. This is why (M) and (IV) require that intervention I should manipulate S 
while holding Z fixed.  
Now, imagine if in place of variable Z, we introduce variable B into the 
causal system, which represents the biological process on which S supervenes. 
                                                                                                                                    
same may not be true for the case of HD and LD. My argument in the second half of this chapter, 
against  Baumgartner’s  underdetermination  argument,  will  address  this  objection.     
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Woodward suggests7 that it no longer seems appropriate to control for B as it was 
for Z, since by being the subvenient base of S, B is simply not the kind of 
variable that could stand in a potential causal relationship with S and hence it is 
simply not the kind of variable that could confound the relationship between S 
and C.  
Put slightly differently, Woodward’s suggestion is that it seems wrong to 
assume that the motivation that we had for controlling for variables, such as Z, 
transmits to variables that are the subvenient bases of the properties under 
consideration, since subvenient properties are not the kind of properties that can 
stand in causal relationships with the properties that supervene on them and 
hence they are not the kind of properties that could act as confounders in the 
ordinary sense to those supervenient properties. Although I will demonstrate, in 
the second half of this chapter, that the issue of potential confounding in the case 
of mental causation is somewhat complex, Woodward is nonetheless right to 
conclude that it is not appropriate to control for the subvenient bases of 
supervenient properties when considering the causal status of those supervenient 
properties, as it is in the case of causal systems that include no non-causal 
dependencies.8  
In summary, what these two arguments both suggest is that there are 
important differences between causal systems that include non-causal 
dependencies and causal systems that do not include any non-causal 
dependencies and that it is not appropriate to control for the subvenient bases of 
                                                 
7 Woodward (2011a: 37) does not explicitly appeal to the example  of smoking to illustrate this 
point, but instead appeals to a general set of variables (X, Y, Z).   
8 The  argument  that  I  present  against  Baumgartner’s  underdetermination  argument  in  the  second 
half of this chapter provides further support for the claim that the subvenient bases of 
supervenient properties should not be treated as confounders in the ordinary sense.   
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supervenient properties when considering the causal status of the latter and hence 
wrong to conclude from the fact that such interventions are impossible, that those 
supervenient properties are thereby a priori excluded as causes.  
 
6.2.1.1 Modifying (M) and (IV)  
 
However, as Woodward himself points out, this does not as yet offer a 
positive proposal of how we should deal with such systems within an 
interventionist framework, nor does it prove that the interventionist can provide 
such an account without running into Baumgartner’s   interventionist exclusion 
argument. How then should we understand (M) and (IV) when applied to causal 
systems that include non-causal dependencies, specifically supervenient 
dependencies?  
Woodward’s   simple   suggestion   is   that   we   should   modify   the  
requirements of (M) and (IV) so that they only consider, as relevant for assessing 
the causal status of some property within such a system, those interventions that 
set the variables within that set to values that respect the non-causal 
dependencies that hold between the variables. For example, when considering the 
causal status of some property in a causal system that includes supervenient 
dependencies, Woodward suggests that we should only consider the outcome of 
interventions that are possible given the supervenient dependencies that hold 
between the variables, i.e. we should not consider as relevant those interventions 
that cannot be carried out for metaphysical reasons, given the supervenient 
relationships that hold between the variables. (Remember that the motivation for 
this was outlined above.)  
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This idea of a relevant intervention suggests how we should modify (IV) 
to deal with causal systems that include supervenient dependencies. As 
Woodward explains,    
 
“To  be  more  explicit,  when  (non-causal) supervenience relationships are 
present, the characterization IV should be interpreted in such a way that 
in  condition  (I3)  a  directed  path  counts  as  “going    from  I to Y through X”  
even if I also changes (as it must) the supervenience base SB(X) of X, as 
well as the value of X.  Similarly,  the  reference  in  (I4)  to  “any  variable  Z”  
should be interpreted as   “any   variable   Z other than those in the 
supervenience base SB(X) of X”.  Put  slightly  differently,  an  intervention  I 
on X with respect to Y will (a) fix the value of SB(X) in a way that 
respects the supervenience relationship between X and SB(X), and (b) the 
requirements in the definition (IV) are understood as applying only to 
those variables that are causally related to X and Y or are correlated with 
them but [not] to those variables that are related to X and Y as a result of 
supervenience  relations or relations of definitional dependence. Call this 
characterization of interventions (IV*) and an intervention meeting these 
conditions an IV*-intervention.”  (Ibid:  34)     
  
In other words, we should not only understand the notion of an 
intervention in condition as IV-3 as allowing that the intervention will 
necessarily bring about a change to the subvenient base of the supervenient 
property being considered (which respects the supervenient relationship that 
holds between the variables), but we should also crucially reinterpret criterion 
Chapter 6, Interventionist Causal Exclusion and the Underdetermination Argument 263  
 
IV-4 in such a way that it makes those variables that are the subvenient bases of 
the supervenient properties under consideration, (or those properties that are on 
causal paths that go through the subvenient properties), exempt from being 
considered as relevant off-path variables that need to be held fixed. Again, the 
justification for this can be drawn from the arguments outlined above.  
With all of this in mind, Woodward provides the following modification 
of  (M)  and  (IV),  which  incorporates  the  idea  of  a  ‘relevant’  intervention.  (I  refer  
directly to the formulation provided by Baumgartner (2010)9):   
 
(M*)   “X is a cause of Y with respect to the variable set V iff there 
possibly exists an (IV*)-defined intervention I1 = z1 on X with respect to 
Y such that all other variables in V that are not located on a causal path 
from X to Y and that are not part of the supervenience base of X are held 
fixed and the value or the probability distribution of Y changes. 
 
(IV*) I is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y iff I satisfies 
(IV.1), (IV.2), (IV.3), and (IV.4*): 
(IV.4*) I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z such that Z is a 
cause of Y, Z is not located on a causal path from X to Y, and Z is not part 
of the supervenience base of X.”  (Baumgartner,  2010:  17)   
 
Thus, (M*) and (IV*), unlike (M) and (IV) make clear exactly which kinds of 
interventions are relevant for assessing the causal status of variables within 
                                                 
9 Baumgartner actually refers to these modified principles as M** and IV*, but for the sake of 
continuity, I refer to them as (M*) and (IV*).  
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causal systems that include supervenient dependencies and also make explicit 
exactly which variables it is appropriate to control for within such systems. 
Before I demonstrate how this revised formulation helps the 
interventionist   to   avoid   Baumgartner’s   exclusion   argument,   it   is   important   to  
emphasise that one direct consequence of this understanding of an intervention, 
(which I noted above), is that any IV*-intervention that changes a supervenient 
property will automatically cause a change in the subvenient base of that 
property (this follows given that any reading of supervenience requires that any 
change at the supervenient level requires a change at the subvenient level). In 
other words, IV*-interventions on mental properties are always common causes10 
of their subvenient physical realizers. Thus an intervention that respects the 
supervenient relationship between, for example, mental property I1 and physical 
realizer N11, will respect the requirement that an intervention that changes the 
value of the intention (for example, from I1 to I2) must also change the value of 
the neural realizer of that intention (for example, from N11 to N14, or whatever 
physical property realizes I2 on this occasion). I will return to this issue in 
Section 6.3 below, but what this in effect means is that when an intervention 
changes the value of some supervenient property, for example, from I1 to I2 and 
changes physical effect variable from R1 to R2 and therefore establishes that I1 is 
a cause of R1, the same intervention will establish that N11 is also a cause of R1. 
This follows since the intervention on I1, (which changes the value of the 
intention from I1 to I2), necessarily changes the value of the physical realizer, 
from N11 to N14 (or whatever physical property realizes I2 on this occasion) and 
                                                 
10 This was helpfully pointed out by Baumgartner in correspondence.  
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since this change in the value of N11 is also associated with a change in the value 
of R1, N11 also qualifies as a cause of R1, under the same intervention.11  
How   then   do   (M*)   and   (IV*)   help   us   to   avoid   Baumgartner’s  
interventionist exclusion argument? Consider again set V, which contained 
mental properties M and M* and their subvenient realizers, P and P*: suppose we 
want to find out whether M causes P*. Although it will be impossible to 
intervene on M independently of P, (which is also a cause of P* and is on a 
causal path that does not go through M), (IV*) does not require that P be held 
fixed while intervening on M, since P is the subvenient base of M and is 
therefore exempt from being held fixed. Since both (IV*) and (M*) will be 
satisfied relative to this set, (since there will exist a possible intervention on M 
that meets the requirements of (IV*)), supervenient causation between M and 
M*, or between M and P* will not be a priori excluded on the grounds that it 
fails to meet the basic requirements of interventionism. Furthermore, what the 
discussion above should have shown is that this is the right way to interpret the 
minimal requirements of interventionism when dealing with causal systems that 
include supervenient dependencies and it is clear that when interventionism is 
understood   in   this  way,  Baumgartner’s   interventionist   exclusion  argument  does  
not go through.   
 
6.2.1.2 Some Further Worries  
 
One immediate worry that arises, however, is whether this solution, 
which modifies the definition of interventionism proposed by Woodward (2003), 
                                                 
11 I address an issue concerning whether these properties can still be considered as causally 
distinct in Section 6.3 below.  
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implies that Woodward’s  (2003) account of interventionism, which I appealed to 
in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, is false.  
In  order  to  see  why  Woodward’s  original  definition  of  interventionism  is  
not falsified by this modification, remember firstly that according to Woodward, 
(M) and (IV) were intended to apply to causal systems that do not include any 
non-causal dependencies and they continue to provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for causation when applied to such causal systems.  
Secondly, it is important to note that in formulating (M*) and (IV*) 
Woodward really is just modifying, or extending (M) and (IV) to include 
additional clauses, so that they can be unproblematically applied to causal 
systems that include variables that stand in non-causal dependency relations. 
What the previous discussion should have shown is that the problem was that 
(M) and (IV) did not make clear exactly how we are to understand the notion of 
an intervention when applied to such causal systems and this left interventionism 
open   to   Baumgartner’s   exclusion   argument.   However, by modifying (M) and 
(IV) along the lines suggested by Woodward (2011a), it is clear that the 
interventionist can   avoid   Baumgartner’s   interventionist exclusion argument. 
Moreover, it should be clear that this proposed modification does not falsify, but 
rather extends the definition of interventionism outlined in Woodward (2003). 
 
6.3 The Underdetermination Argument  
 
A more serious worry regarding this solution, which I will address in the 
remainder of this chapter, is proposed by Baumgartner (2010). Baumgartner 
(2010) objects that this proposed solution to his exclusion argument fails to fit 
the purposes of the non-reductive physicalist, since this modified formulation of 
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interventionism   apparently   results   in   an   ‘underdetermination’   of   mental  
causation. In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that by making clearer the 
metaphysical implications of interventionist mental causation and by making 
clearer the conditions under which we can acquire empirical evidence for mental 
causation,   the   interventionist   can   avoid   Baumgartner’s   underdetermination  
argument.  
To   begin,   what   exactly   is   Baumgartner’s   objection?   Baumgartner  
presents his argument as follows:   
 
“Assume   we   perform   an   (IV*)-defined intervention on the mental 
property M1 and assume furthermore that we find this intervention to be 
followed by a change in the value of P2. Does this test result reveal that 
M1 is a cause of P2? Certainly not. For by (IV*)-manipulating M1 we 
explicitly allowed for changes in P1 which the non-reductive physicalist 
takes to be another cause of P2. This other cause is not located on a path 
from M1 to P2 and, above all, is determined to be causally sufficient for 
P2 by the causal closure of the physical. In consequence, our test result 
significantly underdetermines a causal inference. At least two structures 
can generate the result of our hypothetical test: either (i) the change in the 
value of P2 is only caused by a change in the value of P1 which 
necessarily accompanied our intervention on M1 or (ii) the change in the 
value of P2 is overdetermined by P1 and M1. Of course, this ambiguity 
does not only arise due to a misguided intervention in one particular 
experimental context, rather, (IV*)-defined interventions, in general, are 
not required to be independent of all other causes of an effect under 
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investigation. Supervenience bases of macro variables may vary and 
thereby causally influence investigated effects at will when those macro 
variables are (IV*)-manipulated. Hence, all empirical data that result 
from (IV*)-interventions and that could stem from macro-to-micro 
causation might just as well stem from a structure that only features 
micro-to-micro causation. (IV*)-manipulations never induce an 
unambiguous inference to macro-to-micro causation. Or differently: to 
every causal structure S1 that involves at least one macro-to-micro 
dependency in the sense of non-reductive physicalists there exists a 
causal structure S2 that is only composed of micro-to-micro dependencies 
such that S1 and S2 generate the exact same (IV*)-manipulability 
relations, notwithstanding the fact that they differ in causal respects. That 
is, somebody who subscribes to (M**) and (IV*) and conceives of the 
relationship between macro and micro properties in terms of non-
reductive supervenience renounces one of the core principles behind 
interventionism,   viz.   ‘no   causal   difference   without   a   difference   in  
manipulability  relations’.”  (Ibid:  18-19) 
 
There is a lot going on in this passage, but we can summarise 
Baumgartner’s   argument   as   follows12: because IV*-interventions on mental 
properties are always common causes of the subvenient bases of those mental 
properties, which non-reductive physicalists also take to be causes of the effects 
of mental properties, one could never tell on the basis of an IV*-intervention 
                                                 
12 In keeping with the rest of the discussion in this chapter, I refer to variables M, M*, P and P*, 
rather than variables M1, M2, P1 and P2.  
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whether a mental property, such as M, causes a physical effect, such as P*, since 
the same evidence that is produced by the IV*-intervention on M would 
apparently support either (1) that only P causes P*, or (2) that P* is 
overdetermined by both M and P. Since IV*-interventions provide no evidence 
for mental causation, the definition of interventionism outlined by (M*) and 
(IV*) underdetermines mental causation and is not therefore suitable for the 
purposes of the non-reductive physicalist, who hopes to use interventionism to 
refute  Kim’s   exclusion   problem.  Moreover,   (M*)   and   (IV*)   apparently   violate  
the   interventionist   maxim   ‘no   causal   difference without a difference in 
manipulability   relations’,   since   the   interventionist   claims   that   there   is   a   causal  
difference between each of these causal scenarios, even though there would 
apparently be no difference in manipulability relations between them.  
In order to respond to this argument, some clarification is firstly in order. 
Firstly, is it true that it would be impossible to tell on the basis of an IV*-
intervention, whether M causes P*, or whether only P causes P* (i.e. would it be 
impossible to distinguish between a causal scenario in which M causes P* and 
causal scenario (1))? The answer, quite simply, is ‘no’: according to 
interventionism, if M is not a cause of P* and only P is a cause of P* then there 
would not exist an IV*- intervention on M that changes P*, while there would 
exist some intervention on P that changes P*. As I explained in Chapter 5, this 
happens when the relationship between the mental property and the effect is non-
RIDR and hence non-invariant and non-causal. For example, this occurs in the 
example   of   the   general   psychological   concept   ‘fear’.   See Figure 5.2 from 
Chapter 5 below as an illustration.  
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Figure 5.2: Non-RIDR/Fear   
Solid arrows represent genuine causal relationships. Broken lines represent 
supervenient relationships. Fear systems F1, F2 and F3 represent the different 
realizers   of   the   supervenient   concept   ‘fear’.   B1, B2 and B3 represent different 
behavioural effects.    
  
 As we can see, given that the relationship between the general 
psychological   concept   ‘fear’   and   behavioural effect B1 is not realization 
independent, there would not exist any IV*-intervention   on   ‘fear’   that   changes  
B1, while there would exist some intervention on physical property F1 that 
changes B1; hence only physical property F1 will qualify as a cause of B1.   
On the other hand, if some mental property M is a cause of some physical 
effect P*, then according to interventionism, there will exist some IV*-
intervention on M that changes P*. As I explained in the previous chapter, this 
happens when the relationship between M and P* is realization independent, 
since this ensures that the relationship between M and P* is at least minimally 
invariant and causal and ensures that the relationship between M and P* exhibits 
a distinct level of invariance in comparison to the relationship between P and P* 
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(more on this below). For example, this occurs in the example of the research of 
Andersen et al. See Figure 5.1 from Chapter 5 below as an illustration.  
 
Figure 5.1: RIDR/Intention I1  
Solid arrows represent genuine causal relationships. Broken lines represent 
supervenient relationships.  
 
 As we can see, given that the relationship between mental property I1 and 
physical effect R1 is realization independent, there would exist some IV*-
intervention on I1 that changes R1; hence I1 will qualify as a bona fide cause of 
R1.  
 So, it is simply not true that a causal scenario in which, for example, M 
causes P* would be indistinguishable from a causal scenario in which only P 
causes P* because according to the interventionist, in the latter case there would 
not exist any IV*-intervention on M that changes P*, while there would exist 
some intervention on P that changes P* and in the former case there would exist 
some IV*-intervention on M that changes P*. Or, to put this another way, it is 
not true that a causal scenario in which M causes P* would be indistinguishable 
from a causal scenario in which M is merely epiphenomenal, since according to 
the interventionist (and as demonstrated by the two examples above), there 
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would be a difference in manipulability and hence causal relations between the 
two cases.  
Moreover,  we  can  see  that  Baumgartner’s  worries  about  data  confounding  
in this context are misguided, since it is simply not true that when some IV*-
intervention on M supposedly establishes that M is a cause of P* that this could 
all  be  due   to  P’s  causal   influence  on  P*,  with  M  being  merely  epiphenomenal,  
because, once again, according to the interventionist, if this were the case, there 
would not exist any such IV*-intervention on M that changes P*.  
What about causal scenario (2), in which P* is overdetermined by both M 
and P? Is it true that it would be impossible to tell on the basis of an IV*-
intervention on M, whether M causes P*, or whether both M and P cause P*? As 
we shall see, this question does require more careful treatment, but I will argue 
that it does not lead, as Baumgartner suggests, to an underdetermination of 
mental causation.  
Now, it is true that when an IV*-intervention on some mental property, 
such as intention I1, brings about a change to physical effect R1 and, ex 
hypothesi, establishes that I1 is a cause of R1, the same IV*-intervention will 
cause a change in N11, the physical realizer of I1, and hence will establish that 
N11 is also a cause of R1. In other words, it is true that any IV*-intervention on a 
mental property that establishes that that mental property is a cause of some 
effect will also establish that the physical realizer of that mental property is a 
cause of the effect.  
However, this does not lead to an underdetermination of mental 
causation, but merely reflects a fact that I have emphasised throughout this 
thesis, which is that mental properties and their physical realizers are not 
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metaphysically distinct causes of their effects. In other words, it merely reflects 
that the non-reductive physicalist is committed to the fact that whenever some 
mental property qualifies as a cause of some effect, it is guaranteed (by 
supervenience and causal closure) that the physical realizer of that mental 
property also qualifies as a cause of that effect (i.e. that mental causation entails 
physical causation). (Remember that this would not lead to a problematic form of 
overdetermination, given a supervenience relation between mental properties and 
their physical realizers.)  
Moreover, the interventionist maxim would not be violated in these kinds 
of cases, since there is no difference in manipulability relations between a case in 
which, for example, M causes P* and a case in which both M and P cause P*, 
precisely because there is no causal difference between these two cases. In other 
words, I   suggest   that  Baumgartner’s   initial   question  about  whether   it  would  be  
impossible to distinguish between these two causal scenarios on the basis of an 
IV*-intervention is simply misguided in the context of mental causation, given 
that according to the non-reductive physicalist, there is nothing to distinguish 
between these cases. To conclude from the fact that mental causation entails 
physical causation and from the fact that there is no empirical evidence that 
could distinguish between a case in which M causes P* and a case in which both 
M and P cause P* that mental causation is thereby underdetermined, is simply to 
misunderstand the commitments of non-reductive physicalism.  
However, there is one potential problem with this response and this 
concerns whether what I have said actually undermines the argument that I made 
in Chapter 5, which was that mental properties and their physical realizers can be 
considered as causally distinct, i.e. as causes that cannot be identified, or reduced 
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(thereby upholding the non-reductive  physicalist’s   commitment   to   the   thesis  of  
non-identity). This is because I have accepted that any IV*-intervention on a 
mental property will be a common cause of the physical realizer of that mental 
property and will establish that that physical property is also a cause of that 
effect. However, under these IV*-interventions, mental properties and their 
physical realizers will enter into exactly the same manipulability relations and as 
I have explained, according to interventionism, those properties will therefore be 
considered as the same cause.   
In   other   words,   I   suggest   that   the   problem   that   Baumgartner’s  
underdetermination   argument   highlights   isn’t   that   IV*-interventions always 
establish that the physical realizers of mental properties also qualify as causes of 
their effects, (since I have argued that this is perfectly consistent with and is in 
fact guaranteed given the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism), 
nor is it that the evidence that would be produced when some IV*-intervention 
establishes that some mental property is a cause of some effect is the same 
evidence that would be produced if that mental property were merely 
epiphenomenal, (since I have argued that this is simply not true). Rather, the 
problem is that when some IV*-intervention establishes that some mental 
property is a cause of some physical effect, it looks as though that mental 
property is reducible to its physical realizer13 (i.e. that IV*-interventions do not 
                                                 
13 It  is  worth  noting  that  the  main  target  of  Baumgartner’s  (2010)  paper  is  in  fact Shapiro and 
Sober’s  (2007)  argument  against  epiphenomenalism.  Shapiro  and  Sober  argue  somewhat  
similarly that it is wrong to hold fixed the subvenient bases of supervenient mental properties 
when assessing the causal status of the latter, but go on to argue that it is also wrong to assume 
that mental properties have causal powers in addition to those of their subvenient bases and 
wrong to conclude from the fact that mental properties do not have any such additional causal 
powers that they are thereby epiphenomenal. If what I have said in this chapter is right, Shapiro 
and  Sober’s  argument  would  fail  to  provide  a  satisfactory  non-reductive physicalist solution to 
the exclusion problem, since they accept that the causal powers of mental properties are identical 
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provide any evidence for mental causation). Baumgartner is right that in this 
specific sense (i.e. in the sense that IV*-interventions seem to support the 
conclusion that mental properties are not irreducible causes of their effects, when 
they in fact are), IV*-interventions would underdetermine mental causation and 
would not fit the purposes of the non-reductive physicalist who hopes to use 
interventionism precisely to avoid the threat of reduction.  
How then can the interventionist avoid this problem? In order to prove 
that some mental property M and its physical realizer P are causally distinct (i.e. 
that M and P are causes that cannot be identified or reduced), I suggest that we 
not only consider whether some IV*-intervention on M (and P) changes P*, but 
also consider the outcome of an additional intervention on P, in order to 
determine whether there is a difference in manipulability (i.e. difference in 
degree of invariance) and hence causal relations between the M (and P) to P* 
relationship and the P to P* relationship.  
As the discussion in the previous chapter should have made clear, 
whenever M is a cause of P* (which will occur when the relationship between M 
and P* is realization independent), this additional intervention on P will establish 
that the M (and P) to P* relationship displays a distinct level of invariance in 
comparison to the P to P* relationship and hence would demonstrate that M and 
P are genuinely causally distinct in interventionist terms. As I explained in 
Chapter 5, this is guaranteed given that it is the realization independence of the 
supervenient relationships that mental properties stand in with their effects that 
ensures that mental properties exhibit distinct levels of invariance and hence 
                                                                                                                                    
and hence reducible to those of their physical realizers. This argument is echoed in Shapiro 
(2010, 2011).   
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distinct manipulability and causal relations in relation to their effects. 
(Remember also that I explained that depending on the nature of the realization 
independent dependency relationship between mental properties and their 
physical effects (i.e. depending on whether they are highly realization 
independent or possess only a low degree of realization independence), mental 
properties may exhibit either more or less invariance in relation to their effects in 
comparison to their physical realizers. However, in either case I argued that this 
varying degree of invariance is sufficient to distinguish the causal roles of those 
properties.)  
In other words, whenever any mental property stands in some RIDR 
relationship to some physical effect (and hence qualifies as a cause of that 
effect), it is guaranteed that that mental property and its physical realizer qualify 
as causally distinct. What I have argued in this chapter is that Baumgartner’s  
argument proves that the empirical evidence for such mental causation cannot, 
however, be acquired from single IV*-interventions on mental properties alone, 
but will be acquired from both the IV*-intervention on the mental property and 
the IV-intervention on the physical realizer of that mental property.  
To elucidate these ideas further, we can appeal to the example of 
Andersen et al: in order to determine whether mental property I1 is causally 
distinct from its physical realizer, N11, I suggest that we not only consider 
whether there is some IV*-intervention on I1 (and N11) that changes physical 
effect R1, but also consider the outcome of an additional intervention on N11, in 
order to determine whether there is a difference in manipulability (i.e. difference 
in degree of invariance) and hence causal relations between the I1 and R1 
relationship and the N11 and R1 relationship. Since the relationship between I1 
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and R1 is realization independent, this additional intervention on N11 will 
establish that the I1 (and N11) to R1 relationship displays a distinct (and in this 
case relatively high) level of invariance in comparison to the N11 to R1 
relationship and hence would demonstrate that I1 and N11 are genuinely causally 
distinct in interventionist terms. (As Figure 5.1 above illustrates and as I 
explained in Chapter 5 (Section 5.3.1), the high level of realization independence 
of the relationship between I1 and R1 guarantees that there is a distinct (and in 
this case relatively high) level of invariance between I1 and R1, in comparison to 
the relationship between N11 and R1, because it simply guarantees that there will 
be a wider range of interventions on I1 that change R1 than there are for physical 
property N11.)  
To summarise, although I accept that IV*-interventions on mental 
properties alone cannot distinguish between the causal roles of supervenient and 
subvenient properties, I suggest that the empirical evidence for mental causation 
can be acquired from both the IV*-intervention on the mental property and the 
IV-intervention on the physical realizer of that mental property. By considering 
the outcome of both of these interventions, interventionist mental causation 
would not be underdetermined by the definition of interventionism outlined in 
(M*) and (IV*).   
Moreover, we can   see   that  Woodward’s   argument   about potential data 
confounding that I discussed in the previous section still stands in the sense that 
although, for example, mental property I1 and its physical realizer N11 qualify as 
causally distinct (the evidence for which, I have suggested, is acquired from both 
interventions on I1 (and N11) and N11), given that they are not metaphysically 
distinct and given that I have accepted that supervenient causation entails 
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physical causation (i.e. that whenever I1 is a cause of R1, so is N11), it would be 
wrong to treat N11 as a potential confounder of I1 in the ordinary sense. So long 
as the interventionist considers the outcome of both interventions on I1 (and N11) 
and N11, there is no sense in which N11 could confound the relationship between 
I1 and R1.  
What about the worry that this nonetheless undermines the argument that 
I made in Chapter 5 that it is by intervening directly at the mental level, for 
example, on intention I1 that we often discover highly invariant and hence highly 
useful causal relationships, rather than by intervening directly at the physical 
level, for example on physical realizer N11, given that under any IV*-intervention 
on I1, I1 and N11 (or whatever physical property realizes I1 on some occasion) 
enter into exactly the same manipulability relations with respect to physical 
effect R1?  
In response, I would emphasise that my suggestion is that it is precisely 
I1’s,   not N11’s,   distinct   causal   influence   on   R1 that generates the distinct (and 
high) level of invariance under the common cause IV*-intervention on I1 and N11 
and which ensures that mental property I1 qualifies as a preferable cause of R1, in 
comparison to N11. The fact that the additional intervention on N11 uncovers a 
relatively low invariant relationship between N11 and R1 supports this hypothesis. 
Nothing about the account of mental causation that I outlined in Chapter 5 is 
undermined by the fact that when some IV*-intervention on I1 establishes that I1 
is a cause of physical effect R1 (and establishes that the relationship between I1 
and R1 is highly invariant), the same IV*-intervention on I1 establishes that N11 
also qualifies as a cause of R1, nor is it undermined by the fact that in order to 
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prove that I1 and N11 are causally distinct, we must consider the outcome of an 
additional intervention on N11.  
Finally, it is worth emphasising that far from undermining the account of 
mental causation that I outlined in the previous chapter, this discussion actually 
provides further support for the “metaphysically modest”   (Woodward,   2003:  
121) account of mental causation that I outlined. This is because it emphasises 
that mental properties cannot cause their effects in some metaphysically rich 
sense, for example, via the transfer of some conserved physical quantity, (since 
then Baumgartner would be right to insist that it should be possible to intervene 
on mental properties independently of their subvenient bases)14, but can only 
cause their effects in the “metaphysically modest”  (Ibid) sense that they exhibit a 
distinct level of invariance in relation to their effects, in comparison to their 
physical realizers.  
So, once again, in so far as the target of the exclusion problem, both 
Kim’s   and   Baumgartner’s, is some such metaphysically rich notion of mental 
causation, then both arguments prove that this is ruled out for the non-reductive 
physicalist. However, so long as the non-reductive physicalist is willing to accept 
this “metaphysically modest”  (Ibid) account of mental causation and is willing to 
accept that the empirical evidence for mental causation cannot be acquired from 
IV*-interventions on mental properties alone, her position will not be 
undermined.  
                                                 
14 Shapiro  (2010)  captures  this  point  nicely  in  the  following  passage:  “Thus, the idea that a 
supervening property might contribute causal force in addition to that which its base property 
possesses is at least untestable and, quite possibly, incoherent.”  (Ibid:  601-602) 
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6.4 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I examined two objections put forward by Michael 
Baumgartner against the interventionist account of mental causation and solution 
to the exclusion problem. I began by outlining the first objection put forward by 
Baumgartner (2009) and examined the interventionist response to this objection 
proposed by Woodward   (2011a).   I   demonstrated   that   although   Woodward’s  
solution involved modifying the definition of interventionism that he proposes in 
his (2003), (which I appealed to in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis), it does offer a 
genuine  solution  to  Baumgartner’s a priori interventionist exclusion argument. I 
then argued that by clarifying the metaphysical implications of interventionist 
mental causation and by clarifying the conditions under which we can acquire 
empirical evidence for mental causation, the non-reductive physicalist who hopes 
to use interventionism as a solution to the exclusion problem can avoid 
Baumgartner’s  underdetermination  argument.  Moreover,  I  demonstrated  that  this  
discussion actually provides further support for the “metaphysically modest”  
(Ibid: 121) account of mental causation that I outlined in the previous chapter. It 
is therefore possible to conclude that the interventionist is able to defend her 
position against both of  Baumgartner’s  objections  and  uphold  the  interventionist  
solution to the exclusion problem outlined in the previous chapter.  
Nevertheless, this is not to undermine the significance of Baumgartner’s  
arguments for the interventionist: Baumgartner’s  first  objection  highlighted  that  
interventionists must modify the definition of interventionism outlined in (M) 
and (IV) in order to accommodate cases of supervenient causation. 
Baumgartner’s   second   objection   proved   that   the empirical evidence for mental 
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causation cannot be acquired from IV*-interventions on mental properties alone, 
but that in order to prove that mental properties and their physical realizers are 
causally distinct, we must consider the outcome of additional interventions on the 
physical realizers of those mental properties. However, I hope to have shown that 
so long as the interventionist is willing to make such adjustments, the 
interventionist solution to the exclusion problem that was outlined in the 
previous chapter will not be undermined. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
7.1 Summary 
 
 In   this   thesis,   I   have   argued   that   Woodward’s   (2003, 2008a, 2011a) 
version of interventionism not only provides an account of mental causation that 
avoids   Kim’s   a   priori   exclusion   problem,   but   also   provides   a   genuine   non-
reductive physicalist solution to this problem, since it upholds all of the minimal 
commitments of non-reductive physicalism. In order to demonstrate this, I 
addressed a number of key issues and questions.   
 In Chapter 2, I   began   by   demonstrating   how   Kim’s   a   priori   exclusion  
problem follows from five apparently inconsistent theses of non-reductive 
physicalism, namely  mental causation, non-identity, supervenience, causal 
closure and non-overdetermination. I examined two of these theses in detail, 
namely causal closure and supervenience. I demonstrated that although the thesis 
of causal closure faces the problem of defining what it is to be physical and 
despite having had a complex history, causal closure is a true a posteriori thesis 
that does entail that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. I argued 
that this thesis provides the grounds for physicalism itself and concluded that it is 
therefore a minimal commitment of non-reductive physicalism that cannot be 
rejected in order to overcome the exclusion problem.  
I then examined the thesis of supervenience in detail in order to determine 
exactly which formulation of supervenience the non-reductive physicalist is 
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minimally committed to and what its implications are. I argued that the non-
reductive physicalist is minimally committed to a form of strong supervenience 
that holds with metaphysical necessity across all possible worlds, which implies 
that mental properties are entailed by and dependent on physical properties. After 
addressing some potential problems with this thesis, I argued that it is a minimal 
commitment of non-reductive physicalism that cannot be rejected in order to 
overcome the exclusion problem. I concluded that all five theses are in fact 
minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism that cannot be rejected in 
order to overcome the exclusion problem and that they do appear to a priori lead 
to the exclusion problem.  
In Chapter 3, I examined the assumptions that I take to underlie the 
exclusion problem. I argued that despite its apparent inevitability, the exclusion 
problem only follows a priori from these minimal commitments when they are 
combined with an assumption regarding causation, this being the assumption that 
causation is identical to sufficient production. I began by examining the SP 
concept of causation and demonstrated that Kim makes the assumption of SP. I 
then demonstrated   how   Kim’s   exclusion   problem,   as   it   is   most   commonly  
presented, depends crucially upon this assumption and that without it, the 
minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism do not lead to the a priori 
exclusion of the mental. Finally, I demonstrated that even when Kim 
acknowledges that genuine overdetermination is not possible in the case of 
mental causation, he nonetheless generates the a priori exclusion problem 
because of the assumption of SP.  
At this stage, I had yet to offer a solution to the exclusion problem. This 
is because if it turned out that the assumption of SP was in fact true, the non-
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reductive physicalist would nevertheless be forced to accept the conclusion of the 
exclusion problem. In Chapter 4, I therefore outlined  and  examined  Woodward’s  
version of interventionism and presented an argument that undermined the 
assumption of SP. I began by outlining Woodward’s  version  of   interventionism 
and in particular, examined those features of the theory that would be especially 
relevant to my argument in Chapter 5, in which I presented the interventionist 
account of mental causation as a solution to the exclusion problem. Secondly, I 
highlighted some problems that the SP concept faces and presented 
interventionism as a viable alternative theory of causation that avoids these 
problems, undermining the assumption of SP and thereby demonstrating that the 
non-reductive   physicalist   need   not   accept   Kim’s   a   priori   exclusion   problem.   I  
also addressed the worry that despite the problems that the SP concept faces, 
interventionism fails to provide a viable alternative to this theory and so fails to 
undermine the assumption of SP, since it faces serious problems of its own. I 
argued that not only can interventionism avoid these problems, but that it can 
actually deal with many of these problems in a more satisfying way than the SP 
concept. I concluded that interventionism does, after all, provide a viable 
alternative theory of causation to the SP concept and does undermine the 
assumption of SP, demonstrating that the non-reductive physicalist need not 
accept   Kim’s   a   priori   exclusion   problem. Lastly, I addressed some problems 
concerning the potentially anthropocentric, anti-realist and circular nature of 
interventionist causation, in order to demonstrate that interventionism can 
provide a coherent account of mental causation and satisfactory solution to the 
exclusion problem. 
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In Chapter 5, I   outlined  Woodward’s   interventionist   account   of  mental  
causation and demonstrated that it provides an account of mental causation that 
not only avoids the exclusion problem, but also upholds all of the minimal 
commitments of non-reductive physicalism, thereby providing a successful non-
reductive physicalist solution to the exclusion problem. 
I began by demonstrating that interventionism not only provides an 
account of mental causation by which both mental and physical properties can 
qualify as causes of the same effect, but that when causation is understood in 
interventionist terms, mental properties can actually be considered as preferable 
causes of their effects, in comparison to their subvenient physical realizers 
(when, for example, they are highly realization independent and hence relatively 
invariant and provide the correct contrastive focus). Most importantly, I 
demonstrated that when causation is understood in interventionist terms, the 
question of mental causation becomes an entirely a posteriori, not a priori 
question.  
 I then made explicit how this account of mental causation avoids Kim’s  a  
priori exclusion problem and argued, contra Kim, that although this account is 
“metaphysically  modest”  (Woodward,  2003:  121), it does provide a satisfactory 
account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem. I also 
suggested that it is precisely because this account is   “metaphysically  modest”  
(Ibid) that it is able to uphold all of the minimal commitments of non-reductive 
physicalism and hence provide a viable non-reductive physicalist solution to the 
exclusion problem. Finally, I compared this account to two alternative 
manipulationist accounts of mental causation and argued that since they each 
generate anti-realist conceptions of mental causation, they fail to provide 
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satisfactory accounts of mental causation and solutions to the exclusion problem. 
I   concluded   that   Woodward’s   interventionist   account   of   mental   causation  
therefore provides the only satisfactory non-reductive physicalist account of 
mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I examined two objections put forward by Michael 
Baumgartner (2009, 2010) against the interventionist account of mental causation 
and solution to the exclusion problem. I began by providing an outline and 
analysis   of   Baumgartner’s   first   objection   and   the   response proposed by 
Woodward  (2011a).  I  demonstrated  that  although  Woodward’s  solution  involves 
modifying the definition of interventionism that he proposes in his (2003), 
(which I appealed to in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis), it does offer a genuine 
solution to   Baumgartner’s   a   priori   interventionist   exclusion   argument.   I   then  
argued that by clarifying the metaphysical implications of interventionist mental 
causation and by clarifying the conditions under which we can acquire empirical 
evidence for mental causation,   the   interventionist   can   avoid   Baumgartner’s  
underdetermination argument. In fact, I demonstrated that this discussion 
actually provides further support for the “metaphysically modest”   (Ibid:   121) 
account of mental causation that I outlined in the previous chapter. I concluded 
that both of these objections can be overcome and that it is therefore possible to 
uphold the interventionist solution to the exclusion problem outlined in Chapter 
5.   
 
7.2 Implications for Mental Causation  
 
I have argued that within an interventionist framework it is possible to 
provide an account of mental causation that not only avoids the exclusion 
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problem, but that also upholds all of the minimal commitments of non-reductive 
physicalism, thereby providing a viable non-reductive physicalist solution to the 
exclusion problem. What I also hope to have made clear is that it is precisely 
because this account is  “metaphysically  modest”  (Woodward,  2003:  121) that it 
is able to uphold all of these minimal commitments and hence provide a viable 
non-reductive physicalist solution to the exclusion problem.  
For example, I have demonstrated that this account of mental causation 
provides an account by which supervenient mental properties can count as 
genuine causes of physical effects, in addition to their physical realizers. I 
demonstrated that this account respects the theses of causal closure and non-
overdetermination by guaranteeing that mental properties cannot contribute to or 
interact with the sufficient physical causes of physical effects, or qualify as 
metaphysically distinct sufficient productive causes of those effects. Moreover, I 
demonstrated that this account also upholds causal closure in the sense that it 
remains true that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, even when 
causation is understood in interventionist terms. Lastly, I demonstrated that this 
account nonetheless upholds the theses of non-identity and mental causation, 
since it assigns genuinely distinct causal roles to mental properties, such as 
intentions, beliefs and desires.  
As I hope to have made clear, any metaphysically richer account of 
mental causation is simply ruled out given the minimal commitments of non-
reductive physicalism. For example, as I made clear in Chapters 2 and 3, mental 
properties cannot be thought to exert any force or energy into the physical 
domain to produce or determine their effects, since this would directly violate 
causal closure. Moreover, since overdetermination is not possible given a 
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supervenience relation between the mental and the physical (and since this kind 
of overdetermination would be an implausible model for mental causation in any 
case), mental properties cannot be considered as metaphysically distinct 
sufficient productive causes of their effects. A productive or generative 
conception of mental causation, as captured by the SP concept, for example, is 
therefore ruled out given the minimal commitments of non-reductive physicalism.  
While Kim took this fact to lead to the conclusion of the exclusion 
problem, I argued (in Chapter 3) that the exclusion problem only follows from 
this fact when it is combined with the assumption that causation is identical to 
sufficient production. Interestingly, what this discussion should therefore have 
made clear is that this limitation on mental causation (this being that mental 
properties cannot be thought of as metaphysically distinct sufficient productive 
causes   of   their   effects)   is   not   actually   a   result   of   Kim’s   a   priori   exclusion  
problem, but is in fact a result of the minimal commitments of non-reductive 
physicalism.  
In fact, remember that I suggested that as non-reductive physicalists we 
should not actually be surprised to discover that mental properties cannot be 
thought to cause their effects in this productive, generative sense, but can only be 
considered to produce their effects, or be considered as sufficient causes of those 
effects, in virtue of the fact that they supervene on physical properties. This is 
because it was our commitment to causal closure (which implies that mental 
properties cannot exert any force or energy into the physical domain to produce 
or determine physical effects) and our commitment to the idea that the 
widespread overdetermination of physical effects by two metaphysically distinct, 
sufficient causes would be implausible, that we accepted that the mental must 
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supervene on the physical and hence that we should be physicalists in the first 
place (c.f. the Causal Argument from Chapter 2). This “metaphysically modest” 
(Ibid) account of mental causation may not be satisfactory for some, but I hope to 
have shown that it does nonetheless provide a satisfactory account of mental 
causation and solution to the exclusion problem and that it is in fact the only 
viable account of mental causation and solution to the exclusion problem that we 
can give as serious physicalists. 
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(SS) strong supervenience  
 
(SSmn) strong supervenience that holds with metaphysical necessity across all 
possible worlds 
 
(SP) the sufficient production concept of causation 
 
(EP) the exclusion principle  
 
(M) designates Woodward’s  definition  of   the   interventionist,  or  manipulationist  
concept of causation  
 
(IV) designates the criteria for a suitable intervention  
 
(AC) actual causation  
 
(RIDR) realization independent dependency relation 
 
(MAN)   “There possibly exists an intervention I = zi on X with respect to Y.”  
(Baumgartner, 2009: 167) 
 
(FIX)  “The possible intervention I = zi is such that, while it is performed on X, all 
variables in the pertaining variable set V that are not located on a causal path 
from X to Y are held fixed, i.e. the variables in V that are not located on a causal 
path from X to Y can be held fixed while I = zi is performed on X.”  (Ibid) 
 
(IF)  “a set of variables V satisfies independent fixability of values if and only if 
for each value it is possible for a variable to take individually, it is possible (that 
is,   “possible”   in   terms   of   their   assumed   definitional,   logical,   mathematical,   or  
mereological   relations   or   “metaphysically   possible”)   to   set   the   variable   to   that  
value via an intervention, concurrently with each of the other variables in V also 
being set to any of its individually possible values by  independent  interventions.”  
(Woodward, 2011a: 11-12) 
 
 
 
 
 
